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Nineteen years ago, a New Yorker cartoon depicted a judge proclaiming, 
“Innocence is no excuse.”1 As humorous as it may have been, only a sadist could find 
anything amusing about the extent to which the cartoon reflected, and continues to 
reflect, the reality of U.S. criminal justice in general and capital punishment in particular.  
For most of the nation’s history, innocence was barely a footnote in the dominant 
narrative of criminal justice—exemplified by the distinguished liberal jurist Learned 
Hand’s assertion in 1923 that:  
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic 
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the 
prosecution of crime.2  
Since the advent and advance of DNA forensic technology in the late twentieth 
century,3 the “unreal dream” has given way to a nightmare of unintended consequences—
of which the most thoroughly documented is false convictions.4 As of June 2019, 161 
prisoners sentenced to death under laws enacted after the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down all state death-penalty laws in 19725 had been exonerated based on substantial 
claims of innocence.6 
                                                 
* Executive Director Emeritus, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern 
Pritzker School of Law; Co-founder, National Registry of Exonerations; Co-founder, Injustice Watch, a 
Chicago-based investigative journalism project focusing on criminal justice reform. 
** Reporter, Injustice Watch.  Seasly received a BA in Journalism from Indiana University in 2011 and an 
MS in Journalism from Northwestern University in 2014. 
1 J.B. Handelsman, Innocence Is No Excuse, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21, 2000, at 142. 
2 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
3 See WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENT 2 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“The first use of DNA technology to free an innocent defendant 
in the United States occurred in 1989.”). 
4 Since the advent of the DNA forensic age, more than 2,400 false convictions have been documented. 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last 
visited May 23, 2019).  
5 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
6 Innocence Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence (last visited 
June 6, 2019). The list includes the names of 165 exonerated persons, but four were convicted under pre-
1972 laws. Id.  
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A second—worse—unintended consequence of capital punishment is the execution 
of the falsely accused and convicted, an inevitability that has been acknowledged 
officially in only three cases, involving four defendants, whose executions long predate 
the current laws,7 while a greater number of likely mistaken executions has not been 
acknowledged.8 A third unintended consequence is botched executions, of which history 
is replete with examples.9 Scholarly research suggests that upwards of three percent of all 
executions in the United States between 1890 and 2010 were botched.10  
But there is a fourth unintended consequence: cases of unrequited innocence, in 
which convicted men and women sentenced to death have not been exonerated despite 
compelling evidence of innocence.11 Capital cases in the fourth category are the focus of 
this Article, which does not purport to be a definitive study but rather a compilation of 
anecdotal evidence of the lengths to which the criminal justice system sometimes goes to 
avoid acknowledging the error of its ways. Although it is impossible to determine 
innocence or guilt in any case beyond doubt, we believe that the twenty-four cases 
                                                 
7 William Jackson Marion was hanged in Nebraska in 1887 and received a full pardon in 1987. In the 
Matter of a Posthumous Pardon for William Jackson Marion, Mar. 25, 1987 (granted by Neb. Gov. Robert 
Kerrey on the 100th anniversary of Marion’s hanging) (on file with authors). Thomas and Meeks Griffin 
were electrocuted in South Carolina in 1913 and received full pardons in 2009. Leonard Green, Race Prof 
Clears 2 in ‘13 Slay, N.Y. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, at 8. Joe Arridy died in the Colorado gas chamber in 1939 
and received a full pardon in 2011. Press Release, Office of Gov. Bill Ritter Jr., Gov. Ritter Grants 
Posthumous Pardon in Case Dating Back to 1930s (Jan. 7, 2011), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ArridyPardon.pdf. 
8 See Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long, Inglorious 
Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 249 (2018) (entry dated May 10, 
1984) (James Adams, Fla.); id. at 249–50 (entry dated Sept. 10, 1984) (Timothy George Baldwin, La.); id. 
at 254 (entry dated May 20, 1987) (Edward Earl Johnson, Miss.); id. at 255 (entry dated Mar. 15, 1988) 
(Willie Jasper Darden, Fla.); id. at 256 (entry dated Dec. 7, 1989) (Carlos DeLuna, Tex.); id. at 257 (entry 
dated May 4, 1990) (Jesse Joseph Tafero, Fla.); id. at 259 (entry dated May 12, 1993) (Lionel Torres 
Herrera, Tex.); id. at 260–61 (entry dated Aug. 24, 1993) (Ruben M. Cantu, Tex.); id. at 263 (entry dated 
May 17, 1995) (Girvies Davis, Ill.); id. at 264–65 (entry dated June 21, 1995) (Larry Griffin, Mo.); id. at 
267 (entry dated July 23, 1997) (Joseph Roger O’Dell III, Va.); id. at 267–68 (entry dated Apr. 3, 1997) 
(David Wayne Spence, Tex.); id. at 270–71 (entry dated Mar. 10, 1999) (Roy Michael Roberts, Mo.); id. at 
273 (entry dated June 22, 2000) (Shaka Sankofa, Tex.); id. at 278 (entry dated Feb. 17, 2004) (Cameron 
Todd Willingham, Tex.); id. at 288 (entry dated Sept. 21, 2011) (Troy Anthony Davis, Ga.).  
9 Recent examples are the executions of Dennis McGuire in Ohio in 2014, Erica Goode, After a Prolonged 
Execution, Questions over ‘Cruel and Unusual’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A12, Clayton D. Lockett in 
Oklahoma in 2014, Mark Berman, Inmate Dies Following Botched Oklahoma Execution, Second Execution 
Delayed, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/04/29/oklahoma-execution-botched-inmate-still-dies-second-execution-
delayed/?utm_term=.351f0c80f41b, and seventy-two-year-old Brandon Astor Jones in Georgia in 2016, 
Georgia Executes Its Oldest Death Row Inmate at 72, TIMES & TRANSCRIPT (New Brunswick), Feb. 4, 
2016, at B6. 
10 Of 8,776 U.S. executions from 1890 through 2010, 276 were botched. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME 
SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 179–210 (2014). 
11 We have adopted the National Registry of Exoneration’s definition of “exoneration”—that a convicted 
person has been “relieved of all legal consequences of [his or her] conviction through a decision by a 
prosecutor, a governor or a court, after new evidence of his or her innocence was discovered.” SAMUEL R. 
GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1989–2012, at 6 (2012), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf. 
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profiled in this Article, involving twenty-five condemned men and women, 12  are 
sufficient to establish that unrequited innocence is a real and serious problem.  
The criteria for inclusion among our profiles are simply that the prisoner was 
sentenced to death more than fifteen years ago—a limit we set on the theory that the 
records of more recent cases are unlikely to be sufficiently developed to enable 
meaningful profiling—and that he or she has not been exonerated despite affirmative 
evidence of innocence. Eleven of the defendants in the profiled cases remain on death 
row.13 Three died while still under death sentences.14 Five received sentence reductions 
but remained in prison.15 Six were released but not exonerated.16  
The profiles are presented in chronological order by the date of the crime rather 
than on the strength of the facts supporting the likelihood that the conviction was false. 
Following the profiles, we discuss what might be done to address the problems posed by 
the profiled cases. 
PROFILES IN UNREQUITED INNOCENCE 
1. Sonia Jacobs—Florida 
Phillip Black, a Florida state trooper, and Donald Irwin, a Canadian constable who 
was visiting Black, were shot to death at an Interstate 95 rest stop in Broward County on 
February 20, 1976.17  Sonia “Sunny” Jacobs, a mother of two, was convicted of the 
crime.18 Her jury recommended a life sentence, but the judge—M. Daniel Futch, Jr., 
known as “Maximum Dan”19—sentenced her to death.20  A month earlier, Futch had 
                                                 
12 One of the profiled cases involves two condemned men. See infra profile No. 7 (Thomas Jesse Ward & 
Karl Allen Fontenot, Okla.). 
13 Infra profile Nos. 2 (Jonathan Bruce Reed, Tex.), 6 (Kevin Cooper, Cal.), 8 (Jarvis Jay Masters, Cal.), 11 
(Walter Ogrod, Pa.), 14 (Tyrone Lee Noling, Ohio), 16 (Eddie Lee Howard Jr., Miss.), 18 (Rodney Reed, 
Tex.), 19 (Darlie Lynn Routier, Tex.), 21 (Marcellus S. Willams, Mo.), 22 (Larry Ray Swearingen, Tex.), 
24 (Robert Leslie Roberson III, Tex.). The chance that Cooper and Masters will be executed decreased on 
March 13, 2019, when California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a moratorium on executions. A Pause 
for California’s Death Row (editorial), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2019, at A24. 
14 Infra profile Nos. 9 (Ralph International Thomas, Cal.), 12 (Anibal Garcia Rousseau, Tex.), 13 (Dennis 
Harold Lawley, Cal.). 
15 Infra profile Nos. 5 (John George Spirko Jr., Ohio), 7 (Karl Allen Fontenot & Thomas Jesse Ward), 15 
(David Ronald Chandler, Ala. (federal)), 23 (Kimber Edwards, Mo.). 
16 Infra profile Nos. 1 (Sonia Jacobs, Fla.), 4 (Edward Lee Elmore, S.C.), 10 (Ha’im Al Matin Sharif, 
Nev.), 17 (Damien Wayne Echols, Ark.), 20 (Corey Dewayne Williams, La.). To avoid remaining behind 
bars pending court-ordered retrials, four of these defendants—all except Williams—pleaded guilty while 
professing innocence, as authorized under the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970) (affirming acceptance of a plea from Henry C. Alford, who had told the trial court 
“I’m not guilty but I plead guilty”). While a petition for certiorari for Williams was pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the prosecution and defense filed a joint motion in the trial court to vacate his conviction, 
with the understanding that he would plead guilty to lesser charges in exchange for immediate freedom. 
The trial judge granted the motion and Williams was released. See infra notes 809–11 and accompanying 
text.  
17 Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam). 
18 Id.  
19 Mike Clary, Judge M.D. Futch, ‘Maximum Dan’, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2009-04-14-0904130494-story.html.  
20 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715. In Florida, notwithstanding a jury recommendation of a life sentence, a trial 
judge may impose a death sentence. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2017).  
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sentenced Jesse Joseph Tafero, father of the younger of Jacobs’s children,21 to death for 
the same crime.22 
Jacobs, her children, Tafero, and Walter Norman Rhodes, Jr. had been asleep in a 
Chevrolet Camero at the rest stop when Black and Irwin approached the car and, within 
minutes, were shot to death.23 Rhodes would attribute the murders to Jacobs and Tafero.24 
Jacobs claimed that she did not see what happened and denied firing any shots.25 Tafero 
said that Rhodes killed the officers.26 Two truck drivers who saw the murders could not 
discern who fired the shots, although they did see Rhodes standing in front of the car, and 
one of the truckers thought the initial shots came from the back seat—which, if correct, 
would indicate that Jacobs had fired them. 27  However, gunshot residue on Rhodes’s 
hands indicated that he probably had fired all of the shots.28  
Despite the conflicting evidence, the prosecution made a deal with Rhodes under 
which he would plead guilty to second-degree murder and receive a life sentence in 
exchange for testifying against Jacobs and Tafero.29 At both trials, Rhodes testified that 
the officers ordered him out of the car and, while his back was to the car and his hands 
were raised, he heard a shot, turned and saw Jacobs, in the rear seat, holding a nine-
millimeter handgun,30 which Tafero took from her and with which he shot the officers.31 
At the Jacobs trial, her former cellmate, Brenda Isham, testified that Jacobs had admitted 
shooting the officers.32 The prosecution also introduced several ostensibly incriminating 
statements police attributed to Jacobs—including allegedly answering, “We had to,” 
when asked, “Do you like shooting troopers?”33 
While Jacobs’s appeal was pending, her counsel discovered that the lead 
prosecutor, Broward County Assistant State Attorney Michael J. Satz, had suppressed a 
memo saying that Rhodes had told a polygraph examiner that “he could not be sure 
                                                 
21 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715 n.2. 
22 Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355, 358–59 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).  
23 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715. 
24 Id. at 716. 
25 Email message from Christie E. Webb, appellate attorney for Jacobs, to Rob Warden. (Jan. 2, 2018, 
19:08 CST PM) (on file with authors). 
26 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 716. 
27 Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1289 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992). 
28 See FLA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, GUNPOWDER RESIDUE/NEUTRON ACTIVATION 
ANALYSIS, REP. NO. 760250979, 1–2 (1976) (on file with authors) (reporting that residue on Rhodes’s 
hands was “consistent with the subject having discharged a weapon,” while residue on Jacobs’s hands was 
indicative only of her “having handled an unclean or recently discharged weapon” and that residue on 
Tafero’s hands was indicative of him “having handled an unclean or recently discharged weapon, or 
possibly discharging a weapon.”). These findings are consistent with Tafero’s claim that Rhodes handed 
him the gun after firing it. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
29 Singletary, 952 F.2d at 1285–88; Tafero v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam); Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715.  
30 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 715. 
31 Id. 
32 Singletary, 952 F.2d at 1286. A 2005 study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions found that testimony 
of witnesses with incentives to lie—“snitches,” in the vernacular—had been instrumental in fifty-one of 
111 capital cases (45.9%) in which the defendants had been exonerated after capital punishment was 
resumed in the 1970’s. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: 
HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 
(2005), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf. 
33 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 717. 
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whether or not Jacobs had fired at all.”34 In light of the contradiction between the memo 
and Rhodes’s trial testimony, the Florida Supreme Court put the appeal on hold, directing 
Judge Futch to determine whether suppression of the memo had violated Jacobs’s 
rights..35 
Citing other prior inconsistent statements by Rhodes that the prosecution had 
provided to the defense, Judge Futch held that, when Rhodes’s trial testimony “was 
viewed in its entirety,” withholding the memo had not been prejudicial.36 In 1981, the 
Florida Supreme Court agreed, affirming Jacobs’s conviction, but remanding her case for 
resentencing—holding that Futch had lacked sufficient basis to override the jury’s 
recommendation of a life sentence. 37  Futch thereupon resentenced Jacobs to life. 38 
Rhodes, meanwhile, had signed an affidavit recanting his trial testimony “in the interest 
of justice and to purge myself before my creator”39 and stating that moments after getting 
out of the Camaro with a gun concealed under his shirt:  
I fired a shot into the left side of his chest. The bullet went through him 
and hit the chrome windshield molding of the patrol car. I fired four more 
shots through his head and various parts of his body . . . As I swiveled to 
the left, I observed Constable Irwin attempting to grap [sic] the service 
revolver from Patrolman Black's grip. Thus I fired twice through his 
head.40 
The affidavit continued that Assistant State Attorney Satz had “coerced, threatened, 
and cajoled” him to falsely attribute the murders to Tafero and Jacobs.41  
 In 1982, after Tafero had lost his appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,42 Rhodes 
stated in another affidavit that he had been “the triggerman” and that “neither Tafero nor 
[Jacobs] participated in the shooting and had no prior knowledge that such would 
occur.” 43  Rhodes mailed the second affidavit to Satz 44  and, days later, in a sworn 
statement taken by an attorney for Tafero, again stated that he alone killed the officers.45 
Asked to explain why he had recanted his trial testimony, Rhodes replied:  
                                                 
34 Jacobs v. State, 357 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); see also Memorandum from Carl Lord, 
polygraph examiner, to Assistant State Attorney Michael J. Satz (Apr. 6, 1976) (on file with authors). 
35 Jacobs, 357 So. 2d at 171; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). 
36 Jacobs, 396 So. 2d at 716. Rhodes had not testified that he saw Jacobs fire a shot, but rather that he had 
heard a shot and then saw Jacobs hand the gun to Tafero. Id. 
37 Id. at 718. 
38 Brief for Appellant at 3, Jacobs v. Dugger, No. 90-5293 (11th Cir. 1990) (on file with authors). 
39 Affidavit of Walter Norman Rhodes at 1, (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file with authors).  
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam). 
43 Affidavit of Walter Norman Rhodes Jr., mailed to Broward County Assistant State Attorney Michael J. 
Satz (Sept. 6, 1982) (on file with authors).  
44 Id. 
45 Sworn Statement of Walter Norman Rhodes at 9, 14 (taken by Elizabeth J. Du Fresne, Union Corr. Inst., 
Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with authors). 
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It’s very simple. Ever since this thing happened, I felt extremely—I hate to 
use the word, but I felt extremely guilty. . . . I felt guilty afterwards, after 
coming to prison, and knowing that I put two people . . . on death row, for 
something they didn’t do, and I did.46 
Eventually, Rhodes recanted his recantations—claiming that they had been 
motivated variously by pressure from fellow prisoners, by promises of sex, and by 
substantial sums of money offered by a Tafero emissary47—but the Florida Supreme 
Court denied an evidentiary hearing Tafero sought regarding the recantations.48 Tafero 
sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, which also was denied,49 and, on May 4, 1990, he 
was executed—suffering a macabre death in “Old Sparky,” as the Florida electric chair 
was known, convulsing as flames poured from his head.50  
In Jacobs’s case, Brenda Isham, who had testified at Jacobs’s trial that she had 
confessed to her, recanted, claiming—reminiscent of Rhodes’s recantations—that 
prosecutors had pressured her into lying. 51  Isham initially had told the authorities—
contrary to her trial testimony—only that she had heard “jailhouse gossip” to the effect 
that Jacobs had confessed—but the initial statement had not been disclosed to the 
defense.52 
As evidence of Jacobs’s innocence mounted, Micki Dickoff, a Los Angeles 
filmmaker, initiated correspondence with her; the two had been inseparable friends in 
their pre-teens living near each other on Long Island, New York, in the 1950s.53 After 
                                                 
46 Id. at 9. For a discussion of how courts and prosecutors often dismiss recantations as invalid, even though 
they often eventually prove valid, see Rob Warden, Reflecting on Recantations, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 106 (Daniel 
S. Medwed ed., 2017) (“One lesson of the DNA forensic age is that recantations of trial testimony by 
prosecution witnesses deserve to be taken seriously, notwithstanding time-honored dicta to the contrary. 
Unfortunately, the lesson seems to have been lost on some prosecutors and judges.”). 
47 Lane Kelley, Threats, Bribes Changed Testimony, Inmate Says, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 3, 
1992, at 3B (quoting Rhodes as saying that he had recanted in light of “subtle pressure” from prisoners, 
leading him to fear for his life, and in light of a visit from a since-deceased female Tafero emissary who 
“was willing to do anything to get me to change my testimony”). 
48 See Tafero v. State, 440 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1983) (a 3–2 decision, in which the justices in the majority did 
not explain their rationale, while dissenting Justices Ben F. Overton and Joseph A. Boyd Jr. contended 
“that whenever the asserted recanted testimony was a critical feature of the trial there must be an 
evidentiary hearing”). In 1984, at a post-conviction hearing in Tafero’s case, Rhodes recanted his 
recantation. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 30 n.28. In 1992, Rhodes would testify that he had 
falsely recanted his original testimony because he had been threatened by fellow prisoners and because a 
woman attorney, since deceased, had offered him money and sexual favors. Kelley, supra note 47. 
49 Tafero v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
50 Barry Bearak, Dispute over Fiery Death Idles Florida Electric Chair, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at 15; 
Rene Stutzman, Convicted Cop-Killer Executed, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 4, 1990, 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/05/04/Convicted-cop-killer-executed/2009641793600/. Botched 
executions prompted Florida to abandon the electric chair in favor of lethal injection in 2000. Leslie Clark, 
Lethal Injection Approved, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17, 2000, at B1. For background on the Florida electric 
chair, see Sydney P. Freedberg, The Story of Old Sparky, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1999, at 6A. 
51 Brief of Appellant, supra note 38, at 2–3.  
52 Id. at 17–19. 
53 Peter Marks, Inseparable Sunny Jacobs and Micki Dickoff Were Decades and Worlds Apart When 
Murder, a Death Sentence and the Essence of Friendship Brought Them Back Together, NEWSDAY (Long 
Island), Sept. 8, 1992, at 44.  
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meeting with Jacobs and looking into the evidence, Dickoff became persuaded of her 
childhood friend’s innocence—and of Tafero’s as well.54 Dickoff, with the help of her 
lawyer, Christie E. Webb, provided an analysis for a U.S. Court of Appeals brief 
attacking the last vestige of seemingly credible evidence against Jacobs—the truck 
drivers’ testimony, which the prosecution had construed as corroboration of Rhodes’s 
trial testimony.55 Dickoff and Webb demonstrated that, when the shots were fired, the 
view of one of the truckers had been obstructed as the other trucker’s rig passed between 
him and the murder scene, while the latter’s view shifted from his right window to his 
rearview mirror.56 Consequently, the truckers’ trial testimony, contrary to the contention 
of the prosecution, had been consistent with the defense theory that Rhodes alone had 
shot the officers.57 
In February 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed Jacobs’s conviction and remanded 
her case for retrial, holding that the trial court had erred in admitting her alleged 
statements to police into evidence, and that the prosecution had improperly suppressed 
the polygraph examiner’s exculpatory memo and Isham’s initial statement that she 
merely had heard gossip to the effect that Jacobs had confessed.58 
Jacobs sought release on bond, which was denied.59 In October 1992, eight months 
after prevailing in the Court of Appeals, Jacobs—facing at least several months behind 
bars pending retrial, and perhaps reconviction, albeit unlikely—agreed to enter a plea 
without admitting guilt to two counts of second-degree murder under a procedure 
authorized by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in North Carolina v. Alford.60 Upon her 
guilty-but-not-guilty plea, she was sentenced to time served and released.61  
In 2011, at age sixty-four, Jacobs married seventy-three-year-old Peter Pringle, 
who had been sentenced to death in Ireland for the murder of two police officers in 
County Roscommon—a crime for which he had been exonerated in 1995 after fifteen 
years in prison.62 They launched the Sunny Center, a not-for-profit organization that 
operates a sanctuary in Ireland for the wrongfully convicted.63 But she remains legally 
                                                 
54 Id.  
55 Reply Brief of Appellant at 6–17, Jacobs v. Dugger, No. 90-5293 (11th Cir. 1990) (on file with authors). 
56 Id. at 5, 14–17. 
57 Id. 
58 Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1286, 1287–89, 1296 (11th Cir. 1992).  
59 Kelley Lane, Convicted Killer Fights for Release, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), July 20, 1992, at 1B. 
60 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 29–39 (1970); Peter Marks, I’m Free, I’m Free, I’m Free! Serving 
Life in Murders, She’s Released—with Friend’s Aid, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Oct. 13, 1992, at 5; see also 
IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE (ABC 1996), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlpNI7cDEMk, a dramatization 
based on the Jacobs–Dickoff relationship that aired as an ABC “Movie of the Week” in 1996. For concise 
information on the advent of Alford pleas, see John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: 
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 171–73 (2014); see also 
Megan Rose & ProPublica, The Deal Prosecutors Offer When They Have No Cards Left to Play, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/what-does-an-innocent-man-have-to-
do-to-go-free-plead-guilty/539001/. 
61 Marks, supra note 60. 
62 Vincent M. Mallozzi, Sunny Jacobs and Peter Pringle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at ST15; Frances 
Mulraney, ‘Death Row’ Couple Helps Others, IRISH VOICE (N.Y.), Jan. 4, 2017, at 7. 
63 Vincent M. Mallozzi, Both Were Once on Death Row, Now They Share a Life Helping Others, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2019, at ST11; see also THE SUNNY CTR., http://www.thesunnycenter.com/. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                                                              [2019 
382 
guilty as a result of the plea that she entered in a context that amounts to a modern form 
of torture.64 
2. Jonathan Bruce Reed—Texas 
Wanda Jean Wadle, a twenty-six-year-old Braniff Airlines flight attendant, was 
fatally assaulted in her Dallas, Texas, apartment in the early afternoon of November 1, 
1978.65 Her roommate and fellow flight attendant, Kimberly Pursley, arrived during the 
attack and heard a man call out from the bedroom, “Don’t come in here. Stay out 
there”—to which Pursley replied, “Don’t worry, I won’t come in.”66  
When the man emerged from the bedroom, he said he was from maintenance and 
was there to check the air-conditioning filter, but he then bound and gagged Pursley until 
she feigned unconsciousness, whereupon he left, robbing her of twenty dollars.67 After 
freeing herself, Pursley ran outside, encountering a neighbor a nurse, who with her 
roommate nurse, went into the apartment and found Wadle on her bedroom floor, nude 
from the waist down, blood oozing from her mouth, a plastic bag and belt around her 
neck, and her hands bound with a telephone cord. 68  Pursley summoned emergency 
personnel, who found Wadle still breathing and rushed her to a hospital, where she died 
nine days later.69  
Pursley described the attacker as white, twenty-five to twenty-eight years old, with 
medium-length, curly, thinning blond hair, a little more than six feet tall, and weighing 
about 180 pounds.70 After reading a newspaper account of the attack, Micki Green, a 
legal secretary who lived in the same apartment complex, reported that a man with wavy 
blond hair had knocked on her door the afternoon of the attack, identified himself as a 
maintenance man, and asked if anyone had been by to check her air filter.71 Green told 
the man that she did not know if anyone had been there because she had not been home, 
whereupon the man left, telling her that he would return to check the filter.72 
From the descriptions provided by Green and Pursley, an artist prepared a 
composite sketch, which was pinned to the visor of a squad car into which twenty-four-
year-old Jonathan Bruce Reed happened to be placed a few weeks later when he was 
                                                 
64 See Toni Schlesinger, Plea Bargaining Is Torture, CHI. LAW., Dec. 1978, at 1 (quoting University of 
Chicago Law Professor John H. Langbein on “the parallels in function between torture and plea 
bargaining”).  
65 Reed v. Dretke, No. 3:99-CV-0207-N, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *3, *6 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 
2005), rev’d sub nom Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009); SW. INST. OF FORENSIC SCI., 
AUTOPSY REPORT, CASE NO. 2663-78-1241 (1978) (on file with authors). Wadle was born September 17, 
1952. Wanda Jean Wadle, FIND A GRAVE (Oct. 11, 2008), 
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/30504443/wanda-jean-wadle (last visited May 23, 2019).  
66 Quarterman, 555 F.3d at 365; Dretke, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *3. 
67 Dretke, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15019, at *4–5. 
68 Id. at *5; see also State’s Brief at 6–7, Reed v. Texas, No. 05-11-01495-CR (Tex. App. 2013). 
69 State’s Brief, supra note 68, at 9. 
70 Appellant’s Opening Brief at *18, Reed v. Texas, No. F81-01988-K (Tex. App. 2012).  
71 Id. at *8–9.  
72 Id. at *8. 
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arrested in connection with an unrelated sexual assault.73 Noticing that Reed resembled 
the man depicted in the sketch, the arresting officer exclaimed, “Hey, that’s you.”74 
Within hours, Reed was identified in police lineups by Green, Pursley, and Green’s 
neighbor Phil Hardin, who had seen a man with a clipboard in the area around the time of 
the crime.75 Based on the identifications, Reed was arrested for Wadle’s murder.76 
No physical evidence linked him to the crime.77 In fact, he was excluded as the 
source of fingerprints on items that Pursley believed the killer had touched—two drinking 
glasses, a cold-water tap, a telephone, and the front door knob.78 Reed also had what 
seemed to be a well-corroborated alibi: His father would testify that at midday on the day 
of the attack, he called Reed at his part-time job at Diamond Motors—an eighteen-minute 
drive from the crime scene—and arranged for him to drive a family friend to Fort Worth. 
Reed agreed and left promptly for his parents’ home, where he arrived shortly after 1:00 
P.M., having stopped to buy gasoline, for which he had a credit card receipt.79 A young 
woman visiting next door fixed the time of his arrival by the airing of a television show.80 
Later, from Fort Worth, Reed made two long-distance telephone calls, documented by 
receipts, to Diamond Motors, his part-time place of employment.81 
Despite the fingerprint exclusion and alibi, the jury convicted Reed solely on the 
testimony of Pursley, Green, and Hardin.82 The trial judge ordered a new trial for an 
unspecified reason,83 but Reed again was convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 after 
his second jury trial at which, in addition to the eyewitnesses, the prosecution called 
William S. McLean, Jr., Reed’s former cellmate, who testified that Reed had confessed to 
the crime.84 The prosecution told the jury that Reed confided details of the crime that 
only the killer would know—including that Wadle had a tampon in place during the 
                                                 
73 Id. at *10, *34–36; see also State’s Brief, supra note 68, at *11. Reed was born on October 19, 1951. 
Death Row Information: Offenders on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., 
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_offenders_on_dr.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2019). The National 
Registry of Exonerations summarizes seven murder cases in which false convictions occurred after the 
advent of DNA technology in 1989. The cases are those of Kirk Bloodsworth (Md.), Jeffrey Cox (Va.), 
Cory Epps (N.Y.), Andre Haygood (Tex.) Anthony Hinton (Ala.), Frank Lee Smith (Fla.), and Paul Terry 
(Ill.) NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
74 State’s Brief, supra note 68, at *11. 
75 Id. at *10, *12 
76 Id. at *12.  
77 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *39, *75, *77. 
78 Id. at 75; see also FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATES REPORT 3 (2011) (on file with authors). The source of 
the prints might have been identified years later when the national Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System became available, but the state had lost the original fingerprint cards. Appellant’s Opening Brief, 
supra note 70, at *7 n.8. 
79 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *3. 
80 Id. at *5–6. 
81 Id. at *4. 
82 Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2009). Micki Flanagan Green is referred to in some 
documents as “Green” and in others as “Flanagan.” 
83 State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot, 352 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Although the reason for 
granting the new trial was not stated, it appeared that jury selection had violated Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 
38 (1980), in which the Supreme Court addressed the application of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
(1968), to Texas’s death-penalty statute. Email message from Robert C. Owen, appellate attorney for Reed, 
to Rob Warden. (Feb. 23, 2018, 18:16 CST) [hereinafter Owen E-mail] (on file with authors). 
84 Petitioner-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 12, 27–28, Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 
2009) (No. 05-70046). 
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attack.85 In fact, the tampon had been inserted days later when Wadle began menstruating 
at the hospital.86 Although prosecutors denied that McLean had been promised anything 
in exchange for his testimony, McLean would complain to them in writing that “you have 
brockin [sic] your ple [sic] bargin [sic] with me.”87 
In 2009, after protracted federal habeas corpus proceedings, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit awarded Reed a third trial, holding that there had been racial 
discrimination in selection of the jury for his second trial.88 The Fifth Circuit, however, 
did not reach other issues, such as McLean’s false testimony, who fed McLean the false 
information about the tampon, and whether McLean had been promised anything in 
return for helping send Reed back to death row.89 
At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented testimony of the victim of the sexual 
assault for which Reed had been arrested the month after the Wadle attack and of a self-
professed accomplice in a burglary in which Reed allegedly pretended to be checking an 
air filter.90 Reed was convicted for the third time in 201191—by which time DNA testing 
had excluded him as the source of trace amounts of seminal material recovered from her 
pubic area.92 This time, the prosecution did not seek the death penalty and Reed was 
sentenced to life in prison.93  
After the third conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, 94  post-conviction 
proceedings were held in abeyance pending possible further DNA testing 95—which, 
thanks to a recent advance in amplification technology, could make it possible to identify 
someone other than Reed as Wadle’s killer.96 Failing that, Reed in all likelihood will 
remain in prison for life, despite his exclusion as the source both of fingerprints on the 
                                                 
85 Id. at 28. 
86 Id. at 28–29. 
87 Id. at 9, 24–27. 
88 Quarterman, 555 F.3d at 365. Of more than 2,200 documented state and federal false convictions since 
1989, approximately 7% involved jailhouse-informant testimony. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
supra note 4. 
89 State ex rel. Watkins v. Creuzot, 352 S.W.3d 493, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Not reaching these 
additional issues was in accord with the so-called “narrowest grounds” rule. See Ryan C. Williams, 
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 804 (2017). 
90 Reed v. State, No. 05-11-01495-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *2–3 (Tex. App. Aug. 20, 2013); 
Owen E-mail, supra note 83. 
91 Reed, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *1. 
92 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 70, at *6, 7 n.9. The seminal material apparently resulted not from 
ejaculation but rather had been transferred from the attacker’s groin. While the sample was sufficient to 
exclude Reed, it was insufficient to submit to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to identify its 
possible source. E-mail from Edward T. Blake, forensic analyst for Reed, to author (Apr. 19, 2018, 15:44 
CDT) [hereinafter Blake E-mail] (on file with authors). 
93 Reed, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10489, at *1. 
94 Id. at *14; see also Ex parte Reed, No. WR-38,174-03, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub LEXIS 694, at *1 
(July 27, 2016); In re Reed, No. PD-1663-13, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 222, at *1 (Feb. 12, 2014). 
95 Reed, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub LEXIS 694, at *1. 
96 Blake E-mail, supra note 92. For an overview of the amplification technology, known as MiniFiler, see 
AmpFLSTR MiniFiler PCR Amplification Kit, THERMOFISHER, 
https://www.thermofisher.com/us/en/home/industrial/human-identification/ampflstr-minifiler-pcr-
amplification-kit.html (last visited May 23, 2019). 
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items recovered at the crime scene and seminal material recovered from the victim, and 
his corroborated alibi for the time of the crime.97 
3. Robert M. Kubat—Illinois 
 On the morning of November 2, 1979, sixty-three-year-old Lydia C. Hyde was 
abducted from a tavern where she worked near Kenosha, Wisconsin, brought across the 
state line into Lake County, Illinois, and shot to death on the shoulder of U.S. Route 41 
about a mile south of the Wisconsin state line.98 On June 19, 1980, Robert M. Kubat, a 
forty-five-year-old truck driver from Lyons, Illinois, was sentenced to death for the 
crime.99 
 The principal witness against Kubat was his former wife, Carolyn Sue Quick, 
who surrendered to law enforcement officials in South Bend, Indiana, three weeks after 
the crime and portrayed herself as Kubat’s unwilling accomplice.100 Quick, then forty-
one, was charged with aggravated kidnapping, but the charge was dropped in exchange 
for her testimony against her ex-husband.101  
The defense portrayed Quick as a jealous and vindictive woman—she admitted on 
the witness stand that she once had threatened to kill Kubat102—and contended that Kubat 
had spent the night of November 1 and all of November 2, 1979, in the Chicago area with 
his girlfriend, Francine Bejda.103 Kubat and Bejda had picked up a rent-assistance check 
on November 2 and cashed it that afternoon at a Chicago tavern, according to the 
defense.104 The check, dated November 2, was entered into evidence, but the defense 
failed to rule out the possibility raised by the prosecution that it could have been cashed 
later.105 
Three witnesses from one of the Kenosha area bars that Quick testified she and 
Kubat had visited before abducting Hyde identified him in court as the man who had 
been with her, although the identifications were tainted because they initially were made 
from a photographic spread in which Kubat’s photograph was distinctive. 106  Two 
witnesses from the bar where the abduction occurred, but who had not seen the abduction 
itself, described the getaway vehicle not as the white Chevrolet station wagon that Quick 
claimed had been used in the crime, but as a gray Chevrolet Monte Carlo.107  
The only physical evidence purporting to link Kubat to the crime was hair 
recovered from the front seat of his station wagon that a state forensic scientist testified 
                                                 
97 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, Reed v. State, No. 05-11-01495-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 11, 2013) (on file with 
authors). 
98 Lynn Emmerman, Waitress Seized, Slain in Robbery, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1979, at 7. 
99 Lyons Man Is Sentenced to Die in Waitress’ Slaying, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 1980, at D6 [hereinafter Lyons 
Man]. 
100 People v. Kubat, 447 N.E.2d 247, 256–57 (Ill. 1983). 
101 Id. at 250. 
102 Id. at 252–53. 
103 Id. at 257. 
104 Id. at 258. 
105 Id. at 258–59.  
106 Id. at 253–54 (describing testimony of Jesse Lopez, Sandra Lawson, and Nora Lopez). The photographic 
spread consisted of five photographs, four of which were close-ups of individuals against a wall, while the 
fifth—the one of Kubat—was a full-frontal view with a television set, a painting, and furniture in the 
background. Id. at 279. 
107 Id. at 254; see also People v. Kubat, 501 N.E.2d 111, 116 (Ill. 1986). 
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was “consistent” with Hyde’s hair.108 Tires on Kubat’s station wagon at the time of his 
arrest did not match a tire print found near Hyde’s body, but the prosecution presented 
evidence that Kubat had purchased five new tires eight days after the crime, ostensibly to 
avoid detection.109  
After convicting Kubat of murder and aggravated kidnapping, the jury found no 
mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty 110 —not 
surprising, given that Kubat’s lawyer, Lake County Public Defender George Pease, had 
presented no mitigating evidence. 111  Lake County Circuit Court Judge Robert K. 
McQueen sentenced Kubat to death, plus thirty years for the kidnapping.112 
On direct appeal, Kubat’s leading contention was that he had not been proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Quick’s testimony lacked the “absolute 
conviction of truth” because it had been conditioned on the dismissal of the kidnapping 
charge against her.113 He also contended that Pease had failed to investigate exculpatory 
evidence and that the identification procedures had been “impermissibly suggestive and 
conductive to misidentification.”114  
After the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence in 
January 1983—holding that the evidence “overwhelmingly” supported the jury’s 
verdict115—Chicago Lawyer116 published an extensive article undermining the moorings 
of the prosecution case, beginning with the claim that Kubat had gotten rid of the tires on 
his station wagon so that they could not be matched to the track at the crime scene.117 
In a telephone interview from death row, Kubat said that he had replaced his old 
tires because they had been slashed and that he had taken the damaged ones to an Allstate 
Insurance Company claim center in Westchester, Illinois.118 Chicago Lawyer obtained 
Allstate records—which George Pease had failed to obtain—establishing that the slashed 
tires were Uniroyals—standard equipment on a 1977 Chevrolet station wagon. 119  A 
                                                 
108 Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 258. The forensic scientist was Michael Podlecki, who had testified in an earlier 
capital case that he had been unable “to find any dissimilarities” between a rape-murder victim’s hair and 
hairs recovered from a car allegedly used by the defendants in her abduction. See People v. Rainge, 445 
N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ill. 1983). Podlecki’s testimony in that case proved to have been falsely incriminating 
when the defendants in the case were exonerated by DNA. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Convicted by a 
Hair, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.  
109 Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 252; see also Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 1989). 
110 Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 250. 
111 Id. at 269. 
112 Lyons Man, supra note 99. 
113 Kubat, 447 N.E.2d at 259–60. 
114 Id. at 261–64. 
115 Id. at 259, 278. 
116 A monthly investigative journal founded in 1978 by the Chicago Council of Lawyers—a small, liberal 
bar association founded eleven years earlier “in reaction to the failures of the established Chicago bar to 
speak out” regarding, among other issues, police violence surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention 
and the ensuing “Conspiracy 7” trial. See, e.g., John R. Schmidt, Personal Appreciation of the Council, 
CHI. LAW., May 1984, at B3. In 1988, ownership of Chicago Lawyer was transferred to Rob Warden, its 
longtime editor, who continued as editor until selling the publication to the Law Bulletin Publishing 
Company in 1989. Neil Tesser, Chicago Lawyer: New Management, Less Muck, CHI. READER, Sept. 15, 
1989, at 4.  
117 Rob Warden, Quick and the Dead: New Evidence Raises Doubt About the Guilt of the Man Carolyn Sue 
Quick Sent to Death Row, CHI. LAW., Dec. 1983, at 1. 
118 Id. at 6. 
119 Id. at 6–7. 
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forensic analysis by Peter McDonald, manager of tire design for Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Company in Akron, Ohio, determined with “absolute certainty” that the tire print had not 
been left by a Uniroyal tire.120 
Chicago Lawyer also reported that Pease had failed to interview or present 
potential witnesses who could have corroborated Kubat’s alibi and, although it would not 
become an issue, that Pease had failed to investigate the possibility that—according to 
two Kenosha County Sheriff’s Department reports—Hyde’s body had been dumped 
beside Route 41 after she was killed elsewhere.121 The new evidence regarding the tires—
including a prosecution stipulation that the print could not have been left by a Uniroyal—
and Pease’s failure to corroborate Kubat’s alibi were raised in a petition for post-
conviction relief, but was rejected by Lake County Circuit Court Judge Fred A. Geiger.122 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Geiger, but Justice Seymour Simon strongly 
dissented, writing:  
Counsel’s performance was patently deficient, and there is a reasonable 
probability that the defendant would have been acquitted had his alibi 
defense been properly developed and Quick impeached with all the 
evidence at hand. . . . Justice does not permit the execution of a defendant 
who was effectively rendered no legal assistance at all, and I must 
emphatically dissent.123 
Kubat next turned to the federal courts, seeking a writ of habeas corpus, focusing 
on ineffective assistance of counsel. 124  U.S. District Court Judge Nicholas J. Bua—
although stating that “the seeds of ineffectiveness had been sown before the trial even 
commenced”125—affirmed Kubat’s conviction,126 but vacated his death sentence, holding 
that Pease had failed during the sentencing phase of the trial to call witnesses whose 
“testimony would have made an impressive case for sparing Kubat’s life.”127 After the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Bua’s decision, 128  Kubat 
remained in prison another two decades, until finally being paroled in 2009.129 He died 
four years later.130 The Illinois death penalty was abolished in 2011.131  
4. Edward Lee Elmore—South Carolina 
On January 18, 1982, Jimmy Holloway, a member of the Greenwood, South 
Carolina, County Council, reported finding the body of his neighbor, Dorothy Edwards, a 
                                                 
120 Id. at 7. 
121 Id. 
122 People v. Kubat, 501 N.E.2d 111, 118 (Ill. 1986). 
123 Id. at 122–23 (Simon, J., dissenting). 
124 U.S. ex rel. Kubat, 679 F. Supp. 788, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
125 Id. at 809. 
126 Id. at 810. 
127 Id. 
128 Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 374 (7th Cir. 1989). 
129 E-mail from Dolores Kennedy, who investigated the Kubat case, to Rob Warden (Dec. 21, 2017, 14:15 
CST) (on file with authors). 
130 LaSalle Cty. Clerk, Medical Certificate of Death for Robert Kubat (2013) (on file with authors). 
131 John Schwartz & Emma Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 9, 2011, at A18. 
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seventy-five-year-old widow, in her bedroom closet.132 Holloway told police that, when 
he had seen Edwards two days earlier, she had mentioned that she planned to go out of 
town.133 Thus, after noticing her car parked near her home on January 18, he knocked on 
her backdoor—which came open, revealing signs of a disturbance and prompting him to 
go inside.134 She had been “savagely attacked and brutally raped.”135 
Although Holloway was a logical suspect,136  rather than investigating him, the 
authorities focused on a suspect he brought to their attention—Edward Lee Elmore, a 
twenty-three-year-old African American handyman with an IQ of about seventy. 137 
Edwards, who was white, had employed Elmore sporadically to wash the windows and 
clean the gutters of her home.138 Her checkbook showed that she had paid him by check, 
most recently on December 30, 1981.139 The day after Holloway reported the crime, 
police found Elmore’s thumbprint on the outside frame of Edwards’s backdoor and 
arrested him the next morning.140  
Elmore’s trial began on April 12, 1982, before Judge E.C. Burnett III and a jury 
with ten white and two African American members.141 The prosecutor was William T. 
Jones III, who for thirty years had been Greenwood County’s elected solicitor, the 
official title of South Carolina prosecutors.142 Elmore’s lead defense lawyer was a hard-
drinking local public defender, Geddes D. Anderson, who would deny an investigator’s 
allegation that he had been “drunk through the whole trial,” but would acknowledge that 
he believed “the son-of-a-bitch [Elmore] did it.”143 Anderson was assisted by a court-
appointed Greenwood lawyer, John Beasley, who once allegedly referred to Elmore as a 
“redheaded nigger.”144 
Jones’s case relied heavily on Dr. Sandra Conradi, a forensic pathologist who 
performed the Edwards autopsy.145 Conradi testified that Edwards’s death could have 
occurred as late as Monday, January 18, but more likely had occurred on Saturday night, 
January 16—a time for which Elmore had no alibi. 146  Edwards had been stabbed 
repeatedly in the head, neck, and chest, suffering more than seventy separate injuries, 
including defensive wounds to her arms and hands, fractured ribs, and vaginal abrasions 
that, according to Conradi, were indicative of sexual assault.147  
                                                 
132 Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 785–87, 807 (4th Cir. 2011). 
133 Id. at 791–92. 
134 Id.  
135 State v. Elmore, 332 S.E.2d 762, 765 (S.C. 1985), vacated by Elmore v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101 
(1986). 
136 Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 803 (Holloway’s “illogical statements and bizarre conduct . . . rendered him the 
probable murderer.”); see also CONNIE FLETCHER, WHAT COPS KNOW 70 (1990) (quoting a Chicago 
detective as saying, “Many times the person who discovers the body is the killer.”). 
137 Ozmint, 661 F.3d 803 at 785–87, 807. 
138 Id. at 787, 807. 
139 Id. at 787. 
140 Id. 
141 RAYMOND BONNER, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE: A MURDER CASE GONE WRONG 43–44, 54 (2013). 
142 Id. at 41.  
143 Id. at 46–47.  
144 Id. at 48; see also Ozmint, 661 F.3d 803 at 826 n.23. 
145 BONNER, supra note 141, at 59. 
146 Id. at 61–62. 
147 Id. at 59–61. 
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The theory that Edwards had been raped was supported by state forensic chemist 
Earl Wells, who testified that he had determined to “a very high degree of probability” 
that Elmore was the source of pubic hairs that police claimed to have recovered from 
Edwards’s bed.148 John C. Barron, a state forensic serologist, testified that spots of Type 
A blood—Edwards’s type, shared by forty to forty-five percent of the population—had 
been found on a pair of blue jeans found in Elmore’s room.149 Sergeant Alvin Johnson 
and Lieutenant Thomas W. Henderson, Jr., of the state police, testified that Elmore told 
them that if he had killed Edwards he could not remember it. 150  James Gilliam, a 
jailhouse informant, testified that Elmore had spontaneously confessed that he went to 
Edwards’s house to rob her, but killed her because “she wouldn’t quit screaming.”151 
Gilliam added that Elmore said he knew that “the police couldn’t have no fingerprints of 
his because he had wiped everything down when he left.”152 Elmore took the stand to 
deny the statements attributed to him by the state police officers and Gilliam.153  
After deliberating two and a half hours, the jury found Elmore guilty of murder, 
criminal sexual conduct, house-breaking, and burglary.154 Two days later, while the jury 
was deliberating Elmore’s punishment, Judge Burnett, unaccompanied by counsel, went 
into the jury room and asked the status of the deliberations.155 Shortly thereafter, the jury 
recommended a death sentence.156 When Burnett asked if Elmore wished to say anything, 
he responded, “I’d like to say I did not commit that crime Your Honor said I did.”157 
Burnett followed the jury’s recommendation—sentencing Elmore to death in the electric 
chair.158 
In 1983, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded 
the case for a new trial, holding that Burnett’s visit with the jury had been “highly 
improper” and in violation of Elmore’s right to be present at all stages of his trial.159 
Elmore was tried again in 1984, this time before a jury of eight white jurors, four African 
American jurors, and a different judge, James E. Moore, but with the same prosecutor 
and defense counsel, although Elmore requested different lawyers.160 The evidence was 
virtually the same as at the first trial, and, as at the first trial, the jury deliberated for two 
and a half hours before finding Elmore guilty. 161  The second jury, like the first, 
recommended a death sentence, and Judge Moore obliged.162 
                                                 
148 Id. at 67–69. 
149 Id. at 56–57; see also Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 786. 
150 BONNER, supra note 141, at 77–78.  
151 Id. at 70, 72. 
152 Id. at 71–72. 
153 Id. at 77; see also Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 837. 
154 BONNER, supra note 141, at 82–83. 
155 State v. Elmore, 308 S.E.2d 781, 785 (S.C. 1983) (per curiam), overruled by State v. Torrence, 406 
S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991). 
156 BONNER, supra note 141, at 92–94. 
157 Id. at 94. 
158 Id.  
159 Elmore, 308 S.E.2d at 784–85. 
160 BONNER, supra note 141, at 98–100. 
161 Id. at 100. Although Cooper remains on death row, the chance that he will be executed was diminished 
when Governor Newsom declared a moratorium on executions on March 13, 2019. See A Pause for 
California’s Death Row, supra note 13.  
162 BONNER, supra note 141, at 100. 
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In 1985, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 
sentence,163 but the following year the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case in light of 
its recent decision in another South Carolina capital case in which it held that a trial 
court’s exclusion of certain mitigating evidence had deprived a jury of information 
relevant to sentencing.164 On remand, Elmore received death sentence,165 his third, which 
the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in 1989.166 
Six years later, Diana Holt, who had been a lawyer for less than a hundred days and 
was working at the South Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center, entered the case, 
joining J. Christopher Jensen, a New York litigator who had taken the case pro bono.167 
In ensuing state post-conviction and federal habeas-corpus proceedings, Holt and Jensen 
raised issues that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would conclude raised 
“grave questions about whether it really was Elmore who murdered Mrs. Edwards.”168 
Holt and Jensen contended that the pubic hairs and blood purportedly linking 
Elmore to the crime had been planted by police—inferences they drew from the facts that 
investigators had not photographed the hairs after supposedly discovering them, and that 
copious amounts of blood, not tiny spots, would have been on clothing worn by the killer 
during the crime.169  
New evidence developed by Holt and Jensen established that the prosecution had 
falsely represented that a fingerprint found on Edwards’s toilet had been unidentifiable, 
when in fact both she and Elmore had been eliminated as its source, and that the 
prosecution had suppressed the fact that a Caucasian hair from someone other than 
Edwards had been found on her body, indicating that the killer had been white—not 
African American.170  
The previously secret evidence pointing to someone other than Elmore as the killer 
led Holt to suspect that the crime had been committed by Holloway, Edwards’s now-
deceased neighbor with whom it was rumored that Edwards had had an affair.171 From an 
interview with Edwards’s daughter, Carolyn Lee, who confided that her mother’s planned 
trip probably had been to visit a man whom she planned to marry in North Carolina, Holt 
deduced that Holloway had a motive—jealousy.172 Not long before his death in 1994, 
Holloway had told Holt that the police initially had questioned him because “neighbors 
probably told them [the police] me [sic] and Dorothy [Edwards] were [sic] having an 
affair.”173 
                                                 
163 State v. Elmore, 332 S.E.2d 762, 765 (S.C. 1985), vacated by Elmore v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101 
(1986). 
164 Elmore v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101 (1986). The underlying case to which the decision referred 
was Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
165 BONNER, supra note 141, at 109. 
166 State v. Elmore, 386 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1989). 
167 BONNER, supra note 141, at 113, 143. 
168 Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 786 (4th Cir. 2011). 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 786, 803, 838. The suppression of the hair evidence appeared to violate the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1963 Brady v. Maryland decision. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
171 BONNER, supra note 141, at 140–41. Holloway died in 1994. Raymond Bonner, Old Evidence 
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173 Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 804 n.13. 
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Holt’s suspicion of Holloway was strengthened by a new forensic analysis by Dr. 
Jonathan Arden, New York City’s acting first deputy medical examiner, indicating that 
the crime most likely had occurred on January 17 or 18, when Elmore had a corroborated 
alibi.174 It was, in Arden’s words, “extraordinarily unlikely and improbable really in the 
extreme” that it had occurred on January 16, when Elmore lacked a credible alibi.175 
Further discrediting the veracity of Elmore’s convictions, James Gilliam, the jailhouse 
informant, recanted his trial testimony—saying at an evidentiary hearing that he had lied 
because a jail administrator had promised him, “You help me out on the Elmore thing, 
we’ll look after you.”176  
Although state post-conviction relief was denied despite the new evidence, 
Elmore’s death sentence was reduced to life in prison in 2010 on the ground that his 
limited mental capacity prohibited his execution.177 U.S. District Court Judge David C. 
Norton proceeded to deny habeas relief, but the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case for another retrial in 2011, holding that Elmore had been denied effective assistance 
of counsel.178 
After the Fourth Circuit decision, the prosecution offered to release Elmore 
immediately if he would enter an Alford plea.179 Rather than spending more time behind 
bars and facing a fourth jury, Elmore entered the plea on March 2, 2012, attaining 
freedom—but, in the eyes of the law, rendering himself forever guilty. 180  He died 
December 3, 2018.181 
5. John George Spirko, Jr.—Ohio 
Betty Jane Mottinger, the postmistress of Elgin, a town of ninety-six residents 
located twenty-two miles west of Lima, disappeared on August 9, 1982182—thirteen days 
after John George Spirko, Jr., a thirty-six-year-old career criminal, had been paroled from 
a life sentence for strangling a seventy-two-year-old woman to death in Kentucky.183  
Shortly after Mottinger’s skeletal remains were found wrapped in a paint-splattered 
tarpaulin in a field fifty miles from Elgin in October 1982, Spirko was charged with 
                                                 
174 Id. at 808–09. 
175 Id. at 820–21. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 786; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executing “mentally 
retarded” persons violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment). 
178 Ozmint, 661 F.3d at 786; BONNER, supra note 141, at 272. 
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180 Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at SR8. For an analysis of 
why Elmore chose to enter the plea, see Rob Warden, ‘Injustice’ Serves Dramatic Story, Historic Truths, 
CHI. TRIB. PRINTERS ROW J., Mar. 18, 2012, at 17. 
181 Aleks Gilbert, ‘He’s Really Freed Now’: Friends Mourn Passing of Elmore, AP (Dec. 15, 2018), 
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182 State v. Spirko, No. 15-84-22, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 710, at *1–2 (Mar. 6, 1989); Bob Paynter, A 
Cold-Blooded Liar, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 23, 2005, at A1. Spirko was born on June 13, 1946. 
Offender Details: John Spirko, OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., 
https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A171433 (last visited May 23, 2019). 
183 Paynter, supra note 182. For details of Spirko’s Kentucky conviction, see Special Meeting Minutes, 
Ohio Parole Auth. (Aug. 23, 2005) (on file with authors), and Spirko v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.2d 169, 
170–71 (Ky. 1972). 
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feloniously assaulting a woman in a bar near Toledo.184 In what he would contend was an 
ill-conceived ploy to avoid returning to prison in Kentucky for life—a serious possibility 
for felonious assault in light of his parole status—Spirko claimed to know what had 
happened to Mottinger and promised to tell all in exchange for leniency.185  
Investigators initially discounted Spirko’s story because they had a strong 
suspect— Marion “Sonny” Baumgardner, who was on parole for robbing a postmistress 
seven years earlier in Dupont, thirty miles from Elgin.186 But when Baumgardner was 
arrested in Texas and proved to have an unassailable alibi for the day Mottinger 
disappeared,187 investigators began taking Spirko seriously—ultimately agreeing to a deal 
under which, in exchange for his cooperation, he would face no more than five years in 
prison for the assault near Toledo.188 In addition, his girlfriend, also allegedly involved in 
the Toledo area incident, would not be prosecuted.189  
In interviews with postal inspectors in late 1982 and early 1983,190 Spirko provided 
shifting accounts of what he claimed to know of Mottinger’s fate, ranging from merely 
attending a party where he learned details of the crime to being present when she was 
raped, beaten, and stabbed to death by a man he knew only as “Rooster.”191 Some of 
Spirko’s claims flew in the face of known evidence—e.g., he described the victim as a 
“fat bitch,” although she weighed only 104 pounds; he said that she wore a gold necklace 
and gold watch, although her family maintained that she wore neither; he claimed that 
she had been stabbed in the back, although she had been stabbed only in the chest.192 
Postal inspectors may not have been aware of it when they questioned Spirko, but years 
earlier, in a scheme to get out of jail in Michigan, he had embarrassed authorities with a 
false claim that he had first-hand knowledge of a series of rape-murders.193 
There were no known witnesses to the Mottinger abduction, but two witnesses 
reported seeing a man and a brown two-tone sedan outside the Elgin Post Office around 
the time that she disappeared.194 One of the witnesses, Opal Seibert, described the man as 
clean-shaven, with dark hair, wearing a long-sleeved blue shirt.195 The other witness, 
Mark Lewis, said the man was slightly pot-bellied, weighing about 240 pounds, with 
sandy-brown or reddish hair, maybe having a light mustache, and wearing a green short-
sleeved shirt with orange stripes.196 Neither description fit Spirko, who was blond and 
                                                 
184 Paynter, supra note 182. 
185 Paynter, supra note 182; see also Bob Paynter, A Mysterious Murder Suspect Emerges, Then 
Disappears, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 24, 2005, at A1. 
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192 Bob Paynter, Cop, Criminal Square Off in Jailhouse Duel, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 25, 2005, at 
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CRIME: MICHIGAN: THE STATE'S MOST NOTORIOUS CRIMINAL CASES 91–106 (2011). 
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weighed about 180 pounds.197 But in a scrapbook Spirko had maintained, Paul Hartman, 
the lead postal inspector assigned to the case, noticed a photograph of Delaney Gibson, 
Jr., a former Spirko cellmate, who appeared to match the description Seibert had 
provided.198 Soon thereafter in a final interview, Spirko told Hartman that Gibson had 
robbed, kidnapped, raped, and murdered Mottinger.199  
  In September 1983, Spirko and Gibson were indicted for aggravated murder and 
kidnapping,200 but Gibson was a fugitive and would remain so until after Spirko was 
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.201 The prosecution’s theory at the August 1984 
trial was that Spirko and Gibson committed the crime together—a theory resting largely 
on testimony by Seibert that she was “one hundred percent sure” that Gibson was the 
cleanly shaven man she had seen outside the Elgin post office two years earlier202 and 
testimony by Hartman, the postal inspector, that Spirko had admitted committing the 
crime with Gibson.203 
The evidence against Spirko otherwise had been underwhelming—testimony by 
two informants, Andre Ruffin and Leon Connors, that Spirko, who had been a cellmate of 
each, had admitted the abduction and murder,204 and testimony by Mark Lewis that he 
was “seventy percent certain” Spirko was the man he had seen outside the post 
office205—a dubious claim because Lewis initially had identified Marion Baumgardner as 
the man in question.206 
The defense contended that the crime might have been committed by an eighteen-
year-old local drug dealer, John Willier, who had worked in the summer of 1982 as a 
house-painter—a capacity in which he had access to tarpaulins like the paint-splattered 
one in which Mottinger’s remains had been found.207 Five witnesses had reported seeing 
Willier around the time of the crime driving a brown sedan like the one described by 
Seibert and Lewis.208 
After Spirko’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal,209 his 
pro bono attorneys from the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shaw Pittman LLP 210 
discovered evidence—known to the prosecution and allegedly improperly withheld prior 
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to trial211—indicating that Delaney Gibson could not have been in Ohio at the time of 
Mottinger’s abduction and, thus, could not have been the man Opal Seibert had seen in 
Elgin on August 9, 1982.212 
The newly discovered evidence indicated that from June through October 1982, 
Gibson and his wife, Margie, had been working on a crew of tomato-pickers in North 
Carolina—an alibi corroborated by the leader of the crew, by friends who had visited the 
Gibsons only hours before the Mottinger abduction, by the friends’ motel receipt, and, 
most dramatically, by photographs of Gibson, showing that at the time of the crime he 
was not clean-shaven, but had a full beard.213 In addition, Spirko’s former cellmates, 
Ruffin and Connors, recanted their trial testimony that Spirko had confessed,214  and 
Hartman acknowledged that he had been aware before Spirko’s trial that Gibson could 
not have been involved in the crime.215 
In spite of the new evidence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied 
Spirko’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 216  Spirko’s lawyers petitioned for 
certiorari,217 and a former director of the FBI, two retired federal court of appeals judges, 
and a former U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois filed an amicus brief 
asserting that Spirko had been wrongly convicted because the prosecution had suppressed 
exculpatory evidence, 218  but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 219 
Questions about Spirko’s guilt nonetheless were sufficiently troubling that he received 
seven gubernatorial stays of execution prior to 2008, when his sentence was commuted to 
life in prison without parole by Governor Ted Strickland, who said:  
I have concluded that the lack of physical evidence linking him to the 
murder, as well as the slim residual doubt about his responsibility for the 
murder that arises from careful scrutiny of the case record and revelations 
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about the case over the past twenty years, makes the imposition of the 
death penalty inappropriate in this case.220 
Spirko’s lawyers vowed to continue to pursue his exoneration,221 but there was 
nowhere to turn and he continues to languish behind bars more than eleven years after 
Strickland spared his life.222 
6. Kevin Cooper—California 
Kevin Cooper was sentenced to death on May 14, 1985, for a murder that occurred 
in Chino Hills on June 4, 1984— two days after he escaped from the minimum-security 
section of the nearby California Institution for Men. 223  The bodies of the victims—
Douglas and Peggy Ryen, forty-one-year-old chiropractors and Arabian horse-breeders, 
their ten-year-old daughter Jessica, and an eleven-year-old houseguest, Christopher 
Hughes—were found in the Ryen home on the morning of June 5.224 The Ryens’ eight-
year-old son Joshua suffered near-fatal injuries. 225  The family station wagon was 
missing.226  
Analyses of the stomach contents of the deceased indicated that they had been 
killed the previous night, one to three hours after they had eaten.227 In all, they had 
suffered some 140 wounds inflicted variously with what appeared to have been a knife, 
an ice pick, and an axe or a hatchet.228 Two blood-stained T-shirts—one blue, one tan—
and a hatchet covered with dried blood were found near the home.229 Numerous hairs that 
could have been ripped from someone’s head during a struggle were found clutched in 
Jessica Ryen’s right hand.230 
Joshua Ryen attributed the crime to three Mexican men, one of whom wore a “blue 
short-sleeved shirt.”231 Two witnesses who had been driving in the area the night of the 
crime reported seeing three white men in a station wagon resembling the missing one.232 
Other witnesses reported seeing three white strangers drinking at a bar near the Ryen 
home that night.233 On June 7, the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department issued a 
bulletin identifying the suspected perpetrators as three “white or Mexican males.”234  
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Two days later, however, Sheriff Floyd Tidwell announced that there was just one 
suspect—who was neither white nor Mexican, but African American: twenty-five-year-
old Kevin Cooper, for whom a warrant had been issued on charges of murder, attempted 
murder, and prison escape.235 It seemed unlikely that the massacre had been the work of 
one man, much less that of the 155-pound Cooper, given that Douglas Ryen, an ex-
Marine, stood six-two and kept a loaded rifle near his bed; Peggy Ryen also kept a loaded 
pistol in her bedside drawer.236 Cooper, moreover, could not have been the source of the 
hairs found in Jessica Ryen’s hand.237 Nor did the discovery of two blood-stained T-shirts 
square with the lone-perpetrator theory.238 After his June 2 escape, however, Cooper, 
whose criminal record began at age seven,239 had broken into and spent two nights in an 
unoccupied home 126 yards from the Ryen home.240 It would be alleged that the hatchet 
found shortly after discovery of the massacre had been come from the unoccupied 
home.241  
The day that the sheriff announced that Cooper had been charged and was sought 
for committing the murders, a woman named Diana Roper contacted the sheriff’s office 
to report her suspicion that the crime had been committed by her boyfriend—Eugene 
Leland Furrow, who was white and who until recently had been in prison for murder.242 
Roper said that early on the morning of June 5 Furrow had appeared at her home driving 
a station wagon and wearing blood-splattered coveralls, which she turned over to the 
sheriff’s office.243 She added that on June 4 she had laid out clothes for Furrow, including 
a tan T-shirt, which was gone.244 After learning that a hatchet linked to the Ryen crime 
had been found, Roper again contacted the sheriff’s office to report that she had checked 
Furrow’s tool chest and discovered a hatchet missing. 245  Despite Roper’s claims, 
however, Furrow would not be seriously pursued as a suspect and the bloody coveralls 
would be destroyed without being tested.246  
Cooper remained the prime suspect even though, after seeing a photograph of him 
on television on June 14, Joshua Ryen spontaneously told his grandmother that Cooper 
had not committed the crime.247 On July 30, Cooper was arrested near the Santa Barbara 
coast, where he had been working as a deckhand. 248  When he arrived at the San 
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Bernardino County Jail in shackles the next night, he was taunted by an angry crowd, 
some members of which chanted, “Gas chamber, gas chamber.”249 After a change of 
venue to San Diego County, Cooper pleaded guilty to the prison escape count and his 
trial for murder and attempted-murder opened before Judge Richard Garner and a jury on 
October 23, 1984.250  
In addition to the hatchet supposedly taken from the home that Cooper had broken 
into, the evidence presented by San Bernardino County District Attorney Dennis 
Kottmeier and Assistant District Attorney John Kochis included a drop of blood of 
Cooper’s type allegedly recovered from the Ryen home, blood of types matching those of 
Cooper and Douglas Ryen purportedly found on one of the recovered T-shirts, shoeprints 
purportedly from Pro-Keds Dude tennis shoes Cooper supposedly had obtained from a 
fellow prisoner who testified for the prosecution, and saliva consistent with Cooper’s 
blood type on cigarette butts purportedly recovered from the Ryen home and from the 
stolen station wagon, which had been found at Long Beach.251 
Cooper’s defense, as outlined by Santa Barbara County Public Defender David 
Negus in his opening statement, was that the sheriff’s office botched the investigation and 
that the prosecution evidence would prove less than definitive, leaving reasonable doubt 
about Cooper’s guilt.252 “I’m not going to be able to prove to you that [Cooper] . . . is 
innocent,” said Negus, who cited the failure to investigate Diana Roper’s claims 
regarding Furrow as an example of how the investigation had been botched.253 In a vein 
seemingly more befitting the prosecution than the defense, Negus added that the 
destruction of the bloody coveralls was “a piece of evidence that could well have no 
significance whatsoever in this case.”254 
Joshua Ryen did not testify, but Negus agreed to the admission into evidence of 
electronic recordings of two interviews, conducted in December 1994, in which Joshua 
said that he had seen only one man, or one man’s shadow, during the crime—flatly 
contradicting his repeated statements six months earlier attributing the crime to three 
men.255 The defense contended that the supposed change in Joshua’s recollection was the 
result of manipulation by authorities whose theory was that Cooper alone had committed 
the crime.256 
On January 2, 1985, after a twelve-day holiday break in the trial, the prosecutors 
informed Negus that the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department had interviewed 
two state prisoners who corroborated both Joshua’s initial contention that three men had 
carried out the attack and Diana Roper’s contention that Furrow likely was involved.257 In 
the first interview, on December 17, 1984, a prisoner named Anthony Wisely claimed 
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that his cellmate, Kenneth Koon, had implicated himself and two other men in the 
crime.258 In the second interview, conducted two days later, Koon—who had been out of 
prison from October 11, 1982, to November 7, 1983, and moved in with Diana Roper 
after Furrow moved out—denied any role in the crime, although he said he was aware 
that “Lee Farrel [sic] had left bloody coveralls at Roper’s home.259 
Judge Garner recognized the tardy disclosure of the interviews deprived Negus of 
an adequate opportunity to explore Koon’s possible involvement in the crime with 
Furrow, but the only remedy Gardner advanced was to give Negus an hour to review the 
prisoners’ statements.260 After availing himself of that opportunity, Negus told Garner 
and opposing counsel that he would not request “any further delay at this point in time,” 
although “there might be a time later on when I might need a day or two’s delay to get it 
all together.”261 Ten days later, a defense investigator interviewed Wisely, who said that, 
in light of his conversation with Koon, he had no doubt of Cooper’s innocence, but 
Negus pursued the matter no further and the jury did not hear of Wisely and Koon’s 
statements.262 
In their summations, Kochis, the assistant district attorney, told the jury that the 
evidence proved Cooper’s guilt “beyond any doubt,”263 while Negus contended that it 
proved nothing of the sort.264 Negas argued that if a detective recorded an interview that 
he conducted with Joshua Ryen nine days after the crime the recording would have 
established a “rational interpretation of the evidence” consistent with Cooper’s 
innocence.265 In rebuttal, Kottmeier, the district attorney, asserted falsely that Joshua 
consistently maintained that there had been only one attacker—“Kevin Cooper with a 
hatchet in one hand and a knife at the other.”266 
After both sides rested, Judge Garner instructed jurors on the law and admonished 
them not to be influenced by demonstrators who had appeared outside the courthouse 
carrying signs saying “Kill Cooper” and “Hang the Nigger.” 267  Having heard 141 
witnesses and received 788 exhibits, the jury deliberated for six days before finding 
Cooper guilty on February 19, 1985. 268  Ten days later, the jury unanimously 
recommended a death sentence, which Garner imposed on May 15. 269  It took the 
California Supreme Court nearly six years—until May 1991—to decide Cooper’s 
automatic appeal, in which it affirmed his conviction and death sentence, rejecting his 
claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct, judicial error, ineffective assistance of 
                                                 
258 Id. at 49.  
259 Id. at 50. 
260 Id. 
261 O’CONNOR, supra note 227, at 169 (quoting trial transcript, including Garner’s initial reaction to the 
belated disclosure: “Oh, golly, why couldn’t you have given this to [Negus] before, gentlemen?”). 
262 Id. at 170. 
263 Id. at 210. 
264 Id. at 213–19. 
265 Id. at 216. 
266 Petition for Executive Clemency, supra note 229, at 43, 84, 224. 
267 Amy Wallace, Judge Signs Order Setting Killer's Date for Execution, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1991, at A3; 
see also Kristof, supra note 236.  
268 O’CONNOR, supra note 227, at 227; see also Petition for Executive Clemency, supra note 229, at 9 (on 
file with authors). 
269 Kevin Cooper Timeline of Events, supra note 224.  
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counsel, and accumulated error.270 Three years later, with a petition for a state writ of 
habeas corpus pending, Cooper filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.271  
Two years after that the California Supreme Court denied his state habeas and 
Cooper filed a supplemental federal habeas petition, which was denied by U.S. District 
Court Judge Marilyn L. Huff in August 1997.272 In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed Huff, pronouncing the evidence of Cooper’s guilt 
“overwhelming.” 273  In the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision, Cooper and the 
prosecution agreed to the DNA testing of certain forensic evidence 274 —testing that 
resulted in what the prosecution contended was proof positive of guilt—Cooper’s blood 
on the recovered tan T-shirt.275  
In an application for the Ninth Circuit’s permission to file a successor habeas 
petition, however, Cooper alleged that the blood had been planted.276 In requesting the 
permission—required by the 1996 federal Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act277 and case law278—Cooper claimed actual innocence and sought testing of the blood 
on the T-shirt for the presence of a preservative that, if found, would indicate that the 
blood had been planted.279 He also sought mitochondrial DNA testing of the hairs found 
in Jessica Ryen’s hand—testing that would either identify or eliminate Cooper as the 
source of the hairs and, if he were eliminated, perhaps lead to the identity of their 
source.280 In support of his claim of actual innocence, Cooper attached a hand-written 
sworn declaration from a prisoner named James Taylor recanting his trial testimony that 
he had provided tennis shoes to Cooper of the type that supposedly left the shoeprints 
linking him to the crime.281 
On February 8, 2004, two days before Cooper’s scheduled execution, a three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit denied permission for filing the successor petition, but the next 
day an eight-to-three majority of the full Ninth Circuit reversed the panel, not only 
                                                 
270 People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 885–91, 893–901, 904–05, 912 (Cal. 1991).  
271 Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 1110. The decision was two-to-one, but the dissent pertained solely to whether Cooper’s death 
sentence was appropriate. See id. at 1115–18 (Browning, J., dissenting).  
274 At the time of Cooper’s trial, forensic applications of DNA testing were years in the future. In 1984, Dr. 
Alec J. Jeffreys, a University of Leicester geneticist, discovered the potential of DNA to identify criminals. 
Nick Zagorski, Profile of Alec J. Jeffreys, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8918, 8919 (2006). The technique 
led to the 1988 conviction of the killer of two girls in England. JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING 
(1989). In 1989, advancing DNA technology exonerated Gary Dotson in Illinois. Brandon L. Garrett & 
Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2009).  
275 Cooper v. Calderon, No. 98-99023, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27035, at *2 (9th Cir. 2002).  
276 Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
277 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
278 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 299 (1995) (holding that to bring a second habeas petition “a petitioner 
must show that, in light of all the evidence, including new evidence, it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
279 Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1119. 
280 Id. at 1122. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence is required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963). In 1996, the FBI began testing mitochondrial DNA, the principal type of forensic evidence 
extracted from hair shafts. See Frederika A. Kaestle et al., Database Limitations on the Evidentiary Value 
of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 54, 62 (2006). 
281 See Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1122; Blake, supra note 251 and accompanying text.  
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staying Cooper’s execution and allowing him to file his successor habeas petition, but 
also sending the case back to Judge Huff with directions to allow the DNA testing 
Cooper requested. 282  Two Ninth Circuit judges would have gone further, directly 
ordering the DNA testing.283  
After protracted, albeit limited, testing that she characterized as failing to 
undermine the previous DNA results “confirming” Cooper’s guilt, Huff denied the 
successor federal habeas, as she had the first.284 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed Huff,285 whereupon Cooper sought a rehearing before the full Ninth Circuit, 
which denied it in 2009 with an order from which Judge William A. Fletcher dissented, 
pointedly rebutting both Huff’s conclusions and the majority’s rationale for allowing her 
decision to stand.286 “There is no way to say this politely,” Fletcher wrote, “The district 
court failed to provide Cooper a fair hearing and flouted our direction to perform the two 
tests.”287 
The most telling indication of tampering was a tube of what was supposed to be 
Cooper’s blood that had been in the possession of the sheriff’s office since shortly after 
his arrest.288 Testing conducted while the successor petition was pending before Huff 
showed that the tube contained the blood of two persons—Cooper and someone else—
indicating that some of Cooper’s blood had been removed and replaced with the other 
person’s blood so that none would appear missing.289 
Fletcher’s dissent laid out troubling questions about the case, including: Why did 
Joshua Ryen not recognize Cooper, if he was the lone killer? Why did no fingerprints link 
Cooper to the crime? Why, with so much blood, was only one drop of what supposedly 
was Cooper’s blood found in the Ryen home? Why was the jury not informed of the 
bloody coveralls that were turned over to the sheriff’s office and destroyed?290 Four of 
Fletcher’s fellow Ninth Circuit judges joined in his dissent, and two other judges filed 
separate dissents in which six additional judges joined.291 Four years later, in a lecture at 
New York University School of Law, Fletcher offered a possible answer to all of his 
                                                 
282 See Woodford, 358 F.3d at 1118, 1124. 
283 Id. at 1124–25 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (contending that, “Since Cooper’s guilt can be quickly and 
definitively determined by means of a simple test, there is no reason not to have it performed prior to his 
execution. . . .The public cannot afford a mistake. Neither can Cooper.”). 
284 Cooper v. Brown, No. 04-CV-656H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46232, at *1, *3, *79–91, *94–116, *149 
(S.D. Cal. May 27, 2005). 
285 Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2007). 
286 Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 583–608 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
287 Id. at 583.  
288 Id. at 607–08. 
289 Id.  
290 Id. at 581, 632–33. 
291 Eleven Ninth Circuit judges dissented from the majority holding. In addition to Fletcher, in alphabetical 
order, they were Marsha S. Berzon, Raymond C. Fisher, Susan P. Graber, Alex Kozinski, Richard A. Paez, 
Harry Pregerson, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Stephen Roy Reinhardt, Sidney R. Thomas, and Kim McLane 
Wardlaw. Joining Fletcher’s dissent were Paez, Pregerson, Rawlinson, and Reinhardt. Separate dissenting 
opinions were filed by Fisher, Reinhardt, and Wardlaw. Fisher’s dissent stood alone and comprised a single 
sentence: “I generally agree with Judge Fletcher that we should have taken this case en banc to require the 
factual inquiry the previous en banc court expected to occur.” Id. at 635 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Joining in 
the Reinhardt dissent were Berzon, Garber, Kozinski, and Pregerson. Joining in the Wardlaw dissent were 
Berzon, Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Thomas. 
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questions, succinctly summing up his view of Cooper’s situation: “'He is on death row 
because the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department framed him.”292 
His appeals exhausted, 293  Cooper sought clemency from Governor Edmund G. 
“Jerry” Brown, Jr.,294 before whom a petition requesting a reprieve of the death sentence 
and other relief had been pending since February 17, 2016.295 Brown finally ordered 
DNA testing in the case on December 24, 2018, two weeks before Brown was succeeded 
by his lieutenant governor, Gavin Newsom.296  
The petition Newsom inherited alleges that Cooper was falsely convicted as a result 
of judicial bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, planting of evidence by the sheriff’s 
office, perjured testimony for the prosecution, withholding of exculpatory evidence, 
falsified forensic results, and racial discrimination.297  In addition to the reprieve, the 
petition asks the governor’s office to “undertake a complete investigation” of the case 
under its auspices, order all additional forensic testing that Cooper’s legal team 
determines should be done, grant the team access to all exculpatory materials in the 
possession of the sheriff’s office, district attorney’s office, and state crime laboratory, 
and, if his innocence is established, grant him freedom.298 
7. Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot—Oklahoma 
At around 8:40 P.M. on April 28, 1984, Donna Denice Haraway, a twenty-four-
year-old recently married college student, was abducted from an Ada convenience store 
known as McAnally’s where she worked. 299  The following November 7, although 
Haraway’s body had not been found, Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot, both 
in their early twenties, were charged with robbing, abducting, raping, and killing her.300  
The sine qua non of the prosecution case—and the only evidence that Haraway had 
been raped, or slain, for that matter—were video-taped statements in which Ward and 
Fontenot described dreams they reported having about the crime. 301  The purported 
dreams differed in material respects,302 but in both the victim had died of multiple stab 
                                                 
292 William A. Fletcher, U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit, Our Broken Death Penalty (Oct. 13, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9NfqB6y7L4. 
293 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Cooper’s petition for a writ of certiorari on November 30, 2009. 
Cooper v. Ayers, 558 U.S. 1049 (2009). 
294 Brown had opposed the death penalty, but nonetheless had committed himself to carrying out the state 
law. See Jerry Gillam, Brown Vows to Enforce Death Penalty Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1977, at 1. In 
1960, to no avail, Brown, a former Jesuit seminarian, had urged his father and namesake, then-Governor 
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown, to ask the state legislature for a moratorium on executions. EDMUND “PAT” 
BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW 20–21, 39–40 
(1989). 
295 Petition for Executive Clemency, supra note 229.  
296 Alene Tchekmedyian, Gov. Jerry Brown Orders New Tests in Quadruple-Murder Case of Death Row 
Inmate Kevin Cooper, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2018, at 1; John Wildermuth & Joe Garofoli, Gov. Gavin 
Newsom Promises a ‘Progressive, Principled’ California, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 7, 2019, at 1. 
297 Petition for Clemency, supra note 229, at 27, 75, 95, 131, 151–52. 
298 Id. at 161.  
299 ROBERT MAYER, THE DREAMS OF ADA 2–3, 8–9, 13–14 (1985).  
300 Id. at 36, 79–82, 161. 
301 Id. at 261–304. 
302 For example, Ward dreamed that he tried to rape Haraway, but could not get an erection. Id. at 269, 275. 
Fontenot, in contrast, dreamed that Ward raped Haraway. Id. at 289–91. 
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wounds, her body either had been burned and left in a concrete bunker on the outskirts of 
Ada or in a nearby abandoned house that was set afire the next day, and the ringleader of 
the crime had been a third man—an ex-convict named Odell Titsworth.303  
The authorities promptly eliminated Titsworth as a suspect because he had suffered 
a broken arm in a scuffle with police two days before Haraway disappeared and had been 
physically incapable of the acts attributed to him in the Ward and Fontenot dreams.304 
Once Titsworth was cleared, a reassessment of the prosecution’s case against Ward and 
Fontenot surely was warranted; the false implication of Titsworth, as Ward and 
Fontenot’s lawyers would contend, most likely resulted from “pressure tactics” employed 
by their interrogators305—especially Ada Detective Dennis Smith and Oklahoma Bureau 
of Investigation Agent Gary Rogers, who obtained a false dream confession from former 
minor league baseball star Ronald Keith Williamson in 1987.306  
Despite the false implication of Titsworth, District Attorney William N. Peterson 
and Assistant District Attorney Chris Ross pressed on with the prosecution of Ward and 
Fontenot.307 In addition to playing the defendants’ dream videos at the 1985 trial,308 the 
prosecutors called three eyewitnesses—two of whom placed Ward and another man at a 
convenience store known as J.P.’s Pack-To-Go, which was near McAnally’s. 309 
According to the prosecution theory of the case, Ward and the second man—presumably 
Fontenot—left J.P.’s in a “mixed red primer and gray primer” pickup truck that they used 
shortly thereafter in the Haraway abduction; the third eyewitness placed Ward and a 
second man, as well as a pickup similar to the one seen at J.P’s, at McAnally’s before 
Haraway disappeared.310  
The only other evidence purporting to link Ward and Fontenot to the crime was the 
testimony of a jailhouse informant, Terri Holland, who claimed that Fontenot confessed 
to her in the Pontotoc County Jail, implicating Ward.311 Although the jury was unaware 
of it, Holland also had testified at Ronald Williamson’s trial that Williamson confessed to 
her in jail.312 Despite no physical evidence linking them to the Haraway crime,313 Ward 
                                                 
303 Id. at 47–48, 80, 271–82; see also id. at 283–304.  
304 Id. at 264–68; see also Fontenot v. State, 742 P.2d 31, 31–32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). 
305 MAYER, supra note 299, at 330. 
306 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN 125–27, 193–94 (2006). Williamson was sentenced to death in 
1988 for the murder of Debbie Sue Carter in Ada and exonerated in 1999. Jim Dwyer, Ronald Williamson, 
Freed from Death Row, Dies at 51, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at C11. 
307 MAYER, supra note 299, at 218–20. 
308 Id. at 246–47, 261, 284. 
309 Id. at 236–37.  
310 Id. at 237. Eyewitness identifications of strangers, as all were in this case, often are unreliable. See 
Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A 
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459 (2001). Two of the eyewitnesses who identified 
Ward, including the one who placed him at McAnally’s, were tainted because they had seen a composite 
sketch of a suspect resembling Ward prior to identifying him in lineups. Additionally, the witness who 
placed Ward at McAnally’s had been hypnotized in an effort to enhance his recollection. While the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that hypnosis, as a technique of memory retrieval, does 
not meet the evidentiary standard of general scientific acceptance, testimony based on a witness’s pre-
hypnotic memory is permitted. Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).  
311 Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
312 GRISHAM, supra note 306, at 152–54. False testimony of informants—“snitches,” in the vernacular—has 
been a factor in most wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases since the 1970’s. See THE SNITCH SYSTEM, 
supra note 32. 
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and Fontenot were convicted on September 25, 1985, following a thirteen-day jury trial 
and sentenced to death thirty days later by Judge Donald E. Powers.314  
As dubious as the convictions may have been, they became all the more so on 
January 6, 1986, when—while Ward and Fontenot’s appeals were pending—Haraway’s 
body was found.315 It was not at the location described in the dreams but rather in a field 
twenty-seven miles away.316 An autopsy determined that she died not of stabbing but of a 
single bullet wound to the head and that her body had not been burned. 317  Without 
considering the exculpatory new evidence,318 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
proceeded to reverse the convictions and remand the cases for separate retrials—holding 
that the admission into evidence of the dream statements at the joint trial deprived each 
defendant of his right to confront the other.319 
 Although the dreams were incontrovertibly at odds with virtually every significant 
detail of the crime, the prosecution plowed ahead with retrials, relying primarily on the 
dream statements and the eyewitnesses who testified at the 1995 trial. 320  Ward and 
Fontenot’s juries returned guilty verdicts, recommending a life sentence for Ward and 
death for Fontenot.321 Judge Powers, who presided over both trials as well as the original 
joint trial, sentenced Ward and Fontenot accordingly.322 Both convictions were affirmed 
on direct appeal, but Fontenot’s case was remanded for resentencing because the judge 
had failed to instruct the jury that life without parole was a sentencing option.323 On 
remand, the parties negotiated life without parole.324 
 As unjust as convictions relying on fiction-filled “confessions” may seem in 
retrospect, at the time of the Ward-Fontenot trials the false-confession phenomenon was 
counterintuitive and in the early days of exploration by social scientists.325 Gradually, 
                                                                                                                                                 
313 Brief in Support of Post-Conviction Relief at 2, Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) 
(CR-88-43) [hereinafter Fontenot PC] (on file with authors); Brief in Support of Post-Conviction Relief at 
1, 17, Ward v. State, 755 P.2d 123 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (CRF-1984-183) [hereinafter Ward PC] (on 
file with authors).  
314 MAYER, supra note 299, at 326–49. 
315 Ward PC, supra note 313, at 17. 
316 Id. 
317 Id.  
318 Direct appeal is limited to the factual record as established in the trial court. See DANIEL J. MEADOR & 
JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994).  
319 Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 32; see also Ward v. State, 755 P.2d 123, 124 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
320 Ward PC, supra note 313, at 3; see also Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 2. 
321 Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 71 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Ward v. State, No. F-90-0017 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1994), at 1 (on file with authors). 
322 Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 87. 
323 Id.  
324 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Fontenot v. Rios, 6:16-cv-00069-JHP-KEW (E.D. Okla. 2016) 
(on file with authors). 
325 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of 
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). In 122 capital cases in which exonerations have occurred since the dawning of 
the DNA forensic age in 1989, false confessions occurred in twenty-three cases, or 18.9 percent. NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F-
8A52-
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over ensuing decades, it would be recognized that mentally challenged suspects—as 
Ward and Fontenot were326—“are especially vulnerable to the types of psychological 
pressure and intimidating interrogation techniques that lead to false confessions.”327 
 As it was, however, Ward and Fontenot’s cases lay dormant for nearly the next 
two decades, when the Oklahoma Innocence Project brought a petition for post-
conviction relief on Fontenot’s behalf.328 The petition cited Oklahoma State Bureau of 
Investigation records allegedly withheld from Fontenot’s trial and appellate counsel.329 
The records established that Fontenot had a strong multi-witness alibi, corroborated by 
police dispatch records and police reports, for his whereabouts at the time of the crime.330  
Although the Oklahoma post-conviction statute sets no time limit for seeking post-
conviction relief, 331 Fontenot’s petition was denied by Judge Thomas S. Landrith without 
a hearing in December 2014 based on a legal principle known as laches, which bars 
claims not brought in a timely fashion.332 In 2015, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed Landrith’s decision, and the matter, as of this writing, is the subject of a 
petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.333 
Meanwhile, in 2017, volunteer lawyers from the Chicago-based firm of Sidley 
Austin LLP and the Center on Wrongful Convictions joined Oklahoma attorney Mark 
Barrett, who had been instrumental in the Williamson exoneration,334 in filing a petition 
for post-conviction relief on Ward’s behalf.335  The petition alleged that the withheld 
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation files show that authorities knew of but failed to 
inform Ward’s trial counsel of alternative suspects336 and stymied a proper defense by 
failing to disclose other exculpatory evidence, intimidating witnesses, and knowingly 
allowing and failing to correct false testimony.337  
In light of the ongoing proceedings, exoneration remains possible more than three 
decades after the evidence emanating from the discovery of Haraway’s body left no 
doubt that the dream statements—without which, the petition asserts, there is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=Sentence&FilterValue1=Death&FilterField2=FC&FilterValue2=8_FC 
(last visited May 23, 2019). 
326 MAYER, supra note 299, at 280, 301. 
327 OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION 1, 9 (2013), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/ok_justice_comm_report_convictions_feb_2013.pdf 
(last visited May 23, 2019). 
328 Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 9.  
329 Id. (allegedly in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
330 Fontenot PC, supra note 313, at 9. 
331 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080 (1970). Even if there were a time limit, it would not bar claims of actual 
innocence in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a 
gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . . 
expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). 
332 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Fontenot v. Rios, 6:16-cv-00069-JHP-KEW (E.D. Okla. Feb. 
24, 2016) (citing state application for post-conviction relief filed on July 24, 2013, and denied by Judge 
Thomas S. Landrith on September 17, 2014, without a hearing, based on the state’s assertion of laches). 
333 Id. 
334 GRISHAM, supra note 306, at 298–301. 
335 Ward PC, supra note 313.  
336 Id. at 6. 
337 Id. at 58.  
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“reasonable probability” that Ward and Fontenot would not have been convicted—were 
fiction.338 
8. Jarvis Jay Masters—California 
 Jarvis Jay Masters was sentenced to death in 1990 for his purported role in the 
murder of Sergeant Dean Burchfield, a corrections officer at San Quentin Prison, on June 
8, 1985.339 At the time of the crime, Masters was serving a twenty-three-year sentence for 
a series of 1980 armed robberies.340 The prosecution alleged that another prisoner, Andre 
Johnson, stabbed Burchfield to death in culmination of a conspiracy with Masters and a 
third prisoner, Lawrence Woodard.341 Johnson and Woodard received life sentences.342 
All three prisoners were alleged members of a prison gang known as the Black Guerilla 
Family.343 
Burchfield died of a single stab wound that severed his pulmonary artery. 344 
Johnson was linked to the crime by Rick Lipton, a corrections officer, who testified that 
he had seen Burchfield collapse in front of Johnson’s cell.345 A “homemade spear shaft” 
was discovered nearby.346 The star witness against Masters and Woodard was Rufus 
Willis, also a member of the Black Guerilla Family, who testified under a grant of 
immunity from prosecution at the 1990 trial for which two juries were empaneled—one 
for Johnson, one for Masters and Woodard—before Marin County Superior Court Judge 
Beverly B. Savitt.347  
Willis told the Masters/Woodard jury that he had been in the prison exercise yard 
with the defendants and other members of the Black Guerilla Family when they plotted to 
kill corrections officers.348 Burchfield was chosen as the first—and it would turn out 
only—victim.349 It was agreed that Johnson would carry out the “hit” and Masters would 
provide the murder weapon.350 
The prosecution introduced notes—“kites,” in prison vernacular—that Willis 
claimed had been written by Masters describing his role in the murder, and a handwriting 
expert confirmed that the notes were in Masters’s handwriting.351 In addition, Bobby 
Evans, a Black Guerilla Family member, testified before both juries that Masters, 
Woodard, and Johnson had confessed their roles in the killing about a month after it 
                                                 
338 Id. at 6. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82, 289 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley 514 U.S. 
419, 433 (1995)).  
339 People v. Masters, 365 P.3d 861, 871–73 (Cal. 2016). 
340 People v. Masters, 134 Cal. App. 3d 509, 514 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Perez, 
207 Cal. App. 3d 431 (1989).  
341 People v. Johnson, 19 Cal. App. 4th 778, 794 (1993) (affirming convictions of Johnson and Woodard). 
342 Id. at 780. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at 783. 
345 Id. at 782. 
346 Id. at 783. 
347 People v. Masters, 365 P.3d 861, 873 (Cal. 2016). 
348 Id. at 872.  
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at 873. 
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occurred.352 Regardless of the merits of the cases against Johnson and Woodard, there 
was a serious problem with the Masters case: At a preliminary hearing, Willis had 
described Masters as standing five-seven, bespectacled, clean shaven, and free of tattoos, 
when in fact Masters stood six-one, did not wear glasses, had a mustache and goatee, and 
had a tattoo on his left cheek.353  
In addition, before trial, Harold Richardson, a San Quentin prisoner who fit the 
description Willis had provided of the conspirator alleged to be Masters, confessed to 
playing the role in the crime Willis attributed to Masters.354 At the trial, outside the 
presence of the juries, Masters’s counsel called Richardson to the stand, but he refused to 
testify, citing his right against self-incrimination.355 The defense asked Judge Savitt to 
grant Richardson immunity from prosecution and compel him to testify, but she 
refused.356 Savitt also denied a defense request to present expert testimony regarding the 
unreliability of jailhouse informants.357  
Although upon conviction Johnson and Woodard were sentenced to life in prison 
without parole,358 Masters was sentenced to death after a penalty-phase hearing at which 
a prisoner named Johnny Hoze, a member of the Black Guerilla Family, testified that 
Masters had bragged about murdering a San Quentin prisoner in 1984. 359  Masters, 
according to Hoze, called murdering the prisoner “better than sex.”360 
The Johnson and Woodard convictions were affirmed in 1993,361 but appeals in the 
Masters case would drag on for another quarter of a century with no end in sight,362 even 
though the witnesses whose testimony had led to his conviction and death sentence—
Rufus Willis, Bobby Evans, and Johnny Hoze—had recanted with sworn statements 
saying that they had lied at the trial in the hope of obtaining favorable treatment for 
themselves.363 The Willis statement also said that he had coerced Masters, out of fear for 
his safety, to write the incriminating “kites,” which Masters copied from writings of 
Willis and Woodard.364 In addition, Andre Johnson, the Masters co-defendant convicted 
of actually stabbing Burchfield to death, provided a sworn statement saying that Masters 
had no role in the murder.365 
                                                 
352 Id. at 877. Accusers with incentives to lie were instrumental in a majority of false convictions in U.S. 
capital cases from the 1970’s through the mid-2000’s. See THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 14. 
353 See Brief for Death Penalty Focus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee at 12, Jones v. 
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-56373) (citing Appellant’s Opening Brief at 50-51, People v. 
Masters, No. S016883 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2001)). 
354 Masters, 365 P.3d at 882.  
355 Id. at 885.  
356 Id. 
357 Id. at 891. 
358 People v. Johnson, 19 Cal. App. 4th 778, 780 (1993). 
359 Report of Referee Lynn Duryee at 18-21, In re Masters (Marin Cty. Super. Ct., Apr. 11, 2011) (No. 
S130495) [hereinafter Duryee] (on file with authors). 
360 Id. 
361 Johnson, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 794. 
362 See generally, Masters, 365 P.3d 861. 
363 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. 1, In the Matter of Masters, No. 016883 (Cal. Jan. 5, 2005) 
(Willis declaration) (on file with authors); id. Ex. 7 (declaration of Joseph Baxter, attorney for Masters, 
describing Evans’s recantation); id. Ex. 31 (Hoze declaration) (on file with authors). 
364 Id. Ex. 1, at 4–7. 
365 Id. Ex. 2 (Johnson declaration). 
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In 2004, while Masters’s direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme 
Court, his court-appointed appellate attorneys, Joseph Baxter and Richard I. Targow, 
filed a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus, citing the recantations and alleging that 
Masters’s conviction and death sentence rested on evidence that the prosecution had 
known or should have known “was inflammatory, unreliable, untrue, and/or 
misleading.”366  
Under a 2008 order of the California Supreme Court, Marin County Superior Court 
Judge Lynn Duyree was appointed as a referee to review questions raised in the habeas 
petition, but she did not conduct a hearing until 2011.367 At the hearing, which lasted 
thirteen days, Duyree heard extensive testimony from Willis and Evans, expert testimony 
of a forensic linguist who said that the kites used against Masters had been authored by 
someone other than Masters, and evidence pertaining to the statements of Hoze, who did 
not testify.368At the conclusion of the hearing, Duyree concluded that the evidence she 
heard did not support issuance of the writ—because she had “scant ability to discern” 
whether Willis and Evans had lied at the trial or before her,369 because the unrebutted 
forensic linguistic testimony, while convincing, did not exonerate Masters, 370  and 
because Hoze’s disavowal of his trial testimony was “not believable.” 371  In 2012, 
Masters’s lawyers filed a response in the Supreme Court contending that most of 
Duyree’s findings were not supported by the record or were contrary to law, or both, and 
arguing that Masters was entitled to habeas relief because “[e]very single piece of post-
trial evidence casts fundamental doubt upon [his] conviction and points unerringly to his 
innocence.”372 
In 2015, Masters’s plight was cited in an amicus brief filed by Death Penalty Focus 
of California in the case of Ernest Dewayne Jones as an example of the state’s 
“exorbitant delays in processing capital cases.”373 A year earlier, a federal judge had held 
in the Jones case that “the dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty 
system” rendered it cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional.374 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court decision, holding that federal courts cannot consider novel 
constitutional theories on habeas review—but not disagreeing that the state’s death 
                                                 
366 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1–2, 11, 48–58, 117, In re Masters, No. 10467 (Cal. Dec. 28, 
2004) (on file with authors). A California petition for habeas corpus generally must be filed while the direct 
appeal is pending. See OFFICE OF VICTIMS’ SERVS., CAL. ATTORNEY GEN.’S OFFICE, A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO 
THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 6, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf. 
367 Duryee, supra note 359, at 1. 
368 Id. at 8–13 (discussion of Willis and Evans testimony and recantations); id. 14–15 (discussion of 
forensic linguist Robert Leonard’s testimony); id. at 18–26 (discussion of Hoze testimony and recantation). 
369 Id. at 6.  
370 Id. at 15.  
371 Id. at 25. For a discussion of how judges often fail to take recantations seriously, see Rob Warden, 
Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 106–16 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
372 Petitioner’s Exceptions to Referee’s Report at 2–3, 227, In re Masters, No. S130495 (Cal. Jan. 2, 2012) 
(on file with authors). 
373 Brief for Death Penalty Focus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 353, at 2, 
11–14. 
374 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2014), reversed by Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 
538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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penalty system is dysfunctional and that the delay between sentencing and execution is 
extraordinary.375 
In 2016—twenty-six years after Masters had been sentenced to death and without 
reference to evidence adduced in his still-unresolved habeas proceedings—the California 
Supreme Court finally ruled on his direct appeal, affirming his conviction and 
sentence.376 As a result, in early 2019, despite the substantial evidence of innocence, 
Masters remained on death row—where he became a Buddhist and wrote two books377—
barred from pursuing relief in the federal courts until his state remedies have been 
exhausted.378 
One factor in the delay of the adjudication of the Masters case—the proverbial 
elephant in the room—may be its political touchiness, in light of the facts that the victim 
was a corrections officer, that the corrections officers’ union is a powerful political force 
in California,379 and that members of the California judiciary must stand for election.380 
In November 1986, just short of a year and a half after the Burchfield murder, the perils 
of appearing soft on crime became apparent in California, when voters ousted three 
liberal justices of the California Supreme Court, including Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth 
Bird, whom the Los Angeles Times reported “fell victim to a multimillion-dollar 
campaign that focused on her long record of voting to overturn death sentences.”381  
The Masters case is perhaps just the sort of travesty that Harvard Law School Dean 
Roscoe Pound had in mind eighty years before the Bird defeat when he opined that 
“putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politicians, in many 
jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”382 
9. Ralph International Thomas—California 
The bodies of two Grateful Dead fans—Mary Regina Gioia, twenty-two, of 
Schenectady, New York, and Gregory Allen Kniffin, eighteen, of Wilton, Connecticut—
were found in San Francisco Bay the morning of August 16, 1985.383 They had been 
beaten and shot at point-blank range near a Berkeley transient encampment known as 
                                                 
375 Jones, 806 F.3d at 541, 553. 
376 People v. Masters, 365 P.3d 861, 871 (Cal. 2016). 
377 JARVIS JAY MASTERS, FINDING FREEDOM: WRITINGS FROM DEATH ROW (1997); JARVIS JAY MASTERS, 
THAT BIRD HAS MY WINGS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN INNOCENT MAN ON DEATH ROW (2009). 
378 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). Although Masters remains on death row, the chance that he will be 
executed was diminished when Governor Gavin Newsom declared a moratorium on executions on March 
13, 2019. See A Pause for California’s Death Row, supra note 13.  
379 See Ed Salzman, Politicians Protect and Serve the Police, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1989, at 3 (describing the 
California Correctional Peace Officers Association as “the most potent of the [state’s] law-enforcement 
unions”). 
380 See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Judicial Selection in the States: California, JUD. SELECTION IN THE 
STATES, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=CA (last visited May 23, 
2019).  
381 Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate Three of Court’s Liberal Justices: Bird Becomes First Chief Justice to 
Be Ousted in Modern Era, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at B1. 
382 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. 
REV. 729, 748 (1906). 
383 People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 106–07 (Cal. 1992); Charles Burress, Ex-Convict Arrested in Berkeley 
Slaying, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 27, 1985, at 3. (The article spells the male victim’s name “Kniffen,” but 
reported decisions spell it “Kniffin.”) 
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Rainbow Village, where they and other followers of the Grateful Dead had been 
staying.384 
Ralph International Thomas, a thirty-one-year-old ex-convict, was arrested ten days 
after the murders.385 Following a 1986 jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to death 
based solely on circumstantial evidence: that he had been with the victims not long before 
they were slain, that he had owned what might have been the murder weapon, a 
Remington .44 Magnum rifle that he claimed had been stolen before the murders and had 
never been recovered, and that statements attributed to him after his arrest were indicative 
of guilt.386  
 The defense postulated that the murders had been committed not by Thomas, an 
African American, but by a white, blond-haired man who had been implicated in the 
crime by a witness named Vivian Cercy.387 At a preliminary hearing, Cercy testified that 
she had seen the victims walking toward the waterfront with the man who was carrying 
what Cercy thought at the time was a stick, but that could have been a rifle, heard three 
firecracker-like sounds, and saw the man return from the waterfront and wipe his hands 
on vegetation.388 Cercy was unavailable at Thomas’s trial, but her preliminary-hearing 
testimony was read to the jury.389  
 After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed,390 Thomas sought a state 
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial counsel, Alameda County Public 
Defender James Chaffee, had failed to investigate the alternative suspect whom Cercy 
had described.391 In 2002, the California Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing at 
which several witnesses identified the blond man as James Bowen, a Grateful Dead fan 
known as “Bo.”392 The Supreme Court concluded that Thomas indeed had been deprived 
of effective assistance of counsel, but nonetheless denied relief because he had failed to 
show prejudice and because it was “difficult to know” what a competent investigation 
might have demonstrated two decades earlier.393 
Thomas next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, which U.S. District Court 
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel granted in September 2009, ordering a new trial.394 Judge Patel 
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,395 but Thomas had 
suffered a series of strokes and seizures and his mental health had deteriorated to a point 
                                                 
384 Thomas, 828 P.2d at 106 n.2. 
385 Id. at 107, 111, 125–26. Thomas’s prior convictions were for rape, armed robbery, and sodomy. He was 
born on June 14, 1954. Ralph International Thomas, ARRESTFACTS.COM, https://arrestfacts.com/Ralph-
Thomas-0i6C13 (last visited May 23, 2019). 
386 Thomas, 828 P.2d at 106–09, 113, 122 n.13. 
387 Id. at 110, 125. 
388 Id. at 111. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 105. 
391 In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 50–52 (Cal. 2006). 
392 Id. at 51; see also id. at 69–70 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
393 Id. at 55, 61–62.  
394 See Thomas v. Wong, No. C 93-0616 MHP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131945, at *16–17, *57–58 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) (holding that Chaffee failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into evidence 
supporting the theory that someone other than Thomas committed the murders).  
395 Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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that rendered him incompetent to stand trial.396 As a result, nearly three decades after he 
was sentenced to death, Thomas was committed to a state mental health facility, where, 
his opportunity to establish his innocence foreclosed, he died in January 2014.397 
10. Ha’im Al Matin Sharif—Nevada 
Charles Lamont Robins, later known as Ha’im Al Matin Sharif,398 was sentenced to 
death in December 1988 for what a medical examiner deemed the murder of his 
girlfriend’s infant daughter the previous April in Las Vegas.399 The child, Brittany Smith, 
suffered extensive injuries—a broken back, broken leg, and internal hemorrhaging400—
but medical evidence would emerge a quarter of a century later indicating that her 
injuries were the result of infantile scurvy. 401  In addition, Brittany’s mother, Lovell 
McDowell, who testified in 1988 that Robins had abused Brittany, recanted that 
testimony and accused police and prosecutors of coercing her to lie by threatening to send 
her to prison and take away her other three children.402 
In September 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court, citing “the compelling nature of 
the new medical evidence” and McDowell’s recantation, ordered the trial court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on Sharif’s innocence claim.403 Although the Supreme Court found it 
“more likely than not” that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the 
new evidence, assuming that it withstood scrutiny at trial, 404  Sharif entered into an 
agreement with the prosecution under which his conviction and death sentence were 
vacated in exchange for pleading guilty to second-degree murder—foreclosing the 
possibility of his exoneration, but effecting his immediate release in 2017.405 Had he not 
accepted the deal, Sharif would have remained on death row while pursuing his actual-
innocence claim.406  
 At the trial, McDowell testified that she was awakened shortly after 12:30 A.M. on 
April 19, 1988, by sounds of Brittany gagging or choking and arose to find Robins 
holding the eleven-month-old and hollering, “Brittany, come on. Brittany, wake up. 
Wake up Brittany.”407 McDowell called 911 and ran outside, screaming that her baby had 
                                                 
396 David Crawford, A Crumbling Death Penalty System Does Not Benefit Inmates, Especially the Innocent, 
CASETEXT (Sept. 1, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/a-crumbling-death-penalty-system-does-not-benefit-
inmates-especially-the-innocent. 
397 Id.  
398 Order Changing Name, In the Matter of the Application of Charles Robins (Nev. 7th Dist. Jud. Ct. Mar. 
13, 1995) (on file with authors). 
399 Amended Judgment of Conviction, Nevada v. Robins, No. C84005 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1989) 
(on file with authors); see also Robins v. State, 798 P.2d 558, 561 (Nev. 1990) (per curiam). 
400 Robins, 798 P.2d at 615–16. 
401 Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *6–9 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016). 
402 Declaration of Lovell McDowell (May 5, 2013) (on file with authors). 
403 Robins, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *13–15. 
404 Id. at *14. 
405 Memorandum of Agreement, Nevada v. Robins, No. 88C084005 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct. May 16, 2017) 
(on file with authors).  
406 The plea agreement specified that his conviction and death sentence would be reinstated if he attempted 
further litigation regarding any issues arising from the case. Id. at 2–3. For a discussion of why defendants 
sometimes plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, see Toni Schlesinger, Plea Bargaining Is Torture, 
CHI. LAW., Dec. 1, 1978, at 1 (interview with University of Chicago Law Professor John H. Langbein). 
407 Robins v. State, 798 P.2d 558, 614–15 (Nev. 1990) (per curiam). 
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stopped breathing.408 An Air Force sergeant who heard McDowell’s screams performed 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation before paramedics arrived and rushed Brittany to a 
hospital, where she was pronounced dead.409  
Dr. Nina Hollander, the state medical examiner, concluded from an autopsy that 
Brittany died from blunt-force trauma, which could not have resulted from the attempted 
resuscitation. 410  Robins, then nineteen, 411  was charged with first-degree murder and 
felony child abuse.412 Based on Hollander’s findings and testimony by McDowell and 
other prosecution witnesses who claimed to have seen Robins physically abuse 
Brittany—contrary to findings of medical professionals and child-abuse investigators 
who examined her on four occasions during the relevant time period and found no 
abuse413—the jury convicted Robins and concluded that Brittany’s death involved torture 
and depravity of mind, thus warranting a death sentence.414 
Affirming the conviction and sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
“abusive treatment by Robins ultimately resulted in the infant’s untimely and brutally 
violent death.”415 Robins would languish on Nevada death row for more than another two 
decades, losing appeal after appeal,416 until Cary Sandman, an attorney with the Federal 
Defender for the District of Arizona, was appointed to the case in 2012.417  
Sandman lined up two distinguished experts—Dr. Patrick D. Barnes, chief of 
pediatric neuroradiology at Stanford University Medical Center, and Dr. John Plunkett, a 
board-certified physician in anatomical, clinical, and forensic pathology who had 
performed more than 200 autopsies on children under age two—to review Brittany’s 
medical records—from which both concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
that Brittany died of undiagnosed and untreated infantile scurvy.418 
Sandman also tracked down Brittany’s mother, who, in addition to recanting her 
trial testimony, claimed that the other prosecution witnesses who accused Robins of 
abusing Brittany had lied under oath and that one of those witnesses had admitted to her 
that he had falsely accused Robins in the hope of receiving leniency in a pending drug 
case.419 After agreeing to the plea deal—rendering himself legally, if not in fact, guilty—
Sharif walked off of Nevada death row, his home for nearly three decades, and went to 
live with relatives in Washington State.420  
                                                 
408 Id.  
409 Id.  
410 Id. at 561–62. 
411 Robins was born on August 31, 1968. Certificate of Live Birth for Charles Lamont Robins, Los 
Angeles, Cal. (1968) (on file with authors). 
412 Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 Nev. Unpub LEXIS 764, at *4 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016). 
413 Id. at *9. 
414 Robins, 798 P.2d at 569 n.4. 
415 Id. at 560. 
416 See Robins v. Baker, No. 2:99-cv-0412-LRH-PAL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158402, at *12–17 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 4, 2013).  
417 Id. at *16.  
418 Brief for Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae Supporting Charles Robins, aka Ha’im Al Matin Sharif, 
Robins v. Baker at *7, No. 65063 (Clark Cty. Dist. Ct., Sept. 8, 2014); Michael Kiefer, The Long Journey 
from Death Row to Freedom, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/06/15/nevada-death-row-inmate-
set-free-arizona-lawyer/394809001/. 
419 Declaration of Lovell McDowell, supra note 402, at ¶ ¶ 21–23.  
420 Kiefer, supra note 418.  
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11. Walter Ogrod—Pennsylvania 
After his first trial ended with a jury hung eleven-one in favor of acquittal in 
1993,421  Walter Ogrod was convicted and sentenced to death in 1996 following his 
second trial for the murder of four-year-old Barbara Jean Horn, whose naked, battered 
body had been found in a plastic trash bag inside a cardboard box near her Northeast 
Philadelphia home late the afternoon of July 12, 1988.422 She died of five blows to her 
head inflicted with what the medical examiner thought might have been a two-by-four.423 
There was nothing to indicate that she had been sexually assaulted.424 
Minutes before the grisly discovery, which occurred about two and a half hours 
after the child had been playing in her front yard, four witnesses saw a man carrying the 
box in which the body would be found—a man the witnesses described as in his mid-
twenties or early thirties, standing five-six to five-nine, weighing 165 to 175 pounds, and 
having either dark or sandy hair.425 Shortly before the man was seen by those witnesses, 
another witness who knew the child had seen her walking with a man of similar 
description. 426  From descriptions provided by two of the witnesses, a police artist 
prepared a sketch of the suspect, and a third witness deemed the sketch accurate, 
especially the hair.427  
 The initial suspect was Barbara Jean’s step-father, John Fahy,428 who was in his 
late twenties, stood five-seven, weighed about 160 pounds, and had short brown hair.429 
But police soon focused on other suspects, including Wesley Ward, who had purchased a 
television set in the box in which the body was found,430 and Ross Felice, whom two of 
the witnesses identified as the man they saw carrying the box, but grand juries declined to 
indict either man.431 Police collected organic evidence from the homes of Ward and 
Felice, as well as from the plastic bag and box in which the body had been found, but the 
                                                 
421 Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 305–06 (Pa. 2002); Dianna Marder, Mistrial, Melee End 
Ogrod Trial, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 1993, at A1; see also THOMAS LOWENSTEIN, THE TRIALS OF 
WALTER OGROD 8–9, 288–89 (2017). 
422 Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 306–07, 309; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 5, 8, 10, 302–03; Jack McGuire & 
Gloria Campisi, Child’s Slaying Has NE in Panic, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 13, 1988, at 1; Jury Chooses 
Execution for Walter Ogrod, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1, 1996, at B1; Kimberly J. McLarin & Edward 
Colimore, Man Held in Child's '88 Killing: Ex-Neighbor of N.E. Phila. Girl, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 7, 
1992, at B1.  
423 Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 306–07; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 10. 
424 Postmortem Report at 6, Paul J. Hoyer, M.D. July 12, 1988) (“Oral, rectal, and vaginal smears do not 
show sperm.”) (on file with authors). 
425 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 4–6, 19, 22, 325 n.5 (quoting a police interview on July 12, 1988 with 
Margaret Kruce, mother of a friend of the murdered child). 
426 Id. at 5, 8 (fixing timeframe between the child’s disappearance and discovery of her body); id. at 21–22, 
325 n.4 (quoting July 12, 1988 police interview with Peter Vargas, who had been installing an air 
conditioner in the area); see also Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 308–09 (summarizing trial testimony of witnesses 
Michael Massi and David Schectman).  
427 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 22. 
428 See id. at 10 (quoting Fahy as saying that one officer told him, “We found her, she’s dead, and you did 
it.”).  
429 See id. at 11 (reporting that Fahy was 22 when he met the victim’s mother in 1983); see also id. at 17 
(describing Fahy). 
430 Id. at 27–28.  
431 Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 309; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 28–30. 
Vol. 14:3]                                                                                Rob Warden and John Seasly 
413 
evidence was not subjected to DNA testing.432 One of the witnesses who had identified 
Felice also identified yet another suspect, Raymond Sheehan, from a photo.433  
 The case had grown cold by February 1992, when it was reassigned to veteran 
Philadelphia Detectives Martin Devlin and Paul Worrell.434 Four months earlier, Devlin 
had obtained a confession that would prove false after resulting in the conviction of an 
innocent man for the murder and rape of a seventy-seven-year-old woman.435 Devlin and 
Worrell also threatened and physically coerced witness statements and false confessions 
that had culminated in the conviction of another innocent man for the murder of the 
seventy-eight-year-old operator of a payday-loan business.436 
Once assigned to the Horn investigation, Delvin and Worrell began re-interviewing 
persons who had been interviewed four years earlier—among them Ogrod, who at the 
time of the crime shared a home in the neighborhood with a couple whose young son, 
known as “Charliebird,” was a friend and playmate of Barbara Jean Horn.437 In 1990, 
Ogrod had moved into an apartment above a chandelier shop in suburban Glenside, 
where Worrell went on April 4, 1992.438 Ogrod was not at home, but Worrell left his 
business card at the chandelier shop, asking the owner to ask Ogrod to call the next 
day.439 As requested, Ogrod, now twenty-seven, called and, at Worrell’s request, drove to 
the Philadelphia Police Administration Building, known as the “Roundhouse,” to be 
interviewed—not as a suspect, according to the detectives, but as an “informational 
witness.”440 
Ogrod, who had no criminal record and did not fit the description of the man seen 
carrying the box,441 had attended a school for youths with learning disabilities, graduating 
two years late.442 “Crazy Walter,” as he was known,443 had served briefly in the Army, 
from which he received a medical discharge based on a diagnosis of “mixed personality 
disorder characterized by extreme dependency.”444  One acquaintance said that Ogrod 
“seemed mentally retarded,” 445  and other acquaintances described him as “easily 
                                                 
432 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief at 6, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 
(Pa. 1st Dist. Ct. of Common Pleas, June 24, 2011). 
433 Id. at 4 n.2. 
434 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 37. 
435 Joseph A. Slobodzian, 25 Years Later, Freed by DNA Evidence: ‘It’s the Greatest Day of My Life’, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2016, at A1. 
436 Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 373–75 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
437 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 14, 63. Walter’s adoptive father, who died in 1984, bequeathed the 
house to his sister, Walter’s aunt, on condition that she allow Walter to live there. Id. at 53. 
438 Id. at 66–67; see also Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 8.  
439 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421.  
440 Id. at 17, 66, 109; see also Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 311 (Pa. 2002). Ogrod was born on 
February 3, 1965. Inmate Search Results, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result 
(search for “Walter Ogrod”) (last visited May 23, 2019). 
441 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 24; see also Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 
432, at 6. 
442 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 52. 
443 Id. at 44. 
444 Id. at 51. 
445  Affidavit/Declaration of Steven King dated June 14, 2011, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 36, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors).  
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manipulated,”446  “definitely slow,” 447  and “an easy person to bully.” 448  When Ogrod 
arrived at the Roundhouse, he had been awake for roughly thirty hours, having worked an 
eighteen-hour shift as a driver for a commercial bakery.449  
After hours of interrogation, which was not electronically recorded, Ogrod signed 
each page of a sixteen-page statement—purportedly in his own words, but in Devlin’s 
handwriting— confessing to the murder and attempted sexual assault of Barbara Jean 
Horn.450 According to the statement, which Ogrod recanted almost immediately, the four-
year-old had come to his house looking for Charliebird,451 whereupon he lured her into 
the basement to “play doctor” and tried to force her to perform oral sex.452 She screamed, 
prompting him to strike her head at least four times with “what felt like a pipe,” but 
perhaps was a “pull-down bar” from his weight set.453 He said he then washed her body, 
put it into a plastic bag, and disposed of it in the box in which it would be found.454 
Ogrod was charged with murder and related sex crimes.455 
 At the 1993 trial, the prosecution relied principally upon the signed confession, 
which Judge Juanita Kidd Stout held admissible despite a psychiatrist’s testimony that it 
was not in Ogrod’s style of speaking.456 Ogrod took the stand, denying the murder and 
asserting that, during the hours of interrogation, the detectives had persuaded him—
briefly—that he must be guilty.457 There was no physical evidence linking him to the 
crime.458 The murder weapon was not, and would not be, recovered.459 
                                                 
446 Affidavit/Declaration of Heidi Guhl dated Feb. 20, 2011, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 14, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors). 
447 Affidavit/Declaration of Kim Ward dated Feb. 18, 2011, Ex. No. 22, Appx. Vol. I, Amended Petition for 
Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court of 
Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors).  
448 Affidavit/Declaration of Tara Doherty dated Apr. 22, 2011, at ¶ 3, Ex. No. 39, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011) (on file with authors). 
449  Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432 at 13.  
450 Id. at 14–16. The length of the interrogation was in dispute. The confession was signed at least fourteen 
hours after Ogrod arrived at the Roundhouse. Confessions following interrogations in excess of six hours 
were presumptively inadmissible, but detectives contended that the “six-hour rule” had not been violated 
because they had regarded Ogrod as an “informational witness”—not a suspect—until he blurted out the 
confession. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 109–10, 127. Deprivation of sleep has been described as “the 
most effective torture and certain to produce any confession desired.” Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 
150 n.6 (1944) (citing a 1930 report of the Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law to the Section of 
Criminal Law and Criminology of the American Bar Association). 
451 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 15; Edward Colimore, Confession Released in Girl’s Slaying, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, May 15, 1992, at B1.  
452 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 15. 
453 Id. at 15–16. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. at 25. 
456 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 115–66. 
457 Id. at 133–46. Promptly after signing the statement, Ogrod insisted that he had not committed the crime. 
Id. at 84. 
458 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 2. 
459 Id. at 2. 
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After nine hours of deliberation at the end of the eight-and-a-half-day trial, the jury 
foreman sent a note to Judge Stout stating that the jury was deadlocked eleven to one.460 
Stout summoned the parties to the courtroom, but before court reconvened the foreman 
informed her that the jury had reached a verdict after all.461 The acquittal was announced 
in open court, but when jurors were polled, one said, “I do not agree with the verdict.”462 
Stout declared a mistrial.463  
Charles T. Graham, the jury foreman, who favored acquittal, would explain, “I did 
not believe that Mr. Ogrod was the source of the confession because when he took the 
stand it was clear to me that he could not have authored something as sophisticated as the 
confession. I came to this conclusion because on the stand Mr. Ogrod was not very 
articulate and had difficulty expressing himself.”464 Graham quoted Alfred Szewczak, the 
juror who changed his mind after initially agreeing to the acquittal, as telling the other 
jurors, “Ogrod signed the confession—I have no doubt he’s guilty. No amount of duress 
would make me sign or agree to anything I didn’t believe.”465 
Less than two month before Ogrod’s 1996 retrial,466 the prosecution disclosed to 
his court-appointed lawyer, Mark Greenberg, that two repeat felons, Jay Wolchansky and 
John Hall, had come forward some eighteen months earlier to claim that Ogrod had 
confessed to them when the three were in jail together.467 Wolchansky was an acolyte of 
Hall, a serial informant known as “the Monsignor” for his success in obtaining 
confessions, or rather claiming to obtain them.468 Because the Monsignor “had a lot of 
baggage,” he would not be called to testify against Ogrod, but the acolyte became a 
principal witness for the prosecution at the retrial. 469  Under the alias Jason 
Banachowski,470 Wolchansky testified that Ogrod had admitted luring the victim into his 
house and trying to force her to perform oral sex, but when “she became hysterical . . . he 
grabbed a weight bar and smacked her in the head with it.”471 Wolchansky, who claimed 
that he expected nothing in exchange for his testimony, added that Ogrod had mentioned 
                                                 
460 Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 305 (Pa. 2003). 
461 Id. at 306 
462 Id.  
463 Id. 
464 Affidavit/Declaration of Charles T. Graham dated Dec. 12, 2011, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 5, Appx. Vol. I, 
Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief,  
465 Id. at 91. 
466 A motion to block retrial on double-jeopardy grounds was denied. Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 657 A.2d 
52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); see also Ogrod v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1076 (1996) (denial of certiorari). The 
motion was predicated on the fact that Ogrod’s counsel had not requested the mistrial, citing case law to the 
effect that a second trial following an unrequested mistrial violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment unless the mistrial was manifestly necessary. In Ogrod’s case, the mistrial was held to have 
been manifestly necessary. Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 316–17 (citing Commonwealth v. Diehl, 615 A.2d 690 (Pa. 
1992)). 
467 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 16–20. 
468 Id., at 118; see also Affidavit of Fr. John Bonavitacola ¶ 13, Feb. 1, 2011) (on file with authors); 
William Bunch, The Snitch: Career Thief a Master at Dropping the Dime; “Monsignor” Hall Knows How 
to Elicit Jail Confessions, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997, at 1. 
469 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 219 (discussing the decision of Judith Rubino, the prosecutor at the 
second trial, not to put Hall on the stand); id. at 310 (quoting a post-trial interview with Rubino). 
470 The alias was allowed ostensibly to protect Wolchansky and his family. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, at 327. 
471 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 42.  
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that his mother—by this time deceased—had accused him of the killing, to which he had 
replied, “Damn right I did, and if you know what’s best for you, you’ll keep quiet.”472 
On Greenberg’s advice, Ogrod did not testify at the retrial.473 Greenberg, moreover, 
presented nothing to rebut the confession testimony, not even challenging the 
questionable claim that the murder weapon had been a weight bar, focusing instead on 
the possibility that one of the initial suspects, Ross Felice, had committed the crime.474 In 
closing, the prosecutor, Assistant Philadelphia District Attorney Judith Rubino, suggested 
that Ogrod’s silence was indicative of guilt, telling the jury that the “defendant admitted 
to his mother that he killed Barbara Jean and threatened his own mother; there had been 
no denial of that.”475 Judge Stout sustained an objection from Greenberg, who would 
state in chambers that he did not ask for a mistrial because he knew that Stout would tell 
the jury that defendants were not required to testify.476 
 After instructions, the jury retired and took an initial vote, which was ten-to-two 
in favor of conviction, according to a journal kept by juror Thomas James, who made the 
journal available to journalist Thomas Lowenstein.477 An hour and twenty minutes after 
deliberations began, court adjourned for the day, but the jury, after deliberating another 
hour and a half the next day, found Ogrod guilty of murder and attempted involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse. 478  The day after that, jurors deliberated less than ninety 
minutes before unanimously agreeing that Ogrod deserved to die.479 Judge Stout imposed 
the death sentence on November 8, 1996.480 
 It was not until more than seven years later that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed Ogrod’s conviction and death sentence,481 rebuffing his claims that Rubino had 
impermissibly commented on his silence and that Greenberg had been ineffective in 
failing to object to the 1993 mistrial.482 Five months before Ogrod’s conviction and death 
sentence were affirmed, Raymond Sheehan pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in 
prison for the murder and rape of a ten-year-old girl the year before the Horn murder in 
the same neighborhood.483 
 After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ogrod case,484 a team of 
federal community defenders and pro bono attorneys from the Philadelphia firm of 
Bingham McCutchen LLP485 brought a petition for a state habeas corpus, proffering new 
                                                 
472 Id. at 73 (quoting trial transcript). 
473 Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, at 315. 
474 Id. at 279, 315.  
475 Id. at 324. 
476 Id. at 324–25. 
477 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 241, 287; email message from Thomas Lowenstein, author of THE 
TRIALS OF WALTER OGROD, to Rob Warden (Nov. 14, 2018, 10:58 AM CST) (on file with authors) (stating 
that James made the journal available to Lowenstein). 
478 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 288. 
479 Linda Loyd, Jury Chooses Execution for Walter Ogrod, PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 10, 1996, at B1. 
480 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 26. 
481 The decision was rendered on December 20, 2003. Ogrod, 839 A.2d at 294. 
482 Id. at 324–25, 336, 347.  
483 Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Life Term in Rape, Murder of Girl, 10, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 24, 2003, at A1; 
see also Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 4 n.2. 
484 Ogrod v. Pennsylvania, 543 U.S. 1188 (2005). 
485 Bingham McCutchen ceased operation in 2014. Julie Triedman, How Bingham Failed: The Inside Story, 
AM. LAW., Jan. 14, 2015, at 60. 
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evidence that “affirmatively demonstrates” Ogrod’s innocence and “undermines and 
refutes” the prosecution case. 486  The new evidence included a series of affidavits, 
including one from John Hall, now deceased, stating that Jay Wolchansky, also 
deceased, 487  had never talked to Ogrod “in any detail” and had obtained all of the 
information he purported to know about the Horn crime from Hall,488 one from Hall’s 
widow stating that Hall had told her that Ogrod had not confessed in jail,489 one from a 
man who had been in Ogrod’s basement shortly after the Horn child’s body was found 
and who saw neither blood nor signs of a clean-up,490 one from a pathologist with whom 
the medical examiner who performed the Horn autopsy concurred in the opinion that the 
murder weapon could not have been the weight bar,491 one from a witness stating that the 
man carrying the box had lit a cigarette,492 and ones from associates of Ogrod attesting 
that he did not smoke.493  
 The petition alleged that Mark Greenberg had rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the second trial—principally by failing to pursue evidence of Ogrod’s 
innocence, failing to retain and proffer the testimony of an expert witness regarding the 
counter-intuitive phenomena of false confessions, and failing to explain why Ogrod, in 
light of his sleep deprivation and limited intellect, had been especially vulnerable to 
psychologically coercive interrogation techniques employed by police.494 The petition 
also accused the prosecution of withholding evidence, in violation of the U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
486 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 41. 
487 Hall and Wolchansky died weeks apart in 2006. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 317. 
488 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 
1st Dist. Court of Common Pleas, 2011). Hall’s fabrication of the Ogrod confession fit into a pattern of 
informing—including in, but not limited to, the cases of Ernest Priovolos and Thomas DeBlase in 
Montgomery County, David Dickson in Philadelphia County, and Michael Dirago in Burlington County. 
Id. at ¶ 3.  
489 Affidavit/Declaration of Phyllis Hall dated Jan. 8, 2009, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 31, Appx. Vol. III, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011).  
490 Affidavit/Declaration of Harold Vahey dated June 6, 2011, at ¶ 18, Ex. No. 17, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011). 
491 Affidavit/Declaration of Marcella Fiero dated Sept. 14, 2010, at ¶¶ 13–15 Ex. No. 23, Appx. Vol. I, 
Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st 
Dist. Court of Common Pleas, 2011). 
492 Affidavit/Declaration of Peter Vargas dated Aug. 24, 2006, at ¶ 9, Ex. No. 30, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011). 
493 Affidavit/Declaration of Melanie Ostash dated June 9, 2011, at ¶ 8, Ex. No. 27, Appx. Vol. I, Amended 
Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court 
of Common Pleas, 2011); Affidavit/Declaration of Steven Mulvey (roofing-business operator who 
employed Walter Ogrod) dated Apr. 27, 2011, at ¶ 5, Ex. No. 27, Appx. Vol. I, Amended Petition for 
Habeas Corpus Relief, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, CP-51-CR-0532718-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Court of 
Common Pleas, 2011). 
494 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief at 47–50, 54–58, 63–69, 72–85, 112–16; Report of Richard 
A. Leo, expert on psychological coercion and false confessions, to Andrew Gallo, one of Ogrod’s appellate 
attorneys, at 10–15 (June 2, 2011) (on file with authors). 
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Court’s Brady decision,495 that Hall and Wolchansky had received leniency in exchange 
for their cooperation in the Ogrod case.496 
 Judge Shelley Robins New,497 a former Philadelphia assistant district attorney 
who had worked as a homicide prosecutor alongside Judith Rubino until 1995, was 
assigned to the case.498 In April 2013, a little more than twenty-one months after Ogrod’s 
petition was filed, the commonwealth responded with a motion to dismiss the petition 
without an evidentiary hearing.499 Despite an ensuing lapse of nearly six years, Judge 
New had not ruled as of late January 2019.500 
Ogrod may have reason for optimism, however, in light of what a Philadelphia 
columnist termed a “seismic shift in the city’s criminal-justice climate”501—the result of 
the election of a progressive district attorney, Larry Krasner, who was sworn in on 
January 1, 2018, to replace R. Seth Williams, who had been district attorney during the 
pendency of Ogrod’s state habeas until he went to federal prison for taking bribes in 
2017.502 On March 16, 2018, Krasner’s office informed Judge New that the office’s 
Conviction Review Unit, headed by Patricia Cummings, who had been aggressive in 
correcting wrongful convictions as head of a comparable unit in Dallas County, Texas, 
was reviewing the case. 503  The office’s communications director, Ben Waxman, 
confirmed that the office had agreed to extensive state-of-the-art DNA testing,504 which 
Williams’s administration had opposed.505 If the DNA testing were to lead to Ogrod’s 
exoneration, he will have served longer after having been sentenced to death than all but 
three prisoners who have been exonerated by DNA in capital cases.506 
12. Anibal Garcia Rousseau—Texas 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency investigators David Delitta and James 
Sullivan were about to join friends for dinner at a Houston restaurant on October 27, 
                                                 
495 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
496 Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, supra note 432, at 121–42. 
497 Criminal Docket at 31, Commonwealth v. Ogrod, No. CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Pa. 1st Dist. Ct. of 
Common Pleas) (on file with authors). 
498 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 421, at 320. 
499 Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss at 114, Ogrod, No. CP-51-CR-0532781-1992 (Apr. 4, 2013) (on file 
with authors).  
500 Email message from Thomas Lowenstein, author of THE TRIALS OF WALTER OGROD, to Rob Warden 
(Jan. 24, 2019, 9:48 AM CST) (on file with authors). 
501 Will Bunch, New Hope for Man Convicted in 1988 Murder, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 6, 2018, at 8.  
502 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Acts of Conviction, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2018, at 28. Williams was installed 
as district attorney in January 2010 and went to prison in 2017. Miriam Hill, R. Seth Williams Installed as 
Philadelphia D.A., PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 5, 2010, at A1; Jeremy Roebuck, 
Philly DA Seth Williams Pleads Guilty, Goes to Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 30, 2017), 
http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/crime/philly-da-seth-williams-xxxxxxxx-20170629.html. 
503 Gonnerman, supra note 502, at 28; see also Criminal Docket, supra note 497, at 31. 
504 Bunch, supra note 501.  
505 Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss, supra note 499, at 91–93. 
506 Data compiled by authors from the National Registry of Exonerations. Those who served longer than 
Ogrod has served were Leon Brown and Henry McCollum, co-defendants, who served nearly thirty years 
in North Carolina for a rape and murder they did not commit, and Paul G. House, who served slightly more 
than twenty-two years in Tennessee for a murder he did not commit. Paul G. House, NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, supra note 4, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3307. 
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1988, when a man armed with what Sullivan described as a silver, chrome, or nickel 
revolver “popped up” from between parked cars in the parking lot and robbed them.507 
Delitta drew a gun from an ankle holster and exchanged fire with the robber, who fled on 
foot.508 Delitta died the next day of a .38- or .357-caliber bullet wound.509 
From a description provided by Sullivan, police prepared a composite sketch 
depicting the killer as a dark-complexioned white or Hispanic man, forty-five to fifty-five 
years old, weighing about 160 pounds, standing five-eight or five-nine, and having 
medium-length dark hair, a thin mustache, and wrinkled forehead.510 After a robbery 
detective noted that the man depicted in the sketch resembled Anibal Garcia Rousseau, a 
forty-seven-year-old drug addict who supported his addiction by committing armed 
robberies, Sullivan identified Rousseau from a photo array as the killer.511 On November 
7, ten days after Delitta died, police announced that Rousseau was being sought as a 
suspect.512 He remained at large until December 9, when a television reporter arranged 
his surrender.513  
 On March 9, 1989, three months to the day after Rousseau gave himself up, the 
bullet-riddled body of Leo Williams was found in a ditch in southeast Houston.514 Five 
days later, when a thirty-eight-year-old drunk driver, Juan Alfredo Guerrero, was 
involved in a traffic accident, a witness saw him throw a weapon into a field, where 
police recovered it.515 On April 13, a ballistics test determined that the bullets that killed 
Williams and Delitta had been fired from the recovered weapon—a black .38-caliber 
Rohm revolver.516 
Rousseau’s capital murder trial opened on May 8, 1989, with the lead prosecutor, 
Lorraine Parker, by her account, unaware of the ballistics report.517 At the trial, Sullivan 
identified Rousseau as the killer,518 although, standing just five-six and weighing only 
125 pounds, he was considerably smaller than the man Sullivan initially described.519 
Sullivan expressed certainty that the weapon wielded by the killer had been silver, 
                                                 
507 Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 673–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at 2, 5, 27, 130, Rousseau v. Johnson, No. CV-2588 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2000) (on file with 
authors). 
508 Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 674; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 2. 
509 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 2, 27. 
510 Id. at 3. 
511 Id. at 6 (citing police report). 
512 Id. 
513 Mike Tolson, Reasonable Doubt: Death Row Inmate’s Trial May Have Had Fatal Flaw, HOUS. 
CHRONICLE, Apr. 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting that Rousseau feared that he would have been shot if he had 
surrendered directly to police) (on file with authors). Williams had been shot three times. Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 18.  
514 Tolson, supra note 513. 
515 Id. 
516 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 5, 20, 121. 
517 Tolson, supra note 513; see also Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. 12 at ¶ 6, Rousseau v. 
Johnson, No. 00-CV-2588 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2000) (affidavit of Lorraine Parker, lead prosecutor at 
Rousseau’s 1989 trial) [hereinafter Affidavit of Lorraine Parker] (“I was not aware of the above mentioned 
exculpatory information. Because the firearms lab report was contained in my file, however, it is possible 
that I possessed the report prior to trial, but that I did not recognized its significance. Had I known the 
significance of this report, I am sure that I would have disclosed this to the defense.”).  
518 Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). 
519 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 3 n.1. 
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chrome, or nickel.520 Three eyewitnesses testified that Rousseau was not the killer,521 but 
Parker argued that Sullivan’s testimony was more credible because, owing to his 
Environmental Protection Agency experience, he had “practically a photographic 
memory.”522 Rousseau’s lawyer wanted to call a forensic psychologist who would have 
cast doubt on the veracity of Sullivan’s identification of Rousseau, but the judge did not 
allow it.523 Despite the lack of physical evidence linking Rousseau to the crime, the jury 
found him guilty and he was sentenced to death on May 17, 1989.524 
A little more than a month later, police issued a second ballistics report reaffirming 
that the black Rohm revolver recovered after Guerrero’s traffic accident was the weapon 
used in the slayings of both David Delitta and Leo Williams.525 Eight months after that, 
on February 9, 1990, Guerrero was charged with the Williams murder, to which he 
pleaded guilty a little more than two years later on March 14, 1992, and was sentenced to 
twelve years in prison.526 Some nine years after that, in early 2001, Rousseau’s appellate 
lawyers discovered the ballistics reports in a file at the district attorney’s office.527 In a 
prison interview in June 2001, Guerrero admitted to the Delitta murder to Richard Reyna, 
an investigator for Rousseau, but then denied it after learning that Delitta had been a 
federal agent.528 The following January 28, Guerrero was paroled and deported to the 
Dominican Republic.529 
On February 15, 2002, Lorraine Parker, the lead prosecutor at Rousseau’s 1989 
trial, acknowledged that withholding the ballistics reports violated the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Brady decision530 and stated that she would not have prosecuted Rousseau if she 
had known that the same weapon had been used in both the Williams and Delitta 
killings.531 The following September 11, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded 
the Rousseau case to the trial court to supplement the record for the state habeas 
proceedings.532 While the proceedings were pending, Rousseau died in prison at age 
sixty-five on March 5, 2006, and his quest for exoneration died with him.533 Parker’s 
experience in the case turned her into an opponent of capital punishment.534  
13. Dennis Harold Lawley—California 
After waiving his right to counsel and representing himself—arguing that he was 
being framed as a result of his avowed aspiration “to go into history as a Beast in 
                                                 
520 Id. at 5. 
521 Id. at 68. 
522 Id. at 35. 
523 Id. at 65–66. 
524 Steve McVicker, Inmate Unable to Outlive Appeal, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Mar. 7, 2006, at B1. 
525 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 507, at 11. 
526 Id. at 19. 
527 McVicker, supra note 524. 
528 Tolson, supra note 513.  
529 Id. 
530 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
531 Affidavit of Lorraine Parker, supra note 517, at ¶ 10. 
532 Ex parte Rousseau, No. WR-43, 534-02, 2006 LEXIS 353, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2006).  
533 Id.; Michael Graczyk, Death Row Inmate Dies in Hospital, MIDLAND REP.-TELEGRAM (Midland, TX), 
Mar. 7, 2006, at A2. 
534 Email message from Lorraine Parker, lead prosecutor at Rousseau’s 1989 trial, to Rob Warden (Nov. 30, 
2018, 5:02 PM CST) (on file with authors). 
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Revelations”—Dennis Harold Lawley, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, was 
convicted and sentenced to death in 1990 on charges that he had hired two men to kill 
Kenneth Lawton Stewart.535 
On January 22, 1989, Stewart, who had been released from prison four days earlier, 
was found dead on the side of a road in Modesto near Butler’s Camp, where Lawley lived 
in a cabin that was said to be “the scene of much drug dealing.”536 The prosecution 
contended that Stewart, who had been shot twice in the head, had robbed Lawley, who in 
turn had hired Brian Seabourn and Steven Mendonca to exact deadly revenge.537 
Lawley was deemed competent to represent himself after a court-appointed 
psychologist, Philip Trompetter, concluded that, despite two involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalizations and weird machinations about emulating a Biblical beast, Lawley had “a 
very sophisticated awareness” of the charges he faced and that his decision to waive 
counsel, although perhaps imprudent, was “not motivated by a psychotic delusion.”538 
During the voir dire, Lawley told prospective jurors that he would introduce testimony to 
show “that I have for a number of years attempted to go down in history as a Beast in 
Revelations” and that, as a result, he was being framed.539 Once the jury was sworn, in its 
presence, Lawley reiterated the fantasy.540  
The prosecutor, James C. Brazelton, called four witnesses with purported 
knowledge of the crime. Ricky Black, a heroin addict who had been charged with helping 
Seabourn kidnap Stewart, but who had been granted immunity from prosecution in 
exchange for testifying against Lawley.541 David Anderson, a paid informant and former 
heroin addict who claimed to have overheard Lawley arrange the murder. 542  Treva 
Coonce, Mendonca’s heroin-addicted girlfriend whose testimony was damaging to 
Lawley even though she recanted testimony that she had given at his preliminary hearing 
implicating him and Seabourn in the murder.543 Sharon Tripp, another heroin user who 
testified that before the murder Lawley had told her that he had wanted to kill Stewart for 
robbing him.544 William Jerry Chisum, a criminologist from the California Department of 
Justice, testified—in what Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Eugene M. Azevedo, 
the trial judge, described as “probably the most damaging testimony of all”545—that a 
Ruger .357 Magnum pistol recovered in a search of Lawley’s cabin had been the murder 
weapon.546  
                                                 
535 People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461, 470, 475, 478, 485 n.11 (Cal. 2002); Transcript of Proceedings at 
Probation & Judgment Hearing, People v. Lawley, No. 243109 (Stanislaus Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 1990) 
(on file with authors). The “Beast in Revelations” is a reference to one of the beasts described in the “Book 
of Revelation.” See Revelation, 13:1-18, 17:8-18. 
536 Lawley, 38 P.3d 461 at 470–72; Declaration of Brian Seabourn dated Nov. 18, 1999, at ¶ ¶ 4-6, Ex. 1, 
Ex. Vol. I, In re Lawley, on Habeas Corpus, S089463 (Cal. June 26, 2000). 
537 Lawley, 38 P.3d 461 at 471. 
538 Id. at 480. 
539 Id. at 485 n.11 (quoting voir dire transcript). 
540 Id. at 475. 
541 Id. at 471–72. 
542 Id. at 474–75. 
543 Id. at 472–73. Portions of her preliminary-hearing testimony were read into the trial record. Id. at 492.  
544 Id. at 473.  
545 Transcript of Proceedings at Probation & Judgment Hearing, supra note 535, at 94.  
546 Lawley, 38 P.3d at 474. 
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When Lawley called his first witness, a convict named Monty Ray Mullins, the 
prosecution objected.547 Judge Azevedo excused the jury, allowing Lawley to make an 
offer of proof that Mullins and a second proffered defense witness, David Hager, would 
testify that Seabourn had told them that he had killed someone in Modesto at the 
direction of the Aryan Brotherhood—and that an innocent man was in jail for the 
murder.548 Azevedo held that the allegation that the Aryan Brotherhood had directed the 
hit was inadmissible hearsay and the claim that an innocent man had been jailed for the 
crime was inadmissible opinion.549 As a result, neither Mullins nor Hager testified before 
the jury.550 
After Lawley rested his case, Brazelton told the jury that Lawley had been “ripped 
off” by Stewart and asked, rhetorically, “Did you hear anything in this case at all about 
anybody [other than Lawley] being mad at Kenneth Stewart for any reason and wanting 
to kill him? Did you hear that Brian Seabourn was mad at him? Did you hear that Steve 
Mendonca was mad at him?”551 On October 10, 1989, the jury, having heard no evidence 
to that effect, owing to the fact that Judge Azevedo had excluded testimony about the 
Aryan Brotherhood, found Lawley guilty. 552  On February 26, 1990, after the jury 
concluded that death was appropriate for Lawley, Azevedo sentenced him accordingly.553 
In separate proceedings, Brian Seabourn was tried and convicted of, and Steven 
Mendonca pleaded guilty to, second-degree murder.554 
Lawley’s case descended into the California appellate process, which typically 
takes three decades or more for a condemned defendant to exhaust.555 In 1993, Scott F. 
Kauffman was appointed as Lawley’s appellate counsel.556 It took another six years, until 
November 1999, to complete briefing in Lawley’s automatic appeal, 557  in which the 
principal issue was Lawley’s competency to represent himself.558 The month that the 
briefing was completed, Seabourn signed a sworn declaration stating that he had slain 
Stewart at the behest of the Aryan Brotherhood with assistance from immunized 
prosecution witness Ricky Black,559 that Lawley was innocent,560 that “the gun found in 
Lawley’s cabin was not the gun used to kill Stewart,561 that he, Seabourn, had buried the 
                                                 
547 Id. at 495. 
548 Id. at 495–96. 
549 Id. at 496. 
550 Id. at 472 n.2, 503 n.24; see also infra note 554 (referencing Seabourn conviction and Mendonca guilty 
plea to second-degree murder). 
551 Lawley, 38 P.3d at 498–99 (quoting trial transcript). 
552 Id. at 493.  
553 Transcript of Proceedings at Probation & Judgment Hearing, supra note 535, at 107. 
554 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 894 (Cal. 2008) (quoting People v. Mendonca, No. 255043 (Super Ct. 
Stanislaus County Super. Ct. 1990); People v. Seabourn, No. 244904 (Super Ct. Stanislaus County 1990)). 
Seabourn was acquitted of all death-qualifying counts. People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461, 505 (Cal. 2002). 
555 Brief of Amicus Curiae Death Penalty Focus in Support of Petitioner-Appellee and Supporting 
Affirmance, at 3, Jones v. Warden, 9448655 14-56373 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (on file with authors). 
556 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, In re Lawley, S089463 (Cal. Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with 
authors). 
557 Id. 
558 People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461, 484–87 (Cal. 2002). 
559 Seabourn, No. 244904, at ¶ 6.  
560 Id. at ¶ 8.  
561 Id. at ¶ 9. 
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murder weapon, a Smith & Wesson .357 Magnum, in a field near the murder scene,562 
and that he had told Monty Ray Mullins and David Hager about the murder 563—as 
Lawley had attempted, to no avail, to establish at his trial.564 
“Blood in, blood out”—“you have to kill to get in, and be killed to get out”—was a 
guiding principle of the Aryan Brotherhood.565 In December 1988, the month Seabourn 
was released from prison and moved in with his family in Modesto, Stewart was in “the 
hat”— meaning that the Brotherhood wanted him dead.566 Seabourn was in “the tip”—
meaning that he aspired to Brotherhood membership. 567  Upon learning that Stewart 
would be coming to Butler’s Camp when he was released from prison on January 18, 
1989, Seabourn decided to kill him—but waited four days so that Stewart “could have 
some fun before he died.”568  
In June 2000, with Lawley’s automatic appeal pending, his appellate lawyer, Scott 
Kauffman, filed a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus alleging that Lawley was 
innocent and that the prosecution had withheld extensive exculpatory evidence pertaining 
to Seabourn and the Aryan Brotherhood, in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brady 
decision.569 Nineteen months after that, in January 2002, the California Supreme Court at 
long last decided Lawley’s automatic appeal, affirming his conviction and death 
sentence, citing the discovery of the alleged murder weapon in Lawley’s cabin as 
evidence of his guilt and holding that judicial discretion had not been abused in finding 
Lawley competent to represent himself or in excluding testimony about the Aryan 
Brotherhood.570  
Shortly after affirming the conviction and sentence, the California Supreme Court 
ordered the Attorney General, who represented the state in the proceedings, to show 
cause why the alleged new evidence would not establish Lawley’s innocence and 
appointed a referee to hear evidence and make factual findings regarding Lawley’s claim 
of innocence related claim that the prosecution had failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.571 More than a dozen years had passed since Lawley had been sentenced to 
death, but another two years and ten months would lapse before the referee, Stanislaus 
County Superior Court Judge John E. Griffin, Jr issued findings on the issues raised in 
Lawley’s habeas petition.572  
During an extended evidentiary hearing before Griffin, former Aryan Brotherhood 
members James Brun and Wayne “Smiley” Richardson had testified that the Brotherhood 
ordered Stewart’s murder.573 Richardson added that he had told Seabourn before his 
                                                 
562 Id. at ¶ 7. 
563 Id. at ¶ 9. 
564 See supra notes 548, 549 and accompanying text.  
565 Declaration of Brian Seabourn, supra note 536, at ¶ 8. 
566 Id. at ¶ 3. 
567 Id. 
568 Id. at ¶ 5. 
569 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 556, at 24–25 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963)).  
570 People v. Lawley, 38 P.3d 461, 478–87, 495 (Cal. 2002).  
571 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 894, 898, 902 (Cal. 2008). 
572 Referee Report at 4–15, In re Lawley, No. 1037325 (Stanislaus Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2004) (on file 
with authors). 
573 Petitioner’s Proposed Summary of Evidence and Findings of Fact at 75-90, In re Lawley, No. S089463, 
(Super Ct. of Stanislaus Cty., Aug. 18, 2004) (on file with authors).  
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release from prison in December 1988, “If you get the opportunity when you are out 
there, take care of business”—meaning kill Stewart.574  Seabourn also testified at the 
hearing and, when asked by Kauffman’s co-counsel, Bicka Barlow, how he knew 
Stewart, he memorably replied, “I killed him.”575 
While there was “plenty of evidence” that the Brotherhood was involved in 
Stewart’s murder, Griffin opined that it also was clear from the trial testimony of William 
Jerry Chisum, the state criminalist, corroborated by expert testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing, that the Ruger .357 Magnum found in Lawley’s cabin was the murder weapon, 
thus linking him to the murder.576 “I’m sure,” Griffin wrote, “that the possession of the 
gun by Dennis Lawley [was] a very important factor in his conviction.”577  
In December 2007, three years after Griffin returned his findings, Kauffman, 
Lawley’s lawyer, unearthed a Smith & Wesson revolver in the field where Seabourn 
repeatedly had sworn that he had buried the murder weapon.578 Kauffman promptly filed 
a motion to expand the record to include the discovery of the weapon, 579  but the 
California Supreme Court denied the motion580  and dismissed Lawley’s state habeas 
petition the following March, adopting Griffin’s findings.581 
Kauffman filed a new state habeas petition,582 which was pending in June 2009 
when court-appointed federal counsel Wesley A. Van Winkle and Lissa J. Gardner filed a 
petition in U.S. District Court seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus.583 The petition 
noted that the only physical evidence purporting to link Lawley to the murder was the 
Ruger .357 Magnum that evidently had not been the murder weapon, reiterated Lawley’s 
Brady claims, and challenged the finding that Lawley had been competent to defend 
himself in light of his “ludicrous, preposterous, and absurd” ambition to emulate the 
Beast in Revelations.584 The strength of the claims would come to naught, however, 
because on March 11, 2012, before further substantive action in either the state or federal 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
574 Id. at 85. 
575 Hearing Transcript at 588–89, Lawley, No. 1037325 (on file with authors). 
576 Referee Report, supra note 572, at 12. 
577 Id. at 12–13. 
578 Protective Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 14, Lawley v. Wong, 08-cv-01425-LJO, (E.D. Cal., 
June 11, 2009) [hereinafter Protective Petition]. There was no indication that the ballistics testimony had 
been false or intentionally misleading, but both witnesses had mischaracterized their findings as conclusive. 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING, “Executive Summary,” at 3 (2008) 
https://afte.org/uploads/documents/swggun-nas-summary.pdf (“The validity of the fundamental 
assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related tool marks has not yet been fully 
demonstrated.”). 
579 Protective Petition, supra note 578, at 14. 
580 Id. at 15. 
581 In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 904 (Cal. 2008). 
582 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, In re Lawley, Related Cases S01449 & S089463 (Cal. Apr. 19, 
2008). 
583 Protective Petition, supra note 578. The petition contended that its filing was appropriate because 
federal habeas exists to create justice regardless of “barriers of form and procedural mazes.” Id. at 370 
(citing Ex parte McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264, 280 (1946)).  
584 Protective Petition, supra note 578, at 29, 146, 340–43, 381. 
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proceedings, Lawley died of natural causes on California death row—his home for the 
previous twenty-two years and two months.585 
14. Tyrone Lee Noling—Ohio 
The bullet-riddled bodies of Bearnhardt and Cora Hartig, both eighty-one, were 
found along with ten .25-caliber shell casings on the kitchen floor of their home in 
Atwater Township, Portage County, on April 7, 1990.586 Shortly before the bodies were 
discovered, eighteen-year-old Tyrone Lee Noling had stolen a .25-caliber pistol during a 
robbery in the nearby town of Alliance and fired it during a second robbery there.587 
Noling was questioned about the Atwater crime, but ballistics tests showed that the pistol 
he had stolen in Alliance was not the weapon used in the Hartig killings and Noling was 
not charged.588  
In 1992, the Portage County prosecutor’s office launched a reinvestigation of the 
case and, in a series of interrogations conducted by investigator Ron Craig, three 
associates of Noling’s implicated him and themselves in the murders—for which Noling 
then was indicted.589 The charges were dropped in June 1993,590 but Noling again was 
indicted for the crime in August 1995.591  In the interim, David William Norris, the 
Portage County prosecutor who had dismissed the charges against Noling, resigned after 
pleading guilty to possession of cocaine.592 
Noling volunteered to take a polygraph test, which he passed.593 In addition to the 
shell casings on the Hartigs’ kitchen floor, police found some open jewelry boxes in a 
bedroom drawer that apparently had been rifled through, but Noling and his alleged co-
conspirators were excluded as sources of fingerprints lifted from the house, the shell 
casings, and the jewelry boxes.594 All four also were excluded as the sources of biological 
material recovered from a cigarette butt found in the driveway of the Hartigs, who were 
non-smokers.595 The murder weapon was not recovered.596  
At Noling’s trial, in January 1996, 597  the prosecution relied primarily on the 
testimony of his associates—Gary St. Clair, Joseph Dalesandro, and Butch Wolcott—
with whom Noling had been living and committing crimes in Alliance in 1990.598 In 
                                                 
585 Order Dismissing Action, Lawley v. Chappell, No. 1:08-CV-01425 LJO (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2009) (on 
file with authors). 
586 State v. Noling, 781 N.E.2d 88, 98 (Ohio 2002). Autopsies determined that Cora Hartig had been shot 
five times and died of “gunshot wounds to her chest [and] internal injuries” and that Bearnhardt Hartig had 
been shot three times and died of “gunshot wounds to [his] right chest with multiple visceral injuries.” Id. 
at 97. 
587 Id. 
588 Merit Brief of Tyrone Noling at 2, Ohio v. Noling, No. 2014-1377 (Ohio 2017) (on file with authors).  
589 Id. 
590 Id. 
591 Noling v. Bradshaw, No. 5:04 CV 1232, 2008 WL 320531, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2008).  
592 See Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris, 666 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ohio 1996); Stephanie Kwisnek & Pam 
Reinhard, No Jail Sentence for David Norris, DAILY KENT STATER, Nov. 17, 1994, at 1. 
593 Merit Brief of Tyrone Noling, supra note 588, at 9. 
594 Id. at 4. 
595 Id. at 9–10.  
596 Id. at 5. 
597 Id.  
598 Id. at 1. 
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exchange for their cooperation, St. Clair and Dalesandro received plea deals and Wolcott 
was granted immunity from prosecution.599 Dalesandro and Wolcott told the jury that 
after they, Noling, and St. Clair had committed the second Alliance robbery they went in 
Dalesandro’s car to Atwater, where Noling and St. Clair entered the Hartig home.600 
Dalesandro testified that he had smelled gun smoke when Noling returned to the car and 
Wolcott testified that he had seen the smoking weapon.601  
Before the trial, St. Clair recanted his incriminating statement, but he was called as 
a hostile witness for the prosecution, which rebutted his recantation by reading his prior 
statement into the record.602 The prosecution also called two jailhouse informants who 
testified that Noling had admitted the murders to them after his arrest for Alliance crimes; 
one of the informants, Paul Garner, quoted Noling as saying that he did not mean to kill 
the Hartigs—that it “just happened”—and the other, Ronnie Gantz, claimed that Noling 
admitted the murders after initially attributing them to St. Clair.603 
On January 23, 1996, Noling’s jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death 
twenty-eight days later. 604  On appeal, Noling argued, among other things, that his 
conviction was “against the manifest weight of the evidence,” that he had been denied 
effective assistance of counsel by his lawyer’s failure to adequately investigate the case, 
and that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct by commenting on potential defense 
witnesses who had not testified.605 The Portage County Appellate Court affirmed the 
conviction and death sentence in 1999 and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the 
appellate court in 2002.606 
A Cleveland Plain Dealer examination of the case in 2006, and a records request 
by the Ohio Innocence Project and the Ohio Public Defender in 2009, identified two 
previously undisclosed suspects—Daniel Wilson, whose foster brother claimed that 
Wilson had admitted the Hartig murders and who had been executed for abducting and 
burning a young woman alive, and Raymond VanSteenberg, an insurance agent from 
whom Bearnhardt Hartig had been attempting to collect a $10,000 debt and who had 
owned a .25-caliber pistol that VanSteenberg claimed he had sold to an unknown person 
years earlier. 607  In addition, the key witnesses for the prosecution, Dalesandro and 
Wolcott, recanted their trial testimony, claiming that they had been coerced by the 
prosecution to falsely implicate themselves in the murders and identify Noling as the 
killer.608  
In June 2010, after losing a bid for a federal writ of habeas corpus,609 Noling’s 
lawyers, in moves that would be rejected by the Court of Common Pleas, sought 
                                                 
599 Id. at 2. 
600 Id. at 3. 
601 Id.  
602 Id.  
603 State v. Noling, 781 N.E.2d 88, 103 (Ohio 2002). 
604 Noling v. Bradshaw, No. 5:04 CV 1232, 2008 WL 320531, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2008).  
605 Noling, 781 N.E.2d at 102, 109, 111–12. 
606 Id. at 118–19; State v. Noling, No. 96-P-0126, 1999 WL 454476, at *32 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1999). 
The jurisdiction of Ohio appellate courts in capital cases was eliminated by a constitutional amendment 
approved by voters in November 1994, effective January 1, 1995. See State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 678 
(Ohio 1977). 
607 Merit Brief of Tyrone Noling, supra note 588, at 6–8. 
608 Id. at 5. 
609 Bradshaw, No. 5:04 CV 1232, 2008 WL 320531, at *57 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2008). 
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advanced DNA testing, the goal being to link the cigarette butt to one of the alternative 
suspects, and to get a new trial based on the failure to disclose the existence of the 
alternative suspects before the 1996 trial.610 In 2014, the Portage County Appellate Court 
remanded the case for further development of evidence allegedly withheld in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland, 611  but in 2018 the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
advanced DNA testing.612 In January 2019, as Noling passed the twenty-third anniversary 
of his death sentence, his best hope for freedom, at least in the near term, rested on 
winning a new trial based on Brady violations and subsequent dismissal of the charges.613 
15. David Ronald Chandler—Alabama (federal) 
For a murder that he was convicted of soliciting, David Ronald Chandler, a large-
scale marijuana grower and distributor in northern Alabama, became the first person to be 
sentenced to death under the 1988 federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act.614 
On May 8, 1990, Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr., who worked for Chandler, admittedly—
and indisputably—shot and killed Marlin Shuler, the abusive former husband of Jarrell’s 
half-sister, who also was Chandler’s sister-in-law and one of Chandler’s marijuana 
dealers.615 About two months before Shuler was murdered, based on information he had 
provided about his ex-wife’s drug dealing, police obtained a warrant and searched her 
home, where they found roughly a kilogram of marijuana and arrested her.616 
On January 9, 1991, a federal grand jury returned a nine-count indictment charging 
Jarrell, Chandler, and fourteen others with conspiracy to possess more than a thousand 
marijuana plants and distribute more than a thousand kilograms of marijuana; with 
murdering Shuler in furtherance of a criminal enterprise; and with money laundering and 
firearms violations.617 Eight days later, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for 
the murder, Jarrell agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy and testify against Chandler, 
whose trial was severed from those of the other defendants.618 
                                                 
610 State v. Noling, 992 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Ohio 2013); State v. Noling, No. 2011-P-0018, 2014 WL 
1348008, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014). 
611 Noling, 2014 WL 1348008, at *1, *10; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
612 State v. Noling, 101 N.E.3d 435, 452 (Ohio 2018). 
613 E-mail from Brian Howe, attorney, Ohio Innocence Project to Rob Warden (Dec. 10, 2018, 09:49 AM 
CST) (on file with authors). 
614 Convicted Drug Ringleader Sentenced to Die, WASH. POST, May 15, 1991, at A20. See also 21 U.S.C. § 
848(e)(1)(A) (2012), recognized as repealed by United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2008). The act 
authorizes the death penalty for anyone who counsels an intentional killing in furtherance of a criminal 
operation. See The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-68-anti-drug-abuse-act-1988 (last visited May 23, 
2019). Four other defendants have been sentenced to death under the act: Angela Johnson, Richard Tipton, 
Corey Johnson, and James H. Roane Jr. In 2012, Johnson’s death sentence, imposed in 2005, was 
overturned in 2014, and the Justice Department announced that the death penalty would not be sought again 
in her case. The other three, who were convicted in 1993 of a series of murders in Virginia, remain on death 
row. See Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-
death-row-prisoners#list (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
615 United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1081–82 (11th Cir. 1993). 
616 Id. at 1081. 
617 Id. at 1080. 
618 Id. 
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At the trial before U.S. District Court Judge James H. Hancock and a jury in March 
and April 1991, some forty witnesses testified, but only Jarrell’s testimony linked 
Chandler to the murder.619 Jarrell testified that Chandler offered him $500 to kill Shuler, 
but that he thought Chandler was joking until May 8, 1990, when Jarrell and Shuler were 
at Chandler’s home and Chandler told Jarrell that “you better go on and get rid of him” 
and “I still got that five hundred dollars.”620 After drinking beer for about an hour, Jarrell 
told the jury that he and Shuler went to a lake, ostensibly for target practice with pistols, 
and Jarrell shot Shuler to death, but Jarrell did not collect the $500 he claimed Chandler 
had promised.621  
Countering Jarrell’s testimony, Chandler’s lawyer, Drew Redden, introduced 
evidence of a history of animosity between Jarrell and Shuler, who had abused his ex-
wife and mother-in-law—Jarrell’s half-sister and mother, respectively—and that Jarrell’s 
account of the murder shifted over time—first, he had not done it, then had done it 
accidentally, then he had done it out of personal animosity over the abuse, and, lastly, he 
had done it at Chandler’s behest.622 In 1989, during an argument, Jarrell allegedly had 
pointed a loaded pistol at Shuler’s head and pulled the trigger, but the weapon failed to 
fire.623The jury, accepting Jarrell’s final version of the murder, convicted Chandler of all 
nine counts in the indictment.624  
After a sentencing hearing at which Redden called only Chandler’s wife and 
mother as character witnesses—not calling a substantial number of other witnesses who 
would have testified about Chandler’s good deeds in life—the jury recommended the 
death penalty, and Judge Hancock followed that recommendation followed that 
recommendation.625 In 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated 
Chandler’s conspiracy conviction, but affirmed his death sentence for the murder, as well 
as his conviction and prison sentences on the other counts.626  
In October 1995, under a provision similar to habeas corpus available to prisoners 
in federal custody,627 Chandler’s lawyers filed a motion, which was amended repeatedly 
through early 1997, asking Judge Hancock to set aside Chandler’s conviction based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel and other grounds 628 —the most dramatic being a 
recantation by Jarrell of his trial testimony.629  
                                                 
619 Id. at 1080–81. 
620 Id.; United States v. Chandler, 950 F. Supp. 1545, 1553 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (order denying post-conviction 
claims raised by Chandler), aff’d, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). 
621 Chandler, 950 F. Supp. at 1553, 1569.  
622 Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310–11. 
623 Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1082. 
624 Id.; see also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311; United States v. Chandler, 957 F. Supp. 1505, 1507–10 (N.D. 
Ala. 1997), overruled in part by 193 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 1999). 
625 Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311; Chandler, 957 F. Supp. at 1520. Six years later, more than two-dozen 
witnesses recalled how Chandler bought shoes for impoverished youths, provided shelter for battered 
wives, and built a ramp to give a disabled woman easier access to her home. Bill Rankin, As Drug Lord 
Awaits Execution, Star Witness Recants Story, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 9, 1997, at 13A. 
626 Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1107. The execution was set for March 30, 1995 but was stayed on March 21 by 
Judge Hancock. Bill Rankin, A Murder Frame-Up by Feds?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 24, 1995, at 11A. 
627 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
628 Chandler, 957 F. Supp. at 1506; United States v. Chandler, 950 F. Supp. 1545, 1555 (N.D. Ala. 1996), 
aff’d, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.). 
629 Chandler, 957 F. Supp. at 1506. 
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At a hearing before Hancock in February 1997, Jarrell, who was suffering from 
throat cancer and serving a twenty-five-year prison sentence under his plea deal, testified 
that he committed the murder solely out of animosity over the abuse of his half-sister and 
mother, and that prosecutors and investigators threatened him and his son with the 
electric chair unless he falsely implicated Chandler in the crime.630 In corroboration of 
Jarrell’s recantation, Chandler’s attorneys called seven witnesses—three of Jarrell’s 
relatives and four men who were in jail with him before the trial—who testified that 
Jarrell told them that he was being subjected to, as Hancock put it, “Gestapo-style 
midnight interrogations and harassment” to force him to testify falsely 
against Chandler.631 
Hancock denied relief, speculating, variously, that Jarrell’s recantation might have 
been motivated by his “long relationship and friendship” with Chandler, that Jarrell’s 
memory of events in 1990 was suspect because he “was a very heavy drinker” at that 
time, and that he perhaps feared that Chandler would retaliate for his betrayal.632 In 1999, 
a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit voted two-to-one to vacate the death sentence 
on the ground that Chandler was denied effective assistance of counsel by his lawyer’s 
failure to call character witnesses during the sentencing phase of the 1991 trial,633 but the 
full Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and on July 21, 2000, again affirmed 
Chandler’s conviction and death sentence by a six-to-five vote.634 
In January 2001, while Chandler’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was 
pending, 635  Chandler’s attorneys petitioned President Bill Clinton for clemency, 
contending that, “Our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is 
fallible. Mr. Chandler’s sentence of death should be commuted primarily because there is 
now substantial doubt as to his guilt.”636 One of the attorneys, Jack Martin, summed up 
the situation to an Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporter, “We claim the entire murder 
case was concocted by law enforcement.”637  
Clemency, in Martin’s view, was a long shot, but on January 20, just two hours 
before Clinton left office, he commuted Chandler’s sentence to life without parole.638 As 
Chandler passed his twenty-eighth year behind federal bars in early 2019,639 at least 
                                                 
630 Id. at 1506, 1511. 
631 Id. at 1509–10, 1515. 
632 Id. at 1511, 1515. 
633 Chandler v. United States, 193 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999); see AMNESTY INT’L, AN APPEAL FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP AS THE FIRST FEDERAL EXECUTION LOOMS 28–29 (2000), 
https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/files/resources/federal/AI%20Memo%20to%20Clinton.pdf (last 
visited May 23, 2019). 
634 Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). 
635 Certiorari was denied on February 26, 2001. Chandler v. United States, 531 U.S. 1204 (2001). 
636 Bill Rankin, Alabama Man Seeks Clemency, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 12, 2001, at 12A.  
637 Id.  
638 Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton's Last-Day Clemency Benefits 176, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 
2001, at A1; Clinton’s Decision Result of ‘Long-Shot’ Request, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 22, 2001, 
at C2. 
639 See Find an Inmate: David Ronald Chandler, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search results for “Reg. No. 17867-001”) (last visited May 23, 2019).  
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thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had moved toward legalizing recreational 
marijuana—the criminal enterprise that cost Chandler his freedom.640 
16. Eddie Lee Howard, Jr.—Mississippi 
On February 2, 1992, firefighters responded to a report of smoke coming from a 
Columbus home, where they extinguished a smoldering fire in the living room and found 
eighty-two-year-old Georgia Kemp dead on her bedroom floor, with a bloody butcher 
knife on her bed.641 Dr. Steven Hayne performed an autopsy the next day and reported 
that Kemp died of two stab wounds to her chest and suffered vaginal injuries 
“consistent with forced sexual intercourse.”642  
Thirty-eight-year-old Eddie Lee Howard, Jr. perhaps was a logical suspect because 
he lived just two blocks from the crime scene643 and twice had been in prison for sex 
offenses.644 On February 6, three days after Kemp’s burial, Dr. Hayne arranged for her 
body to be exhumed for examination by a forensic dentist because, as Hayne would put 
it, there “was some question”—which he had not mentioned in the autopsy report—that 
she had been bitten. 645  Also on February 6—before the body was exhumed—police 
detained Howard and took him to a dental office where, with his consent, impressions 
were made of his teeth.646 Two days later, based on a comparison of the impressions with 
bite marks purportedly detected by Dr. Michael West, the dentist who re-examined 
Kemp’s body, police arrested Howard, an African American, for the rape and murder of 
Kemp, who was white.647  
Howard had been in custody more than two years when, as a result of a dispute 
with his court-appointed counsel over delays, he wound up representing himself at his 
trial, which opened on May 9, 1994, before a Lowndes County jury and a judge named, 
coincidentally, Lee Howard. 648  The prosecution relied almost exclusively on the 
testimony of Dr. West, whose forensic qualifications were not challenged by Howard and 
who proceeded to tell the jury that one of several bite marks he had found on Kemp’s 
body was a “positive match” to Howard’s teeth.649 The only evidence that Kemp had 
suffered bites was the word of Dr. West; photographs taken by Dr. Hayne during the 
                                                 
640 State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-
justice/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2018). 
641 Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274, 277 (Miss. 1997). 
642 Steven T. Hayne, Report of Post Mortem Examination (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with authors). 
643 Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 784 (Miss. 2003). Howard was born on June 27, 1953. MISS. DEP’T OF 
CORR., OFFENDER DATA SHEET: EDDIE LEE HOWARD (2012), https://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Death-
Row/DeathRowInmates/Howard,%20Eddie%20Lee%20Jr.pdf (last visited May 23, 2019). 
644 Howard had been sentenced to prison in 1972 for assault with intent to ravish and in 1977 for assault 
with intent to rape and ravish. MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 643; see also Howard, 853 So. 2d at 785–
86.  
645 Hayne, supra note 642; see also Motion to Vacate Conviction at 21–22, Howard v. State (Lowndes Cty. 
Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014) (on file with authors). 
646 Howard, 701 So. 2d at 278; see also Howard, 853 So. 2d at 784. 
647 Howard 701 So. 2d at 278; see also Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 341 (Miss. 2006) (specifying the 
race of the defendant and victim). 
648 Howard, 701 So. 2d at 274–75, 278, 291. Hereinafter, we refer to the defendant as “Howard” and to the 
judge as “Judge Howard” or “the judge.” 
649 Id. at 287. 
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autopsy showed no bite marks.650 David Turner, a Columbus police officer, testified that 
Howard had told him, “I had a temper and that’s why this happened,”—a statement that 
Turner said he considered a confession, although he had not contemporaneously 
memorialized it. 651  Because forensic testing had found neither seminal nor blood 
evidence, the prosecution left it to the jury to infer, from the autopsy report of vaginal 
injuries and the bite-mark testimony, that Kemp had been raped.652  
After three days of testimony and a rambling closing statement by Howard, who 
went so far as to suggest that one of the jurors might have committed the crime, the jury 
found him guilty of murder and rape.653 The same day, after a brief sentencing hearing 
during which Howard offered nothing in mitigation, the jury sentenced him to death.654 
On June 26, 1997, a little more than three years after the conviction and sentence, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a retrial, 
holding that, because Howard had “frequently exhibited behavior which reasonably 
should have raised a question as to his ability to represent himself,” the judge had erred 
by not holding a competency hearing to determine whether Howard was capable of 
knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel.655 
Just short of another three years had passed when Howard’s retrial began in May 
2000 before another Lowndes County jury and his namesake judge. 656  Howard was 
represented by two lawyers, Thomas Kesler and Armstrong Walters.657 During the guilt-
innocence phase of the re-trial, Dr. West reiterated his bite-mark testimony from the first 
trial 658  and Officer Turner again claimed that Howard had made an incriminating 
statement.659 This time, the prosecution also called a witness who had not appeared at the 
first trial: Kayfen Fulgham, a former girlfriend of Howard’s, who told the jury that 
Howard sometimes had bitten her breasts and neck during sex and that, when she had 
seen him the day after Kemp’s body was found, he smelled “like burnt clothes or 
something, you know, wood, like smoke.”660 Fulgham’s testimony was dubious because 
she had been interviewed three months before Howard’s first trial and provided a two-
page statement that mentioned neither Howard biting her nor smelling like smoke.661 
After two days of testimony, Howard again was convicted. After a brief sentencing 
hearing, at which Howard’s attorneys offered no mitigating evidence, the jury returned a 
death sentence, but when the jury was polled one juror disavowed the verdict. 662 
                                                 
650 Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 25 n.92. 
651 Id. at 25; see also Howard, 945 So. 2d at 334 n.3.  
652 Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 21; see also Howard, 701 So. 2d at 278. 
653 Howard, 701 So. 2d at 279. 
654 Id. The foreman of the jury was the father-in-law of the officer who led the investigation that resulted in 
the charges against Howard. Id. at 278. 
655 Id. at 282, 284, 288. 
656 Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 783, 785–86 (Miss. 2003). 
657 Id. at 786. 
658 Id. at 795–96. 
659 Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 24–25. 
660 Id. at 28–29.  
661 Id. at 29 n.121. On November 3, 2003, according to the director of the Mississippi Office of Capital 
Post-Conviction Counsel, which represented Howard, Fulgham’s daughter stated that her mother had 
admitted testifying falsely at the trial because Lowndes County DA Forrest Allgood had threatened her 
with arrest if she refused. Affidavit of Robert M. Ryan at 1–2 (Miss. Aug. 13, 2004) (on file with authors). 
662 Howard, 853 So. 2d at 786, 798–99, 807. 
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Howard’s lawyers thereupon asked Judge Howard to impose a life sentence, but he 
instead told the jurors that a death sentence required unanimity and ordered them to 
resume deliberating—which they did, returning a unanimous death verdict and affirming 
it when polled. 663  On appeal, which took another three years-plus, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on July 24, 2003.664 Howard 
then brought post-conviction proceedings that dragged on more than four more years 
before coming to naught when the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter on 
October 1, 2007.665  
Howard—represented by the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction 
Counsel, the Innocence Project in New York, and the Mississippi Innocence Project—
petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus and, separately in state court, for DNA 
testing of biological evidence recovered at the crime scene. 666  In 2008, two African 
American men who had been falsely convicted of the separate murders of two three-year-
old girls in Mississippi based on false reports and testimony by Drs. Hayne and West 
were exonerated by DNA.667 Even so, in Howard’s case, it was not until December 2, 
2010, that the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered the requested testing of, among other 
items, the butcher knife and the nightgown in which Kemp’s body had been found.668 The 
tests found no DNA on the nightgown where there would have been saliva, if Kemp had 
been bitten,669 and excluded Howard as the source of male DNA on the handle of the 
butcher knife.670 In 2012, in an unrelated Mississippi murder case, Dr. West stated in a 
deposition, “I no longer believe in bite-mark analysis. I don’t think it should be used in 
court. I think you should use DNA, throw bite marks out.”671 
On September 15, 2015, Howard’s appellate team filed a motion to vacate his 
conviction, citing the exculpatory DNA and West’s stunning disavowal of bite-mark 
analysis.672 Nineteen days later, the Mississippi Supreme Court directed Judge Howard to 
                                                 
663 Id. at 791. 
664 Id. at 784. 
665 Howard v. Mississippi, 552 U.S. 829 (2007); Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 371 (Miss. 2006) 
(rehearing denied Jan. 18, 2007). 
666 Howard v. Epps, No. 28:2254 (N.D. Miss. 2007); Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 19.  
667 Kennedy Brewer was sentenced to death and spent thirteen years behind bars for the 1992 murder of his 
girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Levon Brooks was sentenced to life in prison and spent sixteen years 
behind bars for the 1990 murder of his former girlfriend’s daughter. In both cases, Hayne performed 
autopsies, purporting to find bite marks, and called in West, who testified at the respective trials of Brewer 
and Brooks that there was no doubt that the bite marks came from them. DNA tests identified the killer as 
Justin Albert Johnson, who admitted committing the murders but asserted that he had not bitten either 
victim. Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 820–21 (5th Cir. 2017); Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736, 750 
(Miss. 1999); Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106, 116 (Miss. 1998); see also Kennedy Brewer, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kennedy-brewer/ (last visited May 23, 2019); Levon 
Brooks, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/levon-brooks/ (last visited May 23, 
2019). 
668 Howard v. State, 49 So. 3d 79, 80 (Miss. 2010). 
669 CELLMARK FORENSICS, INITIAL REPORT OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION at 3 (2014) (on file with 
authors).  
670 CELLMARK FORENSICS, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION at 3 (2014) (on file 
with authors).  
671 Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 30 (citing West deposition in Vance v. State, No. 2011-
288-LS-LT (Lincoln Cty. Circuit Ct. Feb. 11, 2012)). 
672 Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 645, at 30, 32. 
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hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Howard was entitled to relief.673 In 
2016, at the mandated evidentiary hearing, West backed down on his 2016 epiphany 
regarding bite marks, testifying, “I remember having my highest opinion as to the 
perpetrator who left the bite marks [on Kemp’s body]. It was Eddie Lee Howard.”674 On 
October 10, 2018, Judge Howard denied the motion, asserting that the DNA results did 
not point to a perpetrator other than Howard—although the male DNA on the knife 
handle did just that—and holding that West’s competence had been litigated at earlier 
stages and, therefore, was procedurally barred from consideration as a ground for 
relief.675 Although Howard had unexhausted state and federal remedies, his 
probable innocence remained unrequited in early 2019 as, at age sixty-five, he began his 
twenty-eighth year behind bars for the Kemp murder.676 The heyday of Drs. Hayne and 
West had passed—Hayne was barred from performing autopsies and West stopped bite-
mark analysis—but there was no official effort to assess the magnitude of their 
malfeasance before they fell from what the authors of a book about them termed “the 
powerful institutions that once embraced them.”677  
17. Damien Wayne Echols—Arkansas 
The nude, bound, and mutilated bodies of three eight-year-old Cub Scouts—
Michael Moore, Christopher Byers, and Steve Branch—were found in a water-filled ditch 
in an area known as Robin Hood woods near their West Memphis homes on May 6, 
1993, a day after they disappeared.678  
Suspicion arose that the murders had been the work of a satanic cult.679 Damien 
Wayne Echols, an eighteen-year-old high school dropout who lived in a trailer park in 
nearby Marion,680 seemed a logical suspect because he, as he would acknowledge, had 
delved into the occult and was familiar with its practices.681 Echols and a friend, sixteen-
year-old Charles Jason Baldwin,682 were questioned in the early days of the investigation, 
but there was no basis to arrest them until June 3 when a third youth, seventeen-year-old 
Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr., whose IQ had been measured at seventy-two, implicated 
them and himself in the crime.683  
                                                 
673 Howard v. State, 171 So. 3d 495, 495 (Miss. 2015). 
674 Post-Conviction Hearing for Eddie Lee Howard, GEORGE C. COCHRAN INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 5, 
2017), http://innocenceproject.olemiss.edu/post-conviction-hearing-for-eddie-lee-howard/. 
675 Order Denying Motion to Vacate at 12, Howard v. State, No. 2000-0115-CV1H 7-11 (Lowndes Cty. 
Circuit Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with authors).  
676 MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 643. 
677 RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON, THE CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST: A TRUE 
STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH xxii, 296, 309, 317 (2018). 
678 Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509, 516–17 (Ark. 1996); Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Ark. 
1996). 
679 MARA LEVERITT, DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE 14–15, 58–59 (2002). 
680 Id. at 41.  
681 Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 519. Echols had been born Michael Wayne Hutchison but changed his name in 
1990 when he was adopted by his stepfather—choosing “Damien,” according to some of his classmates, 
because it was the name of the Antichrist in the horror film The Omen, although his family denied that. 
Marc Perrusquia, Damien Echols May Be Troubled but He’s Not Killer, Some Say, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis), Feb. 27, 1994, at 1.  
682 Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 524; LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 53. 
683 Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 706, 712. 
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On June 7—four days after the arrest of “The West Memphis Three,” as the 
defendants would become known,684 the Commercial Appeal in Memphis, Tennessee, 
published an account of Misskelley’s confession attributing the murders to a cult ritual 
and stating that he had watched as Echols and Baldwin choked the boys until they lost 
consciousness and then raped one boy and sexually mutilated another.685 On its face, 
Misskelley’s confession was dubious because the details he related were at odds with 
facts of the crime: He asserted that the murders had occurred during the morning of May 
5, when in fact they had occurred that evening; that the victims had skipped school that 
day, when in fact they had not; and that the victims’ hands had been bound with brown 
rope, when in fact their hands and feet had been hogtied with their black and white 
shoelaces. 686  In addition, there was no indication that any of the victims had been 
raped.687 
In 1993, however, the phenomenon of false confessions absent physical coercion 
was not much appreciated,688 even though it long had been recognized that youthful 
suspects, especially those of limited intellect, were vulnerable to psychological 
manipulation and thus prone to confess to crimes they did not commit.689 Police are 
allowed to deceive suspects 690  as they had done during Misskelley’s interrogation—
telling him that he had failed a polygraph test that he apparently had passed, rendering 
him, and innumerable youths of limited mental capacity, vulnerable to false self-
incrimination.691 
                                                 
684 “Free the West Memphis Three” became the mantra of a website launched by supporters of the 
defendants after their convictions were affirmed in 1996. LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 291–93. 
685 Bartholomew Sullivan, Teen Describes ‘Cult’ Torture of Boys; Defendant Misskelley Tells Police of Sex 
Mutilation, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), June 7, 1993, at 1. 
686 Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols at 20–22, Echols v. State, No. CR 83-450a (Craighead Cty. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 7, 2009) (on file with authors). 
687 Id. at 22. 
688 Several empirical examinations of the phenomenon appeared after the convictions of the “West 
Memphis Three.” See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost 
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard 
A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. L. REV. 979 
(1997).  
689 See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 n.75, 52 (1967) (stating that “authoritative opinion has cast 
formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children” and citing JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940), for the assertion that “under certain stresses a person, 
especially one of defective mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt”). 
690 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (condoning falsely telling a suspect that his 
fingerprints had been found at a crime scene); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (condoning 
falsely telling a suspect that a co-suspect had confessed). 
691 Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 711 (Ark. 1996); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra 
note 686, at 15–16; Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 17 (2010) (stating that “basic research has revealed that 
misinformation renders people vulnerable to manipulation”). Other youths known to have confessed to 
murders they did not commit after being told falsely that they had failed polygraphs include eighteen-year-
old Peter Reilly in Connecticut, DONALD S. CONNERY, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 15, 63, 346–47 
(1977), fourteen-year-old Michael Crowe in California, Mark Sauer & John Wilkens, He Considered It a 
Blessing that He Didn’t Remember Killing His Sister, in TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS 5, 6 (Rob 
Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009), and sixteen-year-old Jeffrey Deskovic in New York, Fernanda 
Santos, DNA Testing Frees Man Imprisoned for Half His Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at B1. 
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Whatever the shortcomings of the confession, Misskelley’s jury found it 
sufficiently persuasive to convict him of the first-degree murder of Michael Moore and 
the second-degree murder of Christopher Byers and Steve Branch.692 The prosecutors, 
John Fogelman and Brent Davis, sought a death sentence, but the jury sentenced 
Misskelley to life in prison without parole—whereupon Fogelman and Davis told 
reporters that the sentence might be reduced if Misskelley would testify against Echols 
and Baldwin, whose joint trial would open eighteen days later.693 
Misskelley did not take the bait—crediting his father and stepmother with helping 
him understand that lying to help the prosecutors convict his friends was “something I 
would have to live with the rest of my life.”694 Ironically, if Misskelley had testified it 
might have been better for Echols and Baldwin, who would have had an accuser to 
confront on the witness stand.695 As it was, the Echols-Baldwin jury would be fully aware 
of Misskelley’s confession—which the jury foreman, Kent Arnold, would term the 
“primary deciding factor” in his concurrence in the guilty finding in the face of “scanty” 
and “extremely circumstantial” evidence.696 
The prosecution evidence at the joint trial included the testimony of two girls who 
claimed to have overhead Echols say he had killed the boys, of the state medical 
examiner who told the jury that a knife found in a lake behind Baldwin’s parents’ home 
could have been the murder weapon. of a witness who claimed to have seen Echols with 
a knife similar to the one that had been found, of two witnesses who claimed to have seen 
Echols near the crime scene the night of the murders, of a state criminalist who claimed 
that fibers found on the victims’ clothing were microscopically similar to fibers recovered 
from Echols’s home, and of a witness who alleged that Echols and Baldwin were 
members of a cult.697 In addition, a self-styled expert on occult killings named Dale 
Griffis, who held what the defense characterized as a mail-order Ph.D. degree from an 
unaccredited university, 698  testified for the prosecution that the crime had borne the 
“trappings of occultism,” including that it had occurred under a full moon near a pagan 
holiday and that the number of victims and their ages—three and eight, respectively—
were significant in occultism and witchcraft.699 
                                                 
692 See Misskelley, 915 S.W.2d at 707 (The statements “were virtually the only evidence, all other 
testimony and exhibits serving primarily as corroboration.”). 
693 LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 190, 192–93. 
694 Id. at 212–13. 
695 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him”); Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal 
Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra note 686, at 1 (stating that, since Misskelley did 
not testify, Echols did not have an opportunity to confront him in court).  
696 Brief of Amici Curiae Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Echols, supra note 686, at 6; Motion for New Trial at 1, Echols v. State, No. 
CR-93-450a (Craighead Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2008) (on file with authors). The Misskelley trial, at which it 
had been alleged that Echols and Baldwin “beat, cut, and sexually abused the boys,” had been televised and 
widely reported in newspapers. Joe Stumpe, Affidavit and DNA Crucial in Appeal of '93 Conviction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A16.  
697 Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509, 518–19 (Ark. 1996). 
698 Motion for New Trial, supra note 696, at 4; LEVERITT, supra note 679, at 236–37. 
699 Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 519. 
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Following their convictions, Echols was sentenced to death, and Baldwin to life in 
prison without parole.700 All three convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, which held that Misskelley’s confession had been voluntary—
despite its indicia of falsity 701 —and thus sufficient to convict him, 702  that Echols’s 
conviction had rested on “substantial evidence of [his] guilt,”703 and that all but one of the 
issues that Baldwin raised were “without merit.”704 
The West Memphis Three, meanwhile, attracted the interest of Mara Leveritt, an 
award-winning investigative journalist, and became the subject of a 1996 HBO 
documentary, Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills.705 As time passed, 
actor Johnny Depp, Pearl Jam lead vocalist-guitarist Eddie Vedder, and Dixie Chicks 
singer-songwriter Natalie Maines would rally to the cause.706 
A petition for post-conviction relief brought on Echols’s behalf was denied in 
2001, 707  but in 2004 the Arkansas Supreme Court granted his motion—and similar 
motions on behalf of Baldwin and Misskelley—for DNA testing of genetic evidence 
recovered from the victims and the crime scene.708 The ensuing testing, conducted by 
Bode Laboratories with technology that had not existed at the time of the trials, 
eliminated all three youths as sources of the recovered material and linked some of it to 
Steven Branch’s stepfather, Terry Hobbs, and a man named David Jacoby, who had been 
with Hobbs when the boys disappeared.709 
In 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered a state trial judge to determine 
whether the DNA evidence invalidated the convictions of the West Memphis Three, but 
before the hearing could be held the prosecution offered the men immediate release if 
they agreed to plead guilty, while publicly maintaining their innocence, under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Alford decision.710 They took the deal, enabling them to walk free on 
August 19, 2001—eighteen years, two months, and sixteen days after their arrest.711  
“I am innocent, as are Jason and Jessie,” said Echols, “but I made this decision 
because I did not want to spend another day of my life behind those bars. I want to live 
and to continue to fight for our innocence.”712 “It’s a total injustice,” said John Mark 
Byers, father of victim Christopher Byers. “These three men are being made to plead 
guilty to something they didn’t do.”713 
                                                 
700 Id. at 516. 
701 Id. at 525. Under case law, the sole prerequisite for admission of a confession into evidence is 
voluntariness; reliability is not an issue. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).  
702 Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Ark. 1996). 
703 Echols, 936 S.W.2d at 518–19. 
704 Id. at 519, 548–49. 
705 Dave Itzkoff, A Continuing Murder Mystery Keeps Its Grip on Filmmakers, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, 
at C1. 
706 Stumpe, supra note 696. 
707 Echols v. State, 42 S.W.3d 467, 468–69 (Ark. 2001). 
708 Motion for New Trial, supra note 696, at 3–4.  
709 Id. at 3, 8–9, 46–52. 
710 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1; 
see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
711 Robertson, supra note 710. 
712 Max Brantley, Damien Echols’ Statement on Plea Deal, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), 
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/08/19/damien-echols-statement-on-plea-deal.  
713 Blume & Helm, supra note 16, at 158. 
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18. Rodney Reed—Texas 
The partially clothed body of nineteen-year-old Stacey Lee Stites was found in 
thorny brush on the side of a desolate road in Bastrop County on April 23, 1996—
eighteen days before her planned marriage to her live-in fiancé, Jimmy Lewis Fennell, 
Jr., a twenty-three-year-old rookie police officer in the nearby town of Giddings.714 Stites 
had been strangled with her belt, and it was obvious from intact sperm heads recovered 
from her body and the crotch of her underwear that she recently had engaged in sex.715  
Fennell told investigators that he and Stites had showered together in their 
apartment in Giddings on the evening of April 22, but they had not engaged in sex 
because, although she was on birth control pills, there was an elevated risk of pregnancy 
at that point in her prescription cycle.716 Stites was scheduled to report for at work at 3:30 
A.M. on April 23 in the produce department of the H-E-B grocery store in the town of 
Bastrop.717  
Stites went to sleep at about 9:00 P.M, according to Fennell, but he stayed up 
watching television and was awakened between 6:30 and 7:00 A.M. by Stites’s mother, 
who lived in an apartment one floor below the apartment he and Stites shared.718 The 
mother had been notified that her daughter had not arrived at work.719 An hour or so 
earlier, a Bastrop County sheriff’s officer on routine parole had noticed a truck in the 
Bastrop High School parking lot and requested a stolen-vehicle check.720 It was Fennell’s 
truck, which he said Stites had driven to work that day.721 Her body was found shortly 
before 3:00 P.M. by a passerby.722  
DNA tests eliminated Fennell as the source of the recovered sperm and of saliva on 
Stites’s breasts, leading the authorities to surmise that she had been sexually assaulted.723 
In ensuing months, DNA screening eliminated twenty-seven other suspects, including 
Fennell’s friends and fellow officers, Stites’s former boyfriends, and her male H-E-B co-
workers.724 
At some point, the authorities focused on Rodney Reed, an African American, who 
in the months after the murder frequently had been seen walking late at night near 
Bastrop High School, where the truck from which Stites presumably had been abducted 
                                                 
714 Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 702, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (denying state habeas corpus). Stites 
was born on January 19, 1977, and Fennell was born on December 25, 1972. Bastrop Police Dep’t 
Supplementary Report, at 3 (1996) (on file with authors). Fennell is referred to in reported decisions and 
most pleadings relating to the Stites murder as “Jimmy Fennell,” but his full name, as cited elsewhere, is 
Jimmy Lewis Fennell Jr. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Lear v. Fennell, No. 1:08-cv-00719-JRN 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2008) (seeking damages from Fennell and the City of Giddings for rape of plaintiff) 
(on file with authors).  
715 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 704–06. 
716 Id. at 703; see also Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Ex parte Reed, No. 8701 
(Bastrop Cty. Dist. Ct. June 8, 2016) (timeline provided to investigators by Fennell) (on file with authors). 
717 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 702. 
718 Id. at 702–03. 
719 Id. at 703. 
720 Id. 
721 Id. 
722 Id. at 704. 
723 Id. at 705–06, 708, 712. 
724 Id. at 707–09.  
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had been found.725 The authorities theorized that the location of the truck likely was 
convenient for the killer; Reed lived six-tenths of a mile away.726 He was questioned after 
it was discovered that his DNA profile included him among a tiny fraction of men who 
could have been the source of the semen and saliva recovered from Stites.727 Unaware of 
the DNA link, he falsely denied knowing Stites.728 In May 1997, Reed, twenty-nine, was 
indicted for capital murder.729 He was tried before a Bastrop County jury, convicted, and 
sentenced to death in May of the following year.730  
An Austin American-Statesman article termed Reed’s defense—that he, a black 
man, had been having an affair with the white fiancée of a white Giddings policeman—
“explosive.”731 Specifically, Reed claimed that he and Stites began an affair in November 
1995 and that the last time they had engaged in sex was April 21, 1996, or “very early” 
the next morning.732 Dr. Roberto J. Bayardo, the Travis County medical examiner who 
performed the Stites autopsy,733 estimated that her time of death had been 3:00 A.M. on 
April 23 and told the jury that the recovered sperm had been deposited shortly before she 
died.734 Karen Blakely, a serologist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified 
that sperm can remain intact for no more than twenty-four hours.735  
In a closing statement that the American-Statesman called “devastating and 
eloquent,” the prosecutor, Lisa Tanner, told the jury that the semen was “the smoking 
gun”— “equivalent to the slipper in the Cinderella story.”736 The jury evidently agreed, 
convicting Reed on May 18, 1998, of murder and nine days later finding him eligible for 
a death sentence, which Judge H.R. Townslee imposed.737 The conviction and sentence 
were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal in 2000738 and on 
a petition for a state writ of habeas corpus in December 2008.739 
Meanwhile, on May 20, 2008, Jimmy Fennell pleaded guilty to aggravated 
kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, having sex with a person in custody, and official 
                                                 
725 Id. at 709. 
726 Id. 
727 Id. Reed’s DNA was in a state database because he previously had been charged with sexual assault, 
although not convicted. Mike Ward & Bill Bishop, Murder in Black and White, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, 
Apr. 22, 2001, at A1. 
728 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 709; Ward & Bishop, supra note 727.  
729 Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 761 (5th Cir. 2014). Reed was born December 22, 1967. Death Row 
Information: Rodney Reed, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., 
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/reedrodney.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).  
730 Mike Kelley, Reed Sentenced to Death in Bastrop Murder Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 29, 
1998, at B1. 
731 Ward & Bishop, supra note 727. 
732 Rodney Reed Affidavit, Reed v. State, No. 8701 (Bastrop Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2014) (on file with 
authors). 
733 Medical Examiner’s Report, (Apr. 24, 1996) PA-96-0213 (on file with authors). 
734 Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
735 Id. at 704; see also Appeal for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Ex parte Reed, No. 8701 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Feb. 4, 2015) (on file with authors).  
736 Ward & Bishop, supra note 727. 
737 Dave Harmon, Jury Convicts Rodney Reed of Murder in Bastrop Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 
19, 1998, at A1; Kelley, supra note 730. 
738 Ex parte Reed, WR-50, 961-03, 2005 WL 2659440, at *1 (citing Reed v. State, No. AP-73,135 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2000)). 
739 Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 713. 
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oppression, and was sentenced to ten years in prison.740 The victim was Connie Iris Lear, 
twenty at the time of her attack, whose case prompted several other women to come 
forward with similar allegations.741 Lear’s civil action against Fennell and the Giddings 
Police Department was settled for $100,000 in 2009.742 The developments raised, in the 
words of an Austin Chronicle report, “a healthy suspicion that Fennell had some 
involvement” in his fiancée’s murder.743 Against that backdrop, Dr. Bayardo backed off 
of his trial testimony about the time of Stites’s death, stating in a sworn declaration that 
that his 3:00 A.M. estimate should not have been “used at trial as an accurate 
statement.”744  
In February 2015, with Reed’s execution scheduled in just two weeks, his appellate 
lawyers, Bryce Benjet and Andrew F. Macrae, filed a successor petition for a state habeas 
corpus contending that new evidence proved that the prosecution theory of the crime was 
“medically and scientifically impossible,” and that Reed was innocent.745 The petition 
cited opinions of three of the nation’s leading forensic pathologists—Drs. LeRoy 
Riddick, Werner U. Spitz, and Michael M. Baden—who concluded from photographs 
and video of Stites’s body that she had been slain hours earlier than 3:00 A.M.—the time 
estimate on which the prosecution had relied at Reed’s trial.746 The petition also relied on 
a sworn statement by a Stites coworker at H-E-B who said that Stites had confided that 
“she was sleeping with a black guy named Rodney and that she didn’t know what her 
fiancé would do if he found out.”747 
In response to the petition, the Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Reed’s 
execution. 748  While the petition remained pending, Curtis Davis, a close friend of 
                                                 
740 Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 714, at 6–8; see also State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent 
Appeal for Writ as Abusive at 6, Ex parte Reed, WR-50, 961-08 & WR-50, 961-09 (Tex. Crim. App. July 
30, 2018) (on file with authors).  
741 Jordan Smith, Is Texas Getting Ready to Kill an Innocent Man?, INTERCEPT (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://theintercept.com/2014/11/17/is-texas-getting-ready-kill-innocent-man/. 
742 Id.; see also Final Judgment at 1, Lear v. Fennell, 1:08-cv-00719 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2009) (on file with 
authors).  
743 Jordan Smith, Reed Appeal Unearths Grisly Details on Fennell, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (May 1, 2009), 
https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2009-05-01/774702/. 
744 Declaration of Roberto J. Bayardo at 2, Reed v. Dretka, A-82-CA-142 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2012) (on 
file with authors).  
745 Appeal for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 735, at 1, 73. 
746 Id. at 3; see also Affidavit of LeRoy Riddick, retired Alabama state medical examiner, at 5 (Jan. 10, 
2015) (stating that the time interval between death and discovery of the body was “significantly longer” 
than the time lapse estimated at trial) (on file with authors); Affidavit of Werner U. Spitz, board-certified 
anatomic and forensic pathologist, at 2 (Feb. 4, 2015) (stating that is was impossible that Stites was 
murdered and left at the scene in the time frame presented at trial) (on file with authors); Affidavit of 
Michael Baden, former New York City chief medical examiner, at 3 (Feb. 10, 2015) (stating that lividity 
depicted in the photographic evidence leaves no doubt that Stites died before midnight on April 22, 1996, 
when she was alone with Fennell) (on file with authors)  For a succinct summary of the evidence of Reed’s 
innocence, see Chuck Lindell, Lawyers for Rodney Reed Assert Innocence in Appeal, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Feb. 13, 2015, at A1. Fennell was released from prison in March 2018. Brittany Glas, Stacey 
Stites’ Fiancé Released from Prison After Serving 10-Year Sentence, KXAN.COM, 
https://www.kxan.com/news/crime/stacey-stites-fianc-released-from-prison-after-serving-10-year-
sentence/1026871725 (last updated Mar. 9, 2018, 11:58 PM CST).  
747 Affidavit of Alicia Slater at 2 (Dec. 14, 2014) (on file with authors).  
748 State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent Appeal for Writ as Abusive, supra note 740, at 6 (citing Order, Ex 
parte Reed, WR-50, 961-07 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2015)).  
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Fennell’s, gave an interview for an upcoming episode of CNN’s Death Row Stories 
attributing incriminating statements to Fennell.749  At a hearing before Senior District 
Court Judge Doug Shaver in October 2017, Davis reiterated under oath the substance of 
what he had told CNN and Fennell asserted his Fifth Amendment right to silence.750 
Shaver denied relief, sending the case back to the Court of Criminal Appeals, where it 
remained pending in early 2019.751 
19. Darlie Lynn Routier—Texas 
Brothers Damon and Devon Routier, ages five and six, respectively, were stabbed 
to death in their Dallas County home on June 6, 1996. 752  Their twenty-six-year-old 
mother, Darlie Lynn Routier, was convicted and sentenced to death in 1997 for her 
younger son’s murder; she was not charged with the older child’s death.753 
 Routier testified that, while her husband and an infant son slept upstairs, she was 
sleeping on a downstairs couch, with her older sons on the floor nearby, when a stranger 
attacked them with a knife and fled. 754  Although Routier was seriously wounded—
“including a slash across her neck that came perilously close to severing her carotid 
artery”—the prosecution contended that there had been no intruder, that Routier had 
staged the crime scene, that her wounds had been self-inflicted, and that she had “some 
pecuniary motive to murder her children.”755 
A significant element of the prosecution case was a video made by a Dallas 
television station showing Routier spraying Silly String on her sons’ graves on the day 
that Devon would have turned seven.756 The defense objected that the video was more 
prejudicial than probative, but Judge Mark Tolle admitted it into evidence757 and the 
prosecution argued that the video “gives you a lot of insight into [Routier]. . . . [T]his is 
not a picture of a grieving mother.”758 The jury—as Routier’s mother, Darlie Kee, put it 
in a Dallas Morning News interview—“ended up deliberating on the Silly String.”759 
The conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal—which largely 
focused not on sufficiency of the evidence or fairness of the trial, but on problems with 
                                                 
749 E-mail from Bryce Benjet, Reed’s appellate attorney, to author (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:24 PM CST) (on file 
with authors).  
750 Id. 
751 Id.; State Motion to Dismiss Subsequent Appeal for Writ as Abusive, supra note 740, at 7. 
752 Tasha Tsiaperas, Did Darlie Routier Kill Her Kids? Doubts Remain Two Decades Later, DALLAS NEWS 
(June 3, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2016/06/03/did-darlie-routier-kill-her-kids-
doubts-remain-20-years-later. 
753 Id. Routier was born on January 4, 1970. Death Row Information: Offenders on Death Row, supra note 
73. 
754 Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).  
755 Id. at 244–45. The supposed “pecuniary motive” was a $5,000 life-insurance policy on each child. Id. at 
258. 
756 Tsiaperas, supra note 752. 
757 Transcript of Record at 2515, State v. Routier, No. A96-253 (Kerr Cty. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997), 
https://darliefacts.com/jury-trial-transcripts/.  
758 Id. at 5238. 
759 Tsiaperas, supra note 752. 
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the trial record.760 During pendency of the appeal, however, Texas Monthly published an 
article raising the possibility that Routier’s husband, Darin Routier, had something to do 
with the crime.761 According to the article, he had twice admitted that shortly before the 
crime he had looked for someone to break into the family home as part of an insurance 
scam—although there was nothing to indicate that anything had been done in furtherance 
of any such scam.762 After the conviction was affirmed, Darlie Routier filed a motion for 
DNA testing of physical evidence that conceivably could prove that there had been an 
intruder.763 The trial court denied the motion,764 but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
ordered some of the requested testing,765 touching off a process that would drag on for 
years without definitive results.766 
Appeals, meanwhile, were in abeyance,767 including a 2005 petition for a federal 
writ of habeas corpus raising a plethora of issues bearing on Routier’s possible 
innocence—competence of the crime scene investigation, admission of “inflammatory 
character evidence” at trial, allegedly inaccurate trial testimony by expert witnesses for 
the prosecution, and effectiveness of trial counsel.768 Expanding on the issue that Texas 
Monthly had raised, the petition noted that lawyers appointed to represent Routier after 
her arrest had retained forensic experts whose preliminary analysis indicated that the 
crime scene had not been staged.769 Before trial, however, Routier’s husband and her 
mother retained new counsel for her—Douglas Mulder, who had defended them for 
alleged violations of a gag order regarding the upcoming trial.770 Mulder had told them 
that the appointed lawyers planned to implicate Darin Routier in the crime.771 Mulder 
promised not to do that 772  and proceeded to trial without any forensic testimony 
challenging the staged-crime-scene theory.773 
The petition also challenged the prosecution rendition of the alleged staging of the 
scene.774 One piece of physical evidence had been a bloody sock that the prosecution 
                                                 
760 Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557–63, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Sandra Halsey, the certified 
court reporter at Routier’s trial, was alleged to have made some 18,000 errors in the 6,000-page record. 
Dallas County v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 553 (Tex. 2002). 
761 Skip Hollandsworth, Maybe Darlie Didn’t Do It, TEX. MONTHLY (July 2002), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/maybe-darlie-didnt-do-it/ (last visited May 23, 2019). 
762 Id. 
763 Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 248–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).  
764 Id. at 245. 
765 Id. at 256–59. 
766 CTR. FOR HUMAN IDENTIFICATION, UNIV. OF N. TEX., FORENSIC DNA REPORT # 3 (2015) (on file with 
authors).  
767 Status Report at 6, Routier v. Stephens, SA-05-CA-1156-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2013) (on file with 
authors). A bloody fingerprint from the coffee table in the room where the murders occurred “is strong 
evidence that an intruder was present at the time of the attacks.” Id. at 10. 
768 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, 12–17, 18–19, 24–42, 46–48, Routier v. Dretke, No. F96-
39973-J (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005) (on file with authors). Judicial action on the petition would be stayed 
pending DNA testing. Id. at 23. 
769 Id. at 15–16, 29–37. 
770 Id. at 16. 
771 Id.  
772 Id. at 24–25. 
773 Id. at 16. In summation, Dallas County Assistant District Attorney Greg Davis told the jury, “It speaks 
volumes to you sometimes what you don’t see and hear.” Id. at 17. 
774 Id. at 10–11. 
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theorized Routier had planted in an alley seventy-five yards from the home.775 She would 
have had to have planted it before stabbing herself, since it contained the blood of both 
boys, but her blood was not on it or in the vicinity.776 She made a call to 911 that lasted 
five minutes and forty-four seconds—presumably after planting the sock.777 Paramedics 
arrived a little more than a minute after the call ended, just as Damon Routier took his 
last breath—which, a state pathologist testified, could have been no more than nine 
minutes after he had been stabbed.778 Thus, after stabbing the boys, Routier would have 
had to have planted the sock, staged the scene inside the house to make it appear that 
there had been an intruder, and stabbed herself, all in, at most, only slightly more than 
two minutes—which the petition deemed “physically impossible.”779 
When the appellate process emerges from abeyance, there is a chance, based on the 
issues raised in the 2005 petition, that the conviction will be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial, leading to dropping of the charges or an acquittal—but as of 
May 1, 2019, Routier, forty-nine, remained one of six women under death sentences in 
Texas.780  
20. Corey Dewayne Williams—Louisiana 
Twenty-three-year-old Jarvis Griffin was robbed and shot to death while delivering 
a pizza in the Queensborough neighborhood of Shreveport on January 4, 1998.781 The 
next morning, after an all-night interrogation, sixteen-year-old Corey Dewayne Williams, 
who had an IQ of sixty-eight, confessed to the crime. 782  Based primarily on the 
confession, he was convicted by a Caddo Parish jury and sentenced to death on October 
28, 2000783—two years before the U.S. Supreme Court banned the death penalty for 
defendants with intellectual disabilities784 and, three years after that, for defendants who 
committed murders before the age of eighteen.785  
On the night of the crime, Williams joined a group of teenagers and young adults 
outside the home of Renee Iverson, who had ordered a pizza.786 Among the group were 





779 Id. at 11. 
780 The other women on death row were Kimberly Cargill, 52, convicted in 2012 of killing a witness against 
her in a child-protective case; Linda Carty, 60, convicted in 2002 of abducting and murdering a woman; 
Brittany Marlowe Holberg, 45, convicted in 1998 of murdering an eighty-year-old man during a robbery of 
his home; Melissa Elizabeth Lucio, 50, convicted in 2008 of murdering her daughter; and Erica Yvonne 
Sheppard, 45, convicted in 1995 of murdering a Houston woman. See Jolie Mccullough & Ben Hasson, 
Faces of Death Row, TEXAS TRIB., https://apps.texastribune.org/death-row/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2019). 
781 State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 840 (La. 2002), superseded by statute as recognized in Brumfield v. 
Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015). 
782 Williams gave two statements on January 5, 1998. In the second statement, at about 8:30 AM, he 
confessed that he shot Griffin. In the first, shortly before 6:00 AM, he attributed the murder to Gabriel 
Logan. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 839, 841 (listing Williams’s IQ at 68 and describing his confessions).  
783 Id. at 83; State v. Williams, at 1, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file 
with authors).  
784 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
785 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
786 Williams, 831 So. 2d at 840. 
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Iverson’s twenty-old-year-old boyfriend, Nathan Logan, his sixteen-year-old brother, 
Gabriel Logan, and twenty-year-old Chris Moore.787 When Griffin arrived with the pizza, 
Iverson paid him and he returned to his car, where he was shot—by, it would be alleged, 
Williams.788 The car rolled down the street, veering into a porch, where, according to 
witnesses, Gabriel Logan took a bank bag and a pizza from the car before fleeing with 
Moore; they put the bag and pizza box into a dumpster, from which the items were 
recovered.789 Nathan Logan claimed that Williams had hidden the murder weapon—a 
.25-caliber semi-automatic pistol—in a barbecue pit, where Nathan and his brother, 
Gabriel, retrieved and cleaned it before hiding it in another location.790 
After motions to suppress the confession as involuntary were denied, the trial 
opened on October 23, 2000, before Caddo Parish District Judge Scott J. Crichton, a 
former prosecutor who years later would ascend to the Louisiana Supreme Court.791 The 
prosecutor was Hugo Holland, who dispatched ten men to death row, more than any other 
prosecutor in the state, although half of those defendants’ sentences were overturned and 
none of the defendants was executed.792 The primary evidence linking Williams to the 
crime, other than his confessions, was the testimony of Chris Moore, who told the jury 
that he had seen Williams shoot Griffin.793 No physical evidence linked Williams to the 
crime, but Nathan Logan’s fingerprint had been found on an empty clip in the recovered 
pistol and Griffin’s blood had been found on Gabriel Logan’s clothing.794 Williams’s 
lawyer argued that Moore and the Logans likely had killed Griffin and “got together” to 
pin the crime on Williams.795 The jury, nonetheless, found Williams guilty and sentenced 
him to death.796 
On November 1, 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Williams’s 
conviction, but remanded his case for resentencing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision a few months earlier banning the death penalty for the mentally disabled.797 On 
                                                 
787 Id. 
788 Id. at 841.  
789 Id. at 840–41. 
790 Id. at 840. 
791 Id. at 839. For background on Judge Crichton, who was sworn in as a justice of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court on December 15, 2014, see Louisiana Supreme Court Justices: Justice Scott J. Crichton, LA. SUP. 
CT., https://www.lasc.org/justices/crichton.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
792 Radley Balko, How a Fired Prosecutor Became the Most Powerful Law Enforcement Official in 
Louisiana, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2017/11/02/how-a-fired-prosecutor-became-the-most-powerful-law-enforcement-official-in-
louisiana/?utm_term=.5f5538e490e8; Jim Mustian, Meet ‘Controversial’ Louisiana Prosecutor: An 
Outspoken Death Penalty Champion with Cat Named After Lee Harvey Oswald, ADVOC. (June 3 2017, 
7:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_3647e248-4551-11e7-8019-
635640ba6b05.html. 
793 Williams, 831 So. 2d at 849.  
794 Id. at 841; Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana at 7–8, Williams v. State, 
No. 17-1241 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
1241/37353/20180302123056168_17-_Petition.pdf (last visited May 23, 2019) 
795 Williams, 831 So. 2d at 841; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 9. 
796 Williams, 831 So. 2d at 839. 
797 Id. at 838, 857; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning the death penalty for the 
mentally disabled). 
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remand, Crichton sentenced Williams to life in prison on February 20, 2004. 798 
Williams’s lawyers filed an application for post-conviction relief in Caddo Parish District 
Court on April 5, 2005.799 Over the ensuing decade, supplemental pleadings were filed, 
the final one on January 13, 2015, 800  leading to the belated disclosure of evidence 
exposing what G. Ben Cohen, one of Williams’s appellate lawyers, termed “a toxic 
combination of hubris, deceit, and indifference” by Hugo Holland.801 
The belatedly surrendered evidence included an electronic recording of a police 
interview hours after the crime with Nathan Logan, who proclaimed, based on what he 
had seen, that the murder “had to” have been committed by his brother, Gabriel Logan, 
and that “it don’t make any sense” to say that Williams had committed it.802 Not only had 
the recording been withheld, but before the trial the defense had been given a summary of 
the interview falsely stating, “Nathan thought that Corey shot the man.” 803  Another 
suppressed recording from the night of the murder was a police interview with a witness 
named Patrick Anthony, who reported that, before the murder, he had seen Nathan Logan 
give the murder weapon to Chris Moore and, after the murder he, Anthony, helped Moore 
and the Logans hide the same weapon where police recovered it.804  
The prosecution conceded that the recorded statements and other exculpatory 
evidence had been withheld from Williams’s trial lawyers, but asserted that the evidence 
had been immaterial under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland 
because Williams had confessed and, therefore, the suppressed evidence would not have 
changed the outcome of the trial 805 —an argument that the post-conviction judge, 
Katherine Clark Dorroh, credited in denying relief to Williams on November 4, 2015.806 
On March 26, 2018, Blythe Taplin, of the New Orleans Promise of Justice 
Initiative, and Amir H. Ali, of the Roderick & Solange Justice Center in Washington, 
D.C., petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari on Williams’s behalf, arguing, 
“The record in this case epitomizes the dangers of allowing prosecutors to . . . suppress 
exculpatory evidence based upon their pretrial assessment of what would be ‘material’ to 
the defense.”807 Forty-four former high-level U.S. Justice Department lawyers and U.S. 
attorneys from around the country joined in an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to 
“grant review and reverse the judgment in this case, as the favorable information not 
disclosed by prosecutors, considered cumulatively, puts this case ‘in such a different light 
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”808 
                                                 
798 Ruling on Issue of Mental Retardation at 1, State v. Williams, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo 
Par., Feb. 20, 2004) (on file with authors). 
799 State v. Williams, at 1, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with 
authors). 
800 The final Williams pleading at the post-conviction stage was filed on January 13, 2005. Id. at 2. 
801 Jessica Pishko, How Prosecutors Ruined the Life of Corey Williams, NATION (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-ruined-life-corey-williams/. 
802 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 12. 
803 Id. at 13. 
804 Id. at 13–14. 
805 Id. at 19; see generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
806 Williams v. State, at 5, No. 193,258 (La. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par. Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with 
authors). 
807 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 34.  
808 Brief of Amici Curiae Former Prosecutors and Dep’t of Justice Officials in Support of Petitioner at 6, 
Williams v. Louisiana, No. 17-1241 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2018). 
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On May 21, 2018, with the petition for certiorari pending, Caddo Parish District 
Attorney James E. Stewart, Sr. and Williams’s lawyers filed a joint motion before Judge 
Dorroh asking that Williams’s conviction and sentence be vacated, with the 
understanding that he would plead guilty to manslaughter and obstruction of justice in 
exchange for immediate release.809 Dorroh granted the motion, accepted the plea, and 
ordered Williams released.810 
The next day, Williams, thirty-six, walked free—but, of course, not exonerated—
twenty years, four months, and eighteen days after his arrest for a crime for which it had 
been doubtful from the beginning that he had committed.811 In pleading guilty to the 
lesser charges, Williams waived any right to pursue civil damages for his wrongful 
conviction, but Amir Ali told a reporter, “This was an impossible deal for Corey to turn 
down. I think, given the circumstances, it was the best possible outcome for Corey.”812 
21. Marcellus S. Williams—Missouri 
Felicia Anne Gayle’s body was found by her husband, Dr. Daniel Picus, a St. Louis 
radiologist, in their suburban University City home on August 11, 1998.813 Gayle, a forty-
two-year-old former St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter,814 had been stabbed forty-three 
times with a butcher knife that the killer found in the home.815  
The case had grown cold when, fifteen months later, St. Louis County Prosecuting 
Attorney Robert P. McCulloch announced that Marcellus S. Williams, a thirty-year-old 
burglar and armed robber, had been charged with the crime.816 The recovery of a laptop 
                                                 
809 Joint Motion for Post-Conviction Relief at 1–2, Williams v. Vannoy, No. 193,258, (La. 1st Jud. Dist. 
Ct., Caddo Par., May 21, 2018) (on file with authors). Amid accusations of racial bias in the district 
attorney’s office, Stewart was elected Caddo Parish’s first African American district attorney in 2015 after 
a hard-fought campaign during which he promised “to bring professionalism and ethics back to the district 
attorney’s office.” Alexandria Burris, Stewart Wins Caddo DA Race, SHREVEPORT TIMES, 
https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/election/2015/11/21/caddo-da-election-runoff-
results/75899240/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2015). 
810 Andrew Cohen, Corey Williams About to Walk Free in Louisiana, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/21/corey-williams-about-to-walk-free-in-louisiana. The 
Marshall Project earlier had published an account of the case, stating that it presented the Supreme Court 
with a seemingly “irresistible constellation of issues”—including police interrogation of an intellectually 
disabled teenager and prosecutorial misconduct—“during the reign of Hugo Holland, a prosecutor known 
for taking shortcuts in pursuing the death penalty.” Andrew Cohen, Is There Such a Thing As a Slam Dunk? 
The Corey Williams Case Comes Close, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/04/16/is-there-such-a-thing-as-a-slam-dunk. 
811 Pishko, supra note 801. Among exculpatory materials released during post-conviction proceedings were 
electronically recorded statements of investigating officers indicating that, until they obtained Williams’s 
confession, they suspected that the older men were falsely accusing him. “It sounds like to me y’all all 
decided y’all going to blame it on Corey,” one officer told other suspects. “That’s exactly what I’m 
getting.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 794, at 15–16. 
812 Mark Berman, He Was 16 When Louisiana Charged Him with Murder. Two Decades Later, He’s Free, 
WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/05/22/he-was-
16-when-louisiana-charged-him-with-murder-two-decades-later-hes-free/?utm_term=.8b710e8abfdf. 
813 Deborah Peterson & Lance Williams, Police Check Out Leads in Slaying of Former Post-Dispatch 
Reporter, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1998, at B3. 
814 Id. 
815 Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 2012). 
816 William C. Lhotka, Man Charged in Slaying of Former Reporter Has Long Criminal Record, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1999, at B1. Williams was born on December, 30, 1968. See Current Inmates, 
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computer and other items taken in the burglary led to the charges, McCulloch said, and 
the Post-Dispatch quoted sources as saying that two informants had provided information 
to authorities.817  
The trial of the racially charged case—black defendant, white victim—opened on 
June 4, 2001, before a St. Louis County jury of eleven white jurors and one black juror 
after the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate six of seven qualified 
black potential jurors from the panel.818 Eleven days later, the jury convicted Williams of 
first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and armed criminal action.819 On June 19, the jury 
recommended a death sentence,820 which Judge Emmett M. O’Brien imposed on August 
27.821  
The conviction rested mainly on the testimony of Williams’s former girlfriend, 
Laura Asaro, and a jailhouse informant, Henry Cole, both of whom claimed that Williams 
had admitted the crime.822 Asaro claimed to have seen a purse containing Gayle’s state 
identification card in the trunk of the car Williams was said to have used in the crime,823 
and police claimed to have found a ruler and a calculator that belonged to Gayle in the 
car.824  
Asaro, a crack addict and prostitute, agreed to testify in exchange for the dismissal 
of outstanding warrants against her.825 She and Cole, a career criminal with a history of 
mental illness, also stood to share in a $10,000 reward offered by Gayle’s family.826 A 
third witness, Glenn Roberts, testified that Williams had sold him a laptop computer 
taken in the burglary.827 Roberts would have added that Williams said he was selling the 
computer for Asaro, but Judge O’Brien barred that proffered assertion as hearsay.828 
Hairs recovered from Gayle’s shirt and from a recently cleaned rug on which her body 
was found had not come from Williams, Gayle, or her husband.829 Nor had blood and 
skin recovered from Gayle’s fingernails come from Williams.830 Bloody footprints at the 
scene matched the shoe size of neither Williams nor first-responders.831  
The jury, with its lone African American member, deliberated less than two hours 
before finding Williams guilty and, four days later, deliberated for less than ninety 
minutes before recommending the death sentence, which Judge O’Brien imposed.832 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
MO. DEATH ROW, https://test-missourideathrowcom.pantheonsite.io/current-inmates/ (last updated Mar. 26, 
2014).  
817 Lhotka, supra note 816. 
818 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Williams v. Roper, No. 4:05CV01474RWS (E.D. Mo.2006) 
(citing trial transcript) (on file with authors).  
819 William C. Lhotka, Jury Votes Death Penalty for Woman’s Murderer, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 
20, 2001, at B1. 
820 Id. 
821 Id. 
822 State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 466–67 (Mo. 2003). 
823 Id. at 467. 
824 Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2012). 
825 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 2–3, 9–10, 17–18. 
826 Id. at 97–99; see also Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Mo. 2005). 
827 Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462 at 467. 
828 Id. 
829 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 10. 
830 Id. 
831 Id. 
832 Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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Missouri Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the conviction both on direct appeal and 
on a motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct.833 The prosecutorial misconduct allegations included offering 
to help two prospective witnesses with pending prosecutions, although the witnesses 
wound up not testifying.834 The alleged ineffective assistance of counsel included failing 
to investigate proffered testimony from Asaro’s mother that the car Williams supposedly 
used in the crime had been inoperable at the time.835 Regarding the ruler and calculator 
that police claimed to have found in the car, Williams’s post-conviction counsel noted 
that Asaro or the police could have planted the items.836  
Williams next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, citing various grounds for 
overturning his conviction or, at least, his death sentence.837 In 2010, a federal judge 
rejected the claims pertaining to the conviction, including a claim of innocence,838 but 
vacated Williams’s death sentence on the ground that trial counsel had failed to 
investigate and present social and medical-history evidence during the penalty phase of 
the trial.839 Among facts that would have been uncovered via diligent investigation, the 
judge found, were that as a child Williams had been physically and sexually abused, that 
his family had condoned criminal behavior, and that he had been exposed to guns, drugs, 
and alcohol at a young age840—facts that the judge found, if known to Williams’s jury, 
would have established “a reasonable probability that the outcome of the penalty phase 
would have been different.”841 
The U.S. Court of Appeals reinstated Williams’s death sentence, saying that 
presenting evidence of childhood abuse in mitigation would have undermined trial 
counsel’s portrayal of Williams as a “family man, who is innocent of such a violent 
murder.”842 Williams, said the appellate court, “cannot now plead ineffective assistance 
alleging that a different strategy would have worked better.”843 Williams’s execution was 
set for January 28, 2015,844 but it was stayed by the Missouri Supreme Court, which 
ordered DNA testing845 that conclusively excluded Williams as the source of DNA on the 
                                                 
833 Williams, 97 S.W.3d at 466; see also Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 439–45 (Mo. 2005). 
834 Williams, 168 S.W.3d at 440.  
835 Id. at 442. 
836 Explanations consistent with Williams’s innocence include that the police could have planted the items, 
or that the police could have provided the items to Asaro, or that the actual killer could have provided the 
items to her without the knowledge of the police. E-mail from Tricia Bushnell, one of Williams’s appellate 
attorneys, to author (Jan. 30, 2019, 17:05 EST) (on file with authors). Asaro had access to the car. In the 
Matter of Marcellus Williams, Request to Appoint an Independent Board of Inquiry at 1 (Aug. 8, 2017) (on 
file with authors). 
837 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 15–114. 
838 Williams v. Roper, No. 4:05CV1474 RWS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144919, at *13–39, *49–69 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 26, 2010).  
839 Id. at *38–49. 
840 Id. at *40. 
841 Id. at *47. 
842 Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 2012). 
843 Id. at 834. 
844 Williams v. McCulloch, 4:15CV00070 RWS, 2015 WL 222170, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2015).  
845 Mo. Sup. Ct. Order SC94720, State ex rel. Williams v. Steele (Jan. 28, 2015). 
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murder weapon.846 Nonetheless, the Missouri Supreme Court denied relief847 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to review the case.848  
The execution was rescheduled for August 22, 2017,849 but, hours before it was to 
be carried out, it was stayed by Governor Eric Greitens to permit further investigation of 
the DNA evidence by a board he appointed for that purpose.850 If the results of the 
investigation were favorable to Williams, Greitens indicated he would grant 
clemency851—but, before the board began delving into the case, Greitens, a Republican 
who had campaigned on a promise to fight corruption, abruptly resigned on May 29, 
2018, in the wake of a scandal involving campaign finances and an extra-marital affair.852 
In February 2019, Williams, at age fifty, more than nineteen years after his arrest for the 
Gayle murder, remained on Missouri death row.853 
22. Larry Ray Swearingen—Texas 
On January 2, 1999, twenty-five days after nineteen-year-old Melissa Aline Trotter 
was last seen alive in the Lone Star College library in Conroe, she was found dead, a 
ligature around her neck, in Sam Houston National Forest. 854  Twenty-seven-year-old 
Larry Ray Swearingen was a suspect because he had met Trotter on the afternoon of 
December 8 at the college library and they had left together, after which her car had been 
found in the library parking lot. 855  Swearingen was arrested on several outstanding 
warrants on December 11, 1998, and was in the Montgomery County Jail when hunters 
found Trotter’s body.856  
Swearingen denied the crime, but was indicted within days.857 His trial opened 
before Judge Fred Edwards and a jury in Montgomery County District Court on June 14, 
                                                 
846 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Williams v. Larkin, No. SC96625, (Mo. Aug. 14, 2017) (on 
file with authors). 
847 State ex rel. Williams v. Steele, 2017 Mo. Unpub LEXIS 47, at *1 (Nov. 28, 2017).  
848 Williams v. Steele, 137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017). 
849 Tony Rizzo, Execution Set for Man Convicted of Killing Former St. Louis Newspaper Reporter, K.C. 
STAR, http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article146876134.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2017). 
850 Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, Missouri Governor Stays Execution of Marcellus Williams, Says 
Officials Will Probe DNA Evidence in the Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/22/missouri-plans-to-execute-marcellus-
williams-as-his-attorneys-say-dna-evidence-exonerates-him/?utm_term=.7ee10fc48de4 (last visited May 
26, 2019) 
851 Id. 
852 Jack Suntrup & Kurt Erickson, Embattled Missouri Gov. Eric Greitens Resigns; Prosecutor Drops 
Computer Tampering Charge, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 2018, at A1. 
853 Current Inmates, supra note 816.  
854 Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc); Alex Hannaford, Is Larry 
Swearingen Innocent?, TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.texasobserver.org/is-larry-
swearingen-innocent/. Trotter was born on November 26, 1979. Melissa Aline Trotter, FIND A GRAVE, 
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/6166138/melissa-aline-trotter (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). 
855Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 93. Swearingen was born on May 21, 1971.Offender Information: Larry Ray 
Swearingen, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., 
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/swearingenlarry.html (last visited May 23, 2019). 
856 Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d 89 at 93; Jerry Urban, Body Found in Forest ID’d as Student, 19, HOUS. 
CHRON., Jan. 4, 1999, at A1; Hannaford, supra note 854. 
857 Harvey Rice, Jury to Be Selected in Swearingen Trial, HOUS. CHRON., May 15, 2000, at A14. 
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2000.858 The prosecution, led by Assistant District Attorney Michael R. Tiffin,859 alleged 
that Swearingen strangled Trotter to death with a ligature torn or cut from her pantyhose 
after she rejected his sexual advances—and that he disposed of her body in the forest the 
same afternoon.860 Dr. Joye M. Carter, who performed the autopsy, testified that the 
decomposition of the body was consistent with it having been in the forest for twenty-five 
days.861 Cell phone records indicated that Swearingen had placed a call from the vicinity 
of the forest at 4:25 P.M. on December 8.862  
Physical evidence purporting to link Swearingen to the crime included a piece of 
pantyhose said to have been found outside his trailer home by his landlord four days after 
Trotter’s body was discovered—the partial garment matched the ligature with which 
Trotter had been slain—but police had twice previously searched the trailer without 
finding it.863 Hairs said to be similar to Trotter’s hair were found in Swearingen’s truck, 
and fibers that might have come from Swearingen’s jacket, truck, and trailer were found 
on Trotter’s body,864 but DNA testing positively excluded Swearingen as the source of 
male blood flakes found in scrapings of Trotter’s fingernails. 865  A cellmate of 
Swearingen’s testified that, when asked if he had committed the crime, Swearingen 
responded, “F---, yeah, I did it.”866 Swearingen took the stand to proclaim his innocence, 
testifying that on December 8 he had left Trotter in the company of another man and gone 
to visit his grandmother, who testified that he had picked her up at 2:30 P.M. and taken 
her to the post office.867 
On June 28, 2000, the jury found Swearingen guilty of murder, and eight days later 
returned findings qualifying him for a death sentence, which Judge Edwards imposed on 
July 11. 868  In March 2003, on direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed the verdict and death sentence.869 Two months later, the court denied a state writ 
of habeas corpus, which Swearingen had sought while the direct appeal was pending.870 
In May 2004, Swearingen sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, but his petition was 
dismissed in September 2005 by U.S. District Court Judge Melinda Harmon,871 whose 
decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Firth Circuit in July 2006.872 
                                                 
858 State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000 (Montgomery Cty. Dist. Ct. July 11, 
2000) (trial judge’s imposition of death sentence and description of the case chronology up to that point). 
859 Id. at *1. 
860 Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d 89 at 95. 
861 Id. at 93; Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Apx. 1, at 1, Swearingen v. Quarterman, TXSD 
No. 4:09-cv-00300 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2009) (affidavit of Joye M. Carter, former Harris County medical 
examiner) (on file with authors).  
862 Id. at 10. 
863 Id. 
864 Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 94. 
865 Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 19. 
866 Id. at 5 n.1.  
867 Id. at 98. 
868 State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000, at *2–4 (Montgomery Cty. Dist. Ct. 
July 11, 2000). 
869 Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 101. 
870 Ex parte Swearingen, No. WR-53, 613-04 (Tex. Crim. App. May 21, 2003). 
871 Swearingen v. Dretke, No. 04-cv-2058, at 1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2005) (cited in Swearingen v. Dretke, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32933, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2006)). 
872 Swearingen v. Quarterman, 192 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
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Swearingen sought DNA testing to no avail 873  and twice came within one day of 
execution—in January 2007 and January 2009—before being granted stays.874 
On January 30, 2009, Swearingen’s appellate lawyers, Philip H. Hilder and James 
G. Rytting, filed a second petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus citing seemingly 
incontrovertible evidence of Swearingen’s innocence875—that, in the opinion of five 
independent forensic experts, Trotter’s body could not have been left in the forest until 
about December 18, 1998, more than a week after Swearingen’s arrest, and probably had 
not been left there until two or three days before the hunters found it on January 2, 
1999.876 In light of the forensic opinions, Dr. Carter, recanted her claim at Swearingen’s 
trial that the decomposition of Trotter’s body had been consistent with the prosecution 
theory that Trotter had been slain on December 8.877  
Hilder and Rytting also developed evidence that days before Trotter disappeared, 
she had received life-threatening telephone calls that caused her to break down in tears.878 
Her co-workers—she had a telemarketing job—reported the threats to police, who 
determined that the threats could not have come from Swearingen, but that information 
was not disclosed to Swearingen’s trial counsel, Jerald Crow, in apparent violation of 
Brady v. Maryland.879 In addition, the second habeas petition alleged that Swearingen 
had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel by Crow’s failure to investigate 
evidence suggesting that Swearingen had been in jail when the murder occurred.880  
Based on the Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act, which severely limits 
state prisoners’ ability to bring successive habeas actions,881 Judge Harmon dismissed the 
petition in November 2009.882 The New York-based Innocence Project and the Innocence 
Network, an umbrella organization of fifty-eight law school innocence projects, filed an 
amicus brief urging the Fifth Circuit to reverse Harmon on the ground that Swearingen 
had been incarcerated when Trotter died and therefore could not have murdered her.883 In 
April 2011, however, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed Harmon.884 Five months later, the 
Texas Legislature, at the behest of the Innocence Project, amended the state law 
                                                 
873 Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 1, Swearingen v. Dretke, No. 4:06-mc-00059 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 
2006) (on file with authors). 
874 Renée C. Lee, Inmate Avoids Death Again, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2009, at A1. 
875 Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 3. 
876 Id. at 11–12. The experts were forensic entomologists Dr. Dael Morris and Dr. James Arends, forensic 
pathologists Dr. Lloyd White and Dr. Glenn Larkin, and Harris County Medical Examiner Dr. Luis 
Sanchez. Id. at 5. 
877 Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, Apx. 1, at 2 (affidavit of Joye M. Carter, 
former Harris County medical examiner) (“[F]indings pursuant to the internal examination [of the body] 
are consistent with a late exposure in the Sam Houston National Forest within fourteen days of 
discovery.”). 
878 Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 19–20. 
879 Id. at 20; State v. Swearingen, No. 99-11-06435-CR, 2000 WL 35627000, at *1 (Montgomery Cty. Dist. 
Ct. July 11, 2000) (identifying Crow as trial counsel); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
880 Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 861, at 2. The decomposition of the body had 
been so minimal that the hunters who found it thought it was a mannequin. Id. at 7 (citing police report). 
881 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012).  
882 Swearingen v. Thaler, No. H-09-300, 2009 WL 4433221, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2009) (“Swearingen 
has not met the AEDPA's requirements for filing a successive petition.”). 
883 Brief of Innocence Project & Innocence Network as Amici Curiae at 13, 15, Swearingen v. Thaler, No. 
09-70036 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (on file with authors).  
884 Swearingen v. Thaler, 421 F. App’x 413, 414 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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governing DNA testing to address some of the reasons Swearingen’s efforts to obtain 
further DNA testing had been denied,885 but as of May 1, 2019, Swearingen, forty-seven, 
remained on death row.886 
23. Kimber Edwards—Missouri 
Thirty-five-year-old Kimberly Cantrell was found shot to death in her apartment in 
the St. Louis suburb of University City on August 23, 2000. 887  Canvassing the 
neighborhood, police interviewed two neighbor boys: brothers Christopher Harrington, a 
ninth grader, who said he had seen a black man carrying a black backpack knocking on 
Cantrell’s door late the afternoon of August 22 and Brandon Harrington, twelve, who 
said he had heard shots and a woman scream at around 5:15 or 5:30 that afternoon.888 
Cantrell’s ex-husband, thirty-six-year-old Kimber Edwards, was an immediate 
suspect.889 The couple had divorced a decade earlier, but in March 2000, Edwards had 
been charged with failing to make a dozen monthly child-support payments.890 Edwards, 
who had a fourteen-year-old daughter with Cantrell, had remarried and was living with 
his wife and their two daughters in St. Louis, where he was a correctional officer at the 
city jail.891 The day after Cantrell’s body was found, Edwards told police that he had 
returned from out of town on August 22, when he had taken his daughters to medical 
appointments, and then had done some repairs at a rental property he owned in St. 
Louis.892 He said he had not seen Cantrell since August 10.893 Edwards’s second wife, 
Jada Edwards, was interrogated for more than an hour, during which police took her 
fingerprints, shoeprints, and hair samples as Edwards watched.894  
On August 25, when police went to the Edwards’s rental property to check his 
alibi, they met a tenant—thirty-nine-year-old Orthell M. Wilson—who fit the description 
of the man Christopher Harrington had reported seeing three days earlier.895 Police found 
a black backpack in Wilson’s apartment, and Harrington identified him from a 
photograph. 896  In a series of shifting statements, Wilson implicated Edwards in the 
                                                 
885 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1), 64.01(b) (West 2017). The amendments were specifically 
designed to permit DNA testing of the sort sought by Swearingen. Testimony of Stephen Saloom, Innocence 
Project Policy Director, Before the Tex. Sen. Criminal Justice Comm., at 5 (Mar. 22, 2011), and Before the 
Tex. H. Criminal Jurisprudence Comm., at 5 (May 10, 2011) (on file with authors). 
886 Death Row Information: Larry Ray Swearingen, supra note 855. 
887 State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 520–21 (Mo. 2003); Woman Is Found Shot to Death in Her 
Apartment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2000, at B2. 
888 Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Mo. 2006); Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522.  
889 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 521. According to state inmate records, Edwards was born on March 29, 1964. 
Offender Search: Kimber Edwards, MO. DEP’T OF CORR., 
https://web.mo.gov/doc/offSearchWeb/offenderInfoAction.do (search results for “Kimber Edwards”). 
890 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 521. 
891 Id. at 520–21. 
892 Id. 
893 Id. 
894 Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 6, Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1092) (on 
file with authors). 
895 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522. According to state inmate records, Wilson (whose first name is misspelled 
“Ortell” in some records) was born on December 18, 1960. Offender Search: Orthell Wilson, MO. DEP’T OF 
CORR., https://web.mo.gov/doc/offSearchWeb/offenderInfoAction.do (search results for “Orthell Wilson”). 
896 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522. 
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crime—in the first version, Edwards paid Wilson $500 “to just go knock on [Cantrell’s] 
door and see if she was there or not, and then to leave,” in another version, Edwards 
asked Wilson to “intimidate” Cantrell for $3,500, and, in the final version, Edwards 
provided the handgun for Wilson to “take her out.”897 On August 26, Wilson led police to 
a vacant building where they recovered the murder weapon.898 
The next day, University City Police arrested Edwards, told him that Wilson was in 
custody, and showed him photographs of the crime scene and murder weapon. 899 
Edwards professed innocence, as he had four days earlier, but when told that the 
investigation would continue, and that it would involve his wife and children, he agreed 
to make a statement, provided that the police would leave his family alone.900 He then 
claimed that a man named Michael had overheard him talking about his child-support 
problems and offered to take care of the problems for $1,600—a price on which they 
agreed.901 When police asked if Michael actually was Wilson, Edwards said that he was 
not, but that Wilson had demanded a share of the money for helping Michael with “the 
job.”902 
On the assumption that the Edwards and Wilson statements were sufficient to prove 
that the former had hired the latter to commit the crime, both were charged with 
Cantrell’s murder.903 After Wilson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison, 
Edwards’s trial opened on April 22, 2002, before St. Louis County Circuit Court Judge 
Mark D. Siegel and an all-white jury—from which the prosecution peremptorily struck 
three qualified African American potential jurors; Edwards was an African American.904 
Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress his incriminating statement, contending that it 
was the product of physical and psychological coercion, but Judge Siegel denied the 
motion.905  
Wilson was not called to testify at the trial, but his brother, Hughie Wilson, also 
Edwards’s tenant, told the jury that that in the spring or early summer of 2000 Edwards 
inquired about getting a “throwaway” gun.906 A few days before the murder, according to 
Hughie Wilson, he had been with his brother and Edwards in his brother’s apartment, 
where he saw a gun that looked like the murder weapon on a bedroom table.907 Edwards 
                                                 
897 Appellant’s Brief at 11–12, Edwards v. State, No. SC 86895 (Mo. Feb. 6, 2006) (on file with authors).  
898 Id. 
899 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 522.  
900 Id. at 523. 
901 Id.  
902 Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 9. 
903 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 49–50.  
904 Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 1, 9; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 13. The 
prosecution claimed that removal of a potential black juror was justified because he had stated that his 
niece had been treated unfairly by law enforcement, although a white juror who complained about the 
harshness of his nephew’s prison sentence for burglary had been accepted. See Editorial Bd., Too Many 
Black Men Sent to Death by White Juries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2015, at A14 (quoting a 
letter to Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed by “dozens of elected officials, attorneys and death penalty 
opponents”). Prosecutorial challenges of potential jurors of the same race as the defendant based solely on 
race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
89 (1986).  
905 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 523–24. 
906 Id. at 523. 
907 Id. 
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took the stand in his own defense, telling the jury that he had made the incriminating 
statement out of fear that police would accuse his wife of being involved in the crime.908  
The jury convicted Edwards on April 25, 2002, and, after a brief hearing the next 
day, found him eligible for a death sentence, which Judge Siegel imposed a day after 
that.909 In August 2003, the conviction and sentenced were affirmed by the Missouri 
Supreme Court,910 which denied Edwards’s petition for post-conviction relief three years 
later.911 Edwards next sought a federal writ of habeas corpus,912 which was denied by the 
U.S. District Court in October 2009913 and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in January 2012.914  
In June 2015, Edwards’s appellate counsel—Kent E. Gibson and Jeremy S. Weis—
filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting Edwards’s innocence based 
primarily on a recantation by Orthell Wilson, who alleged that he had been coerced by 
police to falsely implicate Edwards.915 The affidavit said that Wilson and Cantrell had 
been engaged in a secret romantic relationship that began shortly after she and Edwards 
were divorced, that during the entire relationship Wilson had “a serious drug problem” 
for which he was “constantly in need of money,” that he shot her after a “heated 
argument” over his drug addiction, and that he had recanted shortly after Edwards was 
convicted, but no one “followed up on this with me.”916  
Wilson’s assertion that he had been romantically involved with Cantrell was 
corroborated by affidavits from two of Wilson’s neighbors and the daughter of a third 
neighbor attesting that they had seen him hugging and kissing her on various 
occasions.917 The petition also cited a psychiatric evaluation conducted during earlier 
proceedings indicating that Edwards suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome, a condition 
that rendered him vulnerable to pressure to confess to a crime he did not commit.918 
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the petition without explanation919—which 
was unsurprising in light of the propensity of courts to summarily dismiss recantations as 
unreliable, even though experience in the DNA forensic age has established otherwise,920 
                                                 
908 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 897, at 5–6. 
909 Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 15–16. 
910 Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 550. 
911 Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 521 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) 
912 Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 894, at 22.  
913 Edwards v. Roper, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2009 WL 3164112, at *25 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2009), aff’d, 688 
F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2012). 
914 Edwards, 688 F.3d at 463. 
915 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, 8, 15–17, 22–24, 37, Edwards v. Griffith (Mo. June 1, 2015) 
(on file with authors); id., Ex. 1, at 1–2 (affidavit of Orthell Wilson). 
916 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 915, Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 4–5, 7 (affidavit of Orthell Wilson).  
917 Id., Ex. 4, at ¶ 9 (affidavit of Mara Esthelle Robins-Couch); id., Ex. 5, at ¶¶ 6–7 (affidavit of Joyce 
Harris); id., Ex. 6, at ¶¶ 5–7 (affidavit of Ronyne Jean McKnight). 
918 Id. at 4, 6–7; see also Psychiatric Evaluation (report by William S. Logan, forensic psychiatrist) at 2–4, 
Edwards v. State, 4:06-cv-01419-CJE (Mo. Aug. 17, 2007) (on file with authors). 
919 State ex rel. Edwards v. Griffith, No. SC 95033, 2015 Mo. Unpub LEXIS 340, at *1 (June 30, 2015). 
920 THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 32 at 14. A 2013 study found that, of 250 documented exonerations in 
U.S. murder cases, 139, or 55.6%, involved at least one recantation. ALEXANDRA E. GROSS & SAMUEL R. 
GROSS, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, WITNESS RECANTATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 4 
(2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/RecantationUpdate_5_2013.pdf.  
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and similarly to look askance at the notion that confessions, absent physical torture, are 
“damning and compelling evidence of guilt.”921 
Edwards’s hope of avoiding execution at that point was slim, but on October 2015, 
Missouri Governor Jeremiah W. “Jay” Nixon, a staunch proponent of the death penalty 
who, as attorney general, had fought to preserve Edwards’s death sentence, 922 
unexpectedly commuted his sentence to life—although purporting to believe that 
Edwards was guilty.923 In early 2019, nearing his fifty-fifth birthday and the seventeenth 
anniversary of his death sentence, Edwards languished in Missouri’s South Central 
Correctional Center.924 
24. Robert Leslie Roberson III—Texas 
On the morning of January 31, 2002, thirty-five-year-old Robert Leslie 
Roberson III rolled a wheelchair into the Palestine Regional Medical Center 
emergency room.925 His girlfriend, Teddie Cox, sat in the wheelchair, holding what 
nurse Kelly Gurganus thought looked like a rag doll—but was Roberson’s limp two-
year-old daughter, Nikki Curtis.926 “She’s not breathing,” Gurganus quoted Cox as 
saying.927  
Noticing bruises on Nikki’s body and head, Gurganus asked Roberson what caused 
them.928 He said Nikki had fallen out of bed.929 Finding that explanation implausible in 
view of the severity of Nikki’s injuries, Gurganus asked the nursing supervisor to call 
police—to whom Roberson reiterated that Nikki had fallen out of bed.930 Meanwhile, 
Andrea Sims, a nurse who specialized in sexual assault cases, examined Nikki, finding 
rectal injuries consistent with sexual assault.931 Due to swelling in Nikki’s brain, Dr. 
Thomas Konjoyan transferred her to Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, where she died 
of “blunt force head injuries” that, according to Dr. Jill Urban, who performed the 
autopsy, could have resulted from shaking.932 Based largely on the fact that Roberson had 
been alone with Nikki when she presumably suffered her fatal injuries—Teddie Cox had 
been hospitalized for a hysterectomy933—a grand jury indictment was returned on April 
                                                 
921 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 325. Of 364 U.S. DNA exonerations documented as of late February 2019, 
28% involved false confessions. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
922 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 19, Edwards v. State, No. 06-8534 (Mo. Jan. 29, 2007) 
(on file with authors). 
923 John Eligon, Missouri Inmate Is Spared Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2015, at A13. 
924 Offender Search: Kimber Edwards, supra note 889. 
925 Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., No. 2:09cv327, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
139510, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014). Roberson was born on November 10, 1966. Death Row 
Information: Robert Leslie Roberson III, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., 
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/death_row/dr_info/robersonrobert.html (last visited May 23, 2019). 
926 Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *3. 
927 Id. 
928 Id. at *3–4. 
929 Id. at *3. 
930 Id. at *4; see also Roberson v. Stephens, 614 F. App’x 124, 126 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
931 Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 126. 
932 Id. at 127–28; Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *5–6.  
933 Roberson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *8. 
Vol. 14:3]                                                                                Rob Warden and John Seasly 
455 
25 charging Roberson with murder during the commission, or attempted commission, of 
sexual assault of a child under age six.934  
At Roberson’s jury trial, which opened on February 3, 2003, before Anderson 
County District Court Judge Bascom W. Bentley III, the prosecution relied principally on 
medical testimony. 935  Dr. Konjoyan testified that it was “basically impossible” that 
Nikki’s injuries resulted from falling out of bed.936 Dr. John Ross, who examined Nikki 
on the day she died, testified that her brain had shifted from the right side to the left and 
that her injuries had not been accidental.937 Sims, the nurse who specialized in sexual 
assault, told the jury that she believed that Nikki had been sexually assaulted,938 even 
though Dr. Urban, who performed the autopsy, noted no rectal injuries and detected no 
semen.939 Dr. Janet Squires, a pediatrician who treated Nikki at the Dallas center, testified 
that her death resulted from a “very forceful act,” but could not determine whether she 
had been sexually abused.940  
In addition to the medical witnesses, the prosecution called Teddie Cox, who 
testified that while Roberson was in the Anderson County Jail she had asked him if he 
killed Nikki and he said that he might have “snapped,” but had no memory of it.941 Cox, 
her ten-year-old daughter, Rachel Cox, and eleven-year-old niece, Courtney Berryhill, all 
testified that they had seen Roberson shake and spank Nikki.942 The defense called Cox’s 
sister, Patricia Conklin, who testified the Roberson had a loving relationship with Nikki 
and that Cox had a poor reputation for truthfulness.943  
At the close of the evidence, the prosecution dismissed the sexual assault charges 
for lack of evidence and the defense moved to dismiss the indictment, but Judge Bentley 
denied the motion.944  On February 11, the jury found Roberson guilty of what had 
become a shaken-baby case and, after a hearing on mitigation and aggravation three days 
later, found him eligible for a death sentence, which Judge Bentley imposed on February 
14.945 The conviction and death sentence were affirmed in June 2007 by the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals,946 which denied a petition for post-conviction relief in September 
2009.947 In September 2010, Roberson’s lawyers petitioned for a federal writ of habeas 
corpus,948 which was denied by the U.S. District Court in September 2014949 and by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in May 2015.950  
                                                 
934 Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 125–26. 
935 Id. at 126–27, 129; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, 4, 33, Roberson v. Thaler, 2:09-cv-00327-
JRG-RSP, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2010) (on file with authors).  
936 Roberson, 614 F. App’x at 127.  
937 Id. at 126–27.  
938 Id. at 126. 
939 Id. at 127. 
940 Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., No. 2:09cv327, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
139510, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2104). 
941 Id. at *10. 
942 Id. at *6–7. 
943 Id. at *10. 
944 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 935, at 45. 
945 Id. at 34.  
946 Roberson v. State, No. AP-74,671, 2002 WL 34217382, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. June 20, 2007). 
947 Ex parte Roberson, WR-63, 081-01 & WR-63, 081-02, 2009 WL 2959738, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 
16, 2009) (per curiam). 
948 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 935. 
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On June 8, 2016, thirteen days before Roberson’s scheduled execution, appellate 
counsel he recently had obtained—Benjamin B. Wolff and Gretchen S. Sween, of the 
Texas Office of Capital and Forensic Writs951—moved before the Court of Criminal 
Appeals for a stay based on new evidence incontrovertibly establishing that “[i]t is 
impossible to shake a toddler to death without causing serious neck injuries—and Nikki 
had none.”952 Roberson’s conviction, to quote the motion, had rested “on junk science 
and highly inflammatory sexual-abuse allegations that were false” and in the intervening 
years there had been “a sea change in the medical consensus” on shaken baby cases.953  
The motion cited statements by three forensic pathologists—Drs. Harry J. Bonnell, 
Janice J. Ophoven, and John Plunkett—and a biomechanical engineer—Ken L. Morrison, 
Ph.D.—who agreed that the theory the prosecution advanced at Roberson’s trial about 
how Nikki died was “unsupported by contemporary medicine or biomechanics.”954 The 
four experts advanced various possible causes of death consistent with Roberson’s 
innocence: Nikki could have died of undiagnosed meningitis from a middle ear infection, 
evidenced by the fact that two days before her death she had a 104.5-degree temperature 
when seen by a doctor; of a congenital condition, evidenced by the facts that her birth had 
been difficult and she suffered long-standing health issues; of a head injury she sustained 
before spending the night with her father; or of injuries sustained from a fall of as little as 
two feet.955 
On June 16, when Roberson had five days to live, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
granted the stay and remanded the case to the trial court to resolve his claims that he had 
been convicted on scientifically invalid testimony, that his right to a fair trial had been 
violated by false forensic testimony, and that he was innocent of capital murder.956 More 
than two and a half years later, in early 2019, the case remained under review in 




                                                                                                                                                 
949 Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice-Corr. Insts. Div., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137986, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2014) (adopting recommendation of U.S. Magistrate, Roberson v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of 
Crim. Justice-Corr. Inst. Div., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139510, at *169). 
950 Roberson v. Stephens, 614 F. App’x 124, 125, 136 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
951 Motion for Stay of Execution at *9, Ex parte Roberson, WR-63, 081-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8, 2016) 
(on file with authors) (filing occurred “as soon as practicable” by “recently obtained conflict-free federal 
habeas counsel”); see also OFF. OF CAP. & FORENSIC WRITS, http://www.ocfw.texas.gov/ (last visited Mar. 
21, 2019). 
952 Motion for Stay of Execution, supra note 951, at *5. 
953 Id. at *3. 
954 Id. at *2. 
955 Id. at *6–7. 
956 Ex parte Roberson, No. WR-63, 081-03, 2016 WL 3543332, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 2016). 
957 Death Row Information: Robert Leslie Roberson III, supra note 925. For a discussion of the case and 
shaken-baby syndrome, see Jolie McCullough, Will a Texas Law that Overturns Convictions Based on Bad 
Science Save This Death Row Inmate?, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/16/robert-roberson-death-penalty-junk-science-review/. 
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CONCLUSION 
The standard of proof necessary to establish convicted defendants’ innocence to the 
legal system’s satisfaction is higher than the standard required to convict them in the first 
place—an issue of serious concern in capital cases, as the foregoing profiles show.  
Consider, for example, the case of Anibal Garcia Rousseau,958 who was convicted 
and sentenced to death in Texas for the murder and armed robbery of a federal agent—
even though three eyewitnesses testified that Rousseau was not the killer.959 Shortly after 
the conviction, which rested solely on the demonstrably inaccurate testimony of a 
surviving victim of the crime,960 evidence emerged establishing that the weapon with 
which the agent had been slain was used in a subsequent murder—a fact that, together 
with other evidence, left virtually no doubt that both murders had been committed by 
someone else.961 Rousseau nonetheless languished on death row for more than fifteen 
years, until he died while his innocence claim was still being litigated.962 
Criminal convictions require proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 963 
whatever that may mean in the eyes of beholders in jury boxes or judges at bench 
trials.964 It is higher than a “preponderance of the evidence,” the standard of proof in civil 
cases—a probability greater than fifty percent. How much higher is anyone’s guess, but 
in practice it has not been high enough to prevent the convictions of: 
•  Sonia Jacobs,965 who was sentenced to death in Florida for the murder of two 
police officers based primarily on the testimony of the probable actual killer, who was 
unquestionably a liar.966  
• Tyrone Lee Noling,967 who was sentenced to die for an Ohio double murder in 
which he became a suspect because he had stolen a pistol that was suspected of being the 
murder weapon—but in fact was not—and who was excluded as the source of myriad 
fingerprints and other evidence related to the crime.968  
• Darlie Lynn Routier,969 who was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for 
the murder of her five-year-old son based in part on her seemingly odd behavior in the 
aftermath of the murder—even though during the crime, which she testified had been 
committed by a knife-wielding home-invader, her carotid artery had been nearly fatally 
severed.970 
                                                 
958 Supra profile No. 12.  
959 Supra note 521 and accompanying text.  
960 Supra notes 519–20 and accompanying text. 
961 Supra notes 525–28 and accompanying text. 
962 Supra note 533 and accompanying text. 
963 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of 
every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt 
about his guilt.”). 
964 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of 
our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication.”). 
965 Supra profile No. 1. 
966 Supra notes 28–29, 39–40 and accompanying text.  
967 Supra profile No. 14. 
968 Supra notes 587, 594–95 and accompanying text.  
969 Supra profile No. 19.  
970 Supra notes 754–57 and accompanying text. 
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And what is the standard for establishing innocence after conviction? As a matter 
of law, appellate courts view the evidence in criminal cases in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution971—a sacrosanct principle in the extreme, as exemplified by the cases of: 
• Dennis Harold Lawley,972 for whom a corroborated confession by the likely actual 
killer was insufficient and who died on California death row, his home for more than 
twenty-two years, while his case languished in litigation.973  
• Eddie Lee Howard, Jr.,974 for whom a DNA exclusion and disavowal of highly 
incriminating bite-mark testimony by a prosecution forensic witness was insufficient in 
Mississippi.975  
• Larry Ray Swearingen,976 for whom evidence that he had been in jail when the 
murder for which he was sentenced to death in Texas occurred was insufficient, or at 
least had been as of June 2019.977 
It has been suggested that the risk of erroneous convictions in capital cases might 
be alleviated by raising the standard of proof at trial to something higher than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 978  Whatever the merits of changing the nomenclature—whether it 
curtailed erroneous convictions in capital cases,979 merely reinforced the illusion of jury 
accuracy already provided by the reasonable-doubt standard, 980  or did something in 
between—rejections of proposals to raise the standard to “beyond any doubt” in New 
York,”981  “no doubt” in Massachusetts, 982  and “beyond all doubt” in Illinois 983  have 
                                                 
971 “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means ‘crediting every inference 
that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government.’ ” United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104 
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
972 Supra profile No. 13.  
973 Supra notes 554, 559, 570, 575, 578, 585 and accompanying text.  
974 Supra profile No. 16. 
975 Supra notes 669–71, 674–76 and accompanying text. 
976 Supra profile No. 22.  
977 Supra notes 875–77 and accompanying text. 
978 Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher 
Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2003) (“We propose 
that before the government may deprive a defendant of life, it must prove the defendant's guilt by a 
standard more rigorous than beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
979 Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 74 (2005) (Since 
“certainty is impossible,” proponents of no-doubt standards “seem to be asking that no defendant ever be 
sentenced to death.”). 
980 Id. at 66 (“[R]easonable doubt, by appearing to require a great deal of certainty, may ensure that society 
as a whole accepts guilty verdicts, regardless of whether jurors require such certainty in actuality.”). 
981 William Glaberson, Killer’s Lawyers Seek to Raise Standard of Proof for Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 11, 2014, at 27 (“[T]he state’s Capital Defender Office argues for the first time that . . . [the Court of 
Criminal Appeals] should require prosecutors to prove a defendant’s guilt ‘beyond any doubt’ to justify an 
execution.”). The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument in People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053, 
1068 n.15 (2004) (“Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the reasonable doubt charge here conveyed the 
proper standard.”). Following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam), New York 
did not reinstate the death penalty until 1995. Malcolm Gladwell, After 18 Years, N.Y. Death Penalty 
Revived, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at A15. In 2004, without any executions having occurred under the 
law, the Court of Appeals voided the law by vacating a death sentence on the ground that a defective jury-
deadlock instruction had been given in the case—a defect that could be cured only by “a new deadlock 
instruction from the Legislature.” People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). Ensuing 
attempts to reinstate the death penalty failed. Rebecca Baker Erwin, Lawmakers Reject Death Penalty Bill, 
Vol. 14:3]                                                                                Rob Warden and John Seasly 
459 
rendered the prospect of such change sufficiently remote that, at least for the time being, 
it scarcely seems worth considering.  
There is, however, a change that is more realistically possible and likely to have 
greater impact—ending the “death-qualification” of juries for the guilt-innocence phase 
of capital trials. Until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Witherspoon v. Illinois984 in 1968, 
prospective jurors who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against the death 
penalty could be categorically excluded by judges for cause from capital cases. 985 
Witherspoon held that such a sweeping exclusion resulted in “a tribunal organized to 
return a death verdict,”986 but condoned the time-honored exclusion of prospective jurors 
who said that they would not impose a death sentence, regardless of the evidence.987  
Death-qualification, thus, has remained part of the jury-selection process in capital 
cases.988 The problem is that, while prospective jurors’ unwillingness to impose death 
                                                                                                                                                 
JOURNAL-NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Apr. 13, 2005, at 18. In 2007, the Court of Appeals voided 
another death sentence on constitutional grounds. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 971, 984 (2007). In 
2008, Governor David Peterson ordered the state’s death cell dismantled. Brendan Scott, Gov. Pulls Switch 
on Death Cell, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2008), https://nypost.com/2008/07/24/gov-pulls-switch-on-death-cell/.  
982 JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN ET AL., REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 22 (2004), 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/mr/5-3-04governorsreportcapitalpunishment.pdf 
[hereinafter Mass. Rpt.] (“[T]he jury should be required [as a prerequisite to a death sentence] to find that 
there is ‘no doubt’ about the defendant’s guilt of capital murder.”). The report was central to an effort by 
Governor Mitt Romney to reinstate the death penalty. Laura Mansnerus, States Seek Ways to Make 
Executions Error Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at WK5. Romney’s effort was rejected by legislators. 
AP, Bill to Restore Death Penalty Fails in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16. 
983 Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner, in an amendatory veto of a gun-control measure, called for 
reinstatement of the death penalty for mass murderers and killers of law-enforcement officers. Letter from 
Gov. Bruce Rauner to members of the Illinois legislature ¶ 8 (May 14, 2018) (stating that “the only morally 
justifiable standard of proof in a death penalty case is ‘beyond all doubt’ ”), 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=10000HB1468gms&GA=100&LegID=101958&Se
ssionId=91&SpecSess=0&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=1468&GAID=14&Session. The Illinois death 
penalty was abolished in 2011. See Rob Warden, How and Why Illinois Abolished the Death Penalty, 30 
LAW & INEQ. 245 (2012). 
984 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
985 The Illinois statute challenged in Witherspoon provided as follows: “In trials for murder it shall be a 
cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples 
against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.” Id. at 512 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 
743 (1959)). “Cause challenges” are unlimited in quantity and must be based on specified legal grounds, as 
opposed to “peremptory challenges,” which are limited in number, but which attorneys, at the time of 
Witherspoon, could exercise for any reason. See Craig Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing 
the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512, 516 (1980). Eighteen years after Witherspoon, the 
Supreme Court forbade the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors to exclude jurors of the same race 
as the defendant based solely on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).  
986 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 540–41. 
987 Id. at 522 n.21 (holding that exclusion of jurors is proper only if “their attitude toward the death penalty 
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt”).  
988 Haney, supra note 985, at 515. In 1985, the Supreme Court took the “opportunity to clarify” 
Witherspoon, holding that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when the juror’s views would 
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 
(1980)). In reality, the decision clarified nothing—leaving in place what one student of the law aptly 
branded “a process riddled with ambiguity.” James M. Carr, At Witt’s End: The Continuing Quandary of 
Jury Selection in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REV. 427, 429 (1987). 
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sentences is irrelevant to their ability to fairly decide whether to convict or acquit, there is 
a strong correlation between attitudes about the death penalty and perceptions about 
defendants’ guilt or innocence.989 Studies repeatedly have shown that death-qualified 
jurors are substantially more likely to convict than are jurors excludable under 
Witherspoon.990 In addition to the inclination to convict stemming from attitudes held 
going into the jury-qualification process, the process itself is prejudicial, inevitably 
creating an impression that the major players in the courtroom, including the judge and 
defense counsel, believe the defendant is guilty.991 
Since juries prescribe the punishment in capital cases, jurors who would not under 
any circumstances impose a death sentence of course must be excluded from the penalty 
phase of the trial, but they do not have to be excluded from the guilt-determination phase. 
The solution is to have two juries—one for the guilt-innocence phase that is not death-
qualified, and one for the penalty phase that is death-qualified. Proponents of the death 
penalty can be counted upon to object to the costs associated with impaneling two juries. 
In the scheme of things, however, the cost would be inconsequential.  
In 2018, death sentences were imposed in forty-two state and federal cases.992 The 
data are sketchy on the numbers of trials in which juries impose death sentences 
following capital sentencing hearings,993 but even if only one in three capital trials ends 
in a death sentence, there would have been fewer than 150 capital sentencing hearings in 
2018. Nationally, there are more than 150,000 jury trials annually.994 If a second jury 
were impaneled in each of 150 capital cases, the increase in the number of juries would 
be less than one-tenth of one percent—which would not break the criminal-adjudication 
bank. 
                                                 
989 Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on 
Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 55–59 
(1984) (summarizing studies concluding that death qualification results in juries more likely to convict than 
juries that are not death-qualified); Haney, supra note 985, at 520, 525–26. 
990 HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968); Edward 
Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: A Study of 
Colorado Veniremen, 42 COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process 
vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); George L. 
Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 567 (1971); Welsh S. White, Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qualified 
Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176 (1973). 
991 Haney, supra note 985, at 523. 
992 Death Sentences in 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2018-sentencing 
(last visited May 22, 2018).  
993 DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 233 (1990) (reporting that, in post-
Furman cases, juries imposed death sentences in 25% of Delaware cases, 36% of Colorado and New Jersey 
cases, 42% of Maryland cases, 49% of Louisiana cases, 48% of California cases, 50% of North Carolina 
cases, and 60% of Mississippi cases); Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) 
Death Penalty, 105 GEO L.J. 661, 664 (2017) (reporting the author’s finding that a life sentence was 
imposed in eleven of twenty-one Virginia cases—52%—in which there were capital-sentencing hearings 
from 2005 through 2015). 
994 HON. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF 
JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS 7 (2007), http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx (reporting that, from 2002 
through 2006, on average there were an estimated 148,558 state and 5,940 federal jury trials). 
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A related situation that veritably demands action is racial discrimination in jury 
selection—an historic wrong that could be remedied most easily by eliminating 
peremptory challenges.995 Abuse of the jury-selection system in a racially discriminatory 
manner is legion. 996  One example of how peremptory challenges are implicated in 
dubious convictions is the Missouri case of Marcellus S. Williams, 997  an African 
American at whose capital trial for the murder of a white woman the prosecution 
exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate six qualified African Americans from the 
jury.998 There is a strong and growing consensus among judges and legal scholars that the 
jury-selection process should be overhauled.999 Reform, in our view, is long overdue.  
                                                 
995 Justice Thurgood Marshall believed that eliminating peremptory challenges was the only way to end 
“the repugnancy” of racial discrimination in jury selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
996 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 456–47 (1996) (surveying reported decisions 1,101 Batson 
claims by criminal defendants between April 30, 1986 and April 30, 1993). 
997 Supra profile No. 21.  
998 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 818, at 4. A more egregious example is the case of 
Curtis Giovanni Flowers, an African American gospel singer with no criminal record who is on death row 
in Mississippi for a quadruple murder for which he has been tried six times. David Leonhardt, The 
Mississippi Man Tried Six Times for the Same Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2018, at A22; Nathalie 
Baptiste, Prosecutors Are Using Jailhouse Snitches to Send Innocent People to Death Row, MOTHER 
JONES, (July 9, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/07/prosecutors-are-using-
jailhouse-snitches-to-send-innocent-people-to-death-row/ (last visited May 23, 2019) Curtis appears to 
have been the repeated victim of racial discrimination in jury selection, having been sentenced to death 
following four of his six trials at which the prosecutor, Montgomery County District Attorney Doug Evans, 
exercised peremptory challenges to eliminate most qualified black jurors. Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 95, 110, Flowers v. State, No. 200300071-CR (Montgomery Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 17, 2016) (on file 
with authors). The first three convictions were reversed based on prosecutorial misconduct. Flowers v. 
State, 947 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 2007); Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 535 (Miss. 2003); Flowers v. State, 
773 So. 2d 309, 312–13 (Miss. 2000). Curtis’s other two trials ended in hung juries—the second in 2007 
when seven white jurors voted to convict and five black jurors voted to acquit. Brief of Amici Curiae, The 
Magnolia Bar Association, The Mississippi Center For Justice, and Innocence Project New Orleans at 21. 
Flowers v. State, No l 7-9572 (U.S. July 26, 2018) (on file with authors). Flowers’s fourth conviction, after 
his sixth trial, was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1075–76 
(Miss. 2014), but remanded by U.S. Supreme Court for consideration of possible racial discrimination in 
jury selection, Flowers v. Mississippi, 136 S. Ct. 2157 (2016), and reaffirmed by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082, 1106 (Miss. 2017). On November 2, 2018, the U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed to review the case. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018). The case was argued on 
March 20, 2019. Richard Wolf, Justices Ponder Racism in Miss. Case, CLARION LEDGER (Jackson), Mar. 
21, 2019, at A4. A decision is awaited.  
999 See José Felipé Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New 
World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 349 (1998) (“There is a cruel irony in the jury system 
that the very element of public consensus that gives it its democratic character may, in the same breath, 
lead to controversial and unjust verdicts that many of us abhor.”); Mark W. Bennett, 
Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010) 
(“[P]resent methods of addressing bias in the legal system—particularly in jury selection—which are 
directed primarily at explicit bias, may only worsen implicit bias.”); Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, 
A Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 507, 508 (1997) (“[I]t is now evident that trial attorneys primarily use peremptory challenges to 
‘stack the deck’ and seat a favorable, rather than impartial, jury.”); Morris B. Hoffman, 
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It also seems reasonable that, since appellate courts view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, trial juries ought to be instructed to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the accused. Presently juries in criminal cases are instructed 
that defendants are entitled to a presumption of innocence and that guilt must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.1000 We are not suggesting changing the standard of proof, but 
rather merely that the standard be expressed differently. What does the presumption of 
innocence mean—if not that the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant? We are confident that the language we propose would result in fewer 
erroneous convictions if the instruction were given at least three times—during the jury-
qualification process, before opening statements, and before the jury retires at the close of 
evidence. 
Regarding evidentiary issues, in our view, no conviction should stand when it 
probably would not have occurred absent the testimony of a witness who is a proven 
liar—as a recanting witness is by definition, except under the rarest of circumstances.1001 
A case in point is that of Sonia Jacobs, whose conviction and death sentence rested 
heavily on the testimony of Walter Norman Rhodes, Jr., who recanted his trial testimony 
and then recanted his recantation.1002 All fifty states and the federal government permit 
perjury convictions solely on proof that materially conflicting statements were made 
under oath—without regard to which may be true or false.1003 The same standard should 
entitle a convicted person to relief upon showing that the sole witness on whose 
testimony the conviction rested is a liar—which a recantation definitively establishes. Yet 
judges reviewing cases in which prosecution witnesses have recanted often presume that 
recantations are inherently unreliable1004—as evidenced by the fact that recantations in 
eleven of the twenty-four cases profiled above have proved insufficient to secure 
relief.1005  
An even better idea than endeavoring to persuade judges to take recantations 
seriously would be to keep the sort of testimony that winds up being recanted out of trials 
                                                                                                                                                 
Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 
(1997) (“After experiencing peremptory challenges firsthand for six years as a trial judge in a state court of 
general jurisdiction, I now add my small voice to the chorus calling for abolition.”); Tania Tetlow, Solving 
Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1992 (2015) (“Peremptory challenges function not as an 
individualized attempt to determine impartiality but rather as an adversarial process that makes use of each 
side’s self-interest.”). 
1000 California Pattern Jury Instruction No. 103 says, for example, “A defendant in a criminal case is 
presumed to be innocent.” CAL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 103 (JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. 2019). This 
presumption requires the state to prove a defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
1001 A recantation can be a retraction of a mistake. For example, Jacques Rivera was exonerated in 2011 of 
a murder for which he had been in prison in Illinois for twenty-two years, after the only witness who linked 
him to the crime—a twelve-year-old boy—recanted, saying that, after identifying Rivera, he had seen the 
killer on the street and realized that he had made a mistake. Ruling of Hon. Neera Walsh at 7, People v. 
Rivera, 88 CR 15436 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty. Sept. 12, 2011) (on file with authors). 
1002 Supra profile No. 1. 
1003 Survey of Perjury Statutes by Rob Warden (2015) (on file with authors). 
1004 Warden, supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
1005 The cases, in addition to that of Sonia Jacobs, are those of Edward Lee Elmore (supra profile No. 4), 
John George Spirko Jr. (No. 5), Kevin Cooper (No. 6), Jarvis Jay Masters (No. 8), Ha’im Al Matin Sharif 
(No. 10), Dennis Harold Lawley (No. 13), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14), David Ronald Chandler (No. 15), 
Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22), and Kimber Edwards (No. 23). 
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in the first place. Jailhouse informant testimony has proved so notoriously false in cases 
in which defendants have been exonerated1006 that a categorical ban on such testimony—
which contributed to convictions in ten of our profiled cases1007—seems justified.  
Another useful reform would be to allow defendants, at their discretion, to 
introduce polygraph results at their trials.1008 The fact that the defendant agrees to take 
the test is in itself probative of innocence. Reliability of the test is beside the point.1009 
Jurors who convicted Tyrone Lee Noling1010 might have acquitted him had they known 
that he had agreed to take and passed a polygraph test. 1011  The convictions of 
Damien Wayne Echols1012 and his co-defendants might have been avoided if their juries 
had known that Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr. had taken and passed a polygraph.1013 Sonia 
Jacobs1014 might not have been convicted if the judge in her case had not suppressed a 
polygraph examiner’s exculpatory memo.1015 
To gain prompt release and avoid retrials, Jacobs and defendants in three of the 
other profiled cases—Edward Lee Elmore,1016 Ha’im Al Matin Sharif,1017 and Damien 
Wayne Echols1018—entered what amounted to coerced pleas under North Carolina v. 
Alford.1019 In addition, Corey Dewayne Williams agreed to plead guilty in exchange for 
                                                 
1006 Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA 
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 40, 51 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) 
(reporting that 74 convictions, or 22% of 330 convictions in cases in which defendants were exonerated by 
DNA evidence, rested in part on jailhouse-informant testimony). 
1007 See supra profiles Sonia Jacobs (No. 1), Jonathan Bruce Reed (No. 2), Edward Lee Elmore (No. 4), 
John George Spirko Jr. (No. 5), Kevin Cooper (No. 6), Jarvis Jay Masters (No. 8), Ha’im Al Matin Sharif 
(No. 10), Walter Ogrod (No. 11), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14), and Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22). 
1008 A forerunner of the modern polygraph was deemed inadmissible nearly a century ago. Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that a systolic blood pressure deception test had not 
gained “standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities”), 
superseded by FED. R. EVID. 702, as stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
In the years since, polygraphs have been banned under the Frye standard. See James R. McCall, 
Misconceptions and Reevaluation—Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363, 364 (1996) (“American courts have invariably followed Frye . . . on the question of 
admitting polygraph results in[to] evidence.”). 
1009 The National Academy of Sciences has noted that, “One role of the polygraph test is to help elicit 
admissions from people who believe, or are influenced to believe, that it will accurately detect any 
deception they may attempt. . . . The polygraph test has a useful role independently of whether it can 
accurately detect deception.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’S ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE 
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 22 (2003). 
1010 Supra profile No. 14. 
1011 See supra note 593 and accompanying text.  
1012 Supra profile No. 17. 
1013 Supra note 691 and accompanying text.  
1014 Supra profile No. 1.  
1015 Supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
1016 Supra profile No. 4.  
1017 Supra profile No. 10. 
1018 Supra profile No. 17.  
1019 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970). For a discussion of the coercive effect of plea 
negotiations for defendants in custody, see David M. Reutter, Alford Pleas: Prosecutors’ Choice for the 
Wrongfully Convicted, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), 
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immediate release while a petition for certiorari in his case was pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.1020 Prosecutors’ willingness to offer and accept such pleas is a tacit 
acknowledgement that the defendants pose no danger to society. The defendants, thus, 
ought to be released on personal recognizance while considering the offer—a situation 
that would remain coercive, but not to the extent that it is for persons in custody. Another 
way to alleviate the problem would be to establish civil procedures under which persons 
who enter pleas to gain prompt release could pursue certificates of innocence, restoring 
their legal innocence and entitling them to pursue compensation for wrongful 
imprisonment.1021  
Dubious confessions were involved in five of the profiled cases—those of co-
defendants Thomas Jesse Ward and Karl Allen Fontenot,1022 Walter Ogrod,1023 Damien 
Wayne Echols,1024 Corey Dewayne Williams,1025 and Kimber Edwards.1026 In the case of 
Eddie Lee Howard, Jr., a police officer testified that during interrogation Howard had 
stated, “I had a temper and that’s why this happened.”1027 In recent years, electronic 
recording of custodial interrogations, a safeguard against police misconduct during 
interrogations, has been implemented in about half of the states,1028 but the common, 
counterintuitive phenomenon of false confessions persists.1029  
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2017/nov/16/alford-pleas-prosecutors-choice-wrongfully-
convicted/. 
1020 Supra profile No. 20. 
1021 Illinois, Kansas, and the District of Columbia have civil procedures under which exonerated persons 
may obtain certificates of innocence but, to qualify, an applicant’s conviction must have been vacated and 
charges must have been dismissed. D.C. CODE § 2-421 (2017); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018). The laws would have to be amended in order for persons who enter Alford 
pleas to avail themselves to the procedures.  
1022 Supra profile No. 7.  
1023 Supra profile No. 11. 
1024 Supra profile No. 17. 
1025 Supra profile No. 20. 
1026 Supra profile No. 23. 
1027 Supra profile No. 16. 
1028 In 2000, when the Kimber Edwards case (the last of the profiled cases involving a confession) arose, 
electronic recording was required only in Alaska and Minnesota—by court order. THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, 
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 7–8 (2019), 
https://www.nacdl.org/electronicrecordingproject. Fourteen states (California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Vermont) and the District of Columbia now require electronic recording by law. Id. Court orders similar to 
those that have required electronic recording in Alaska since 1985 and in Minnesota since 1994 now 
require electronic recording in five additional states (Arkansas, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Utah). 
Id. Recording of custodial interrogations is not required in Pennsylvania, but Philadelphia police now 
record them voluntarily in murder cases. Id. at 121.  
1029 Electronic recording has not prevented false confessions in a number of cases, including those of 
(jurisdiction and crime date in parenthesis) Robert Armstrong (Ariz., 2003), David Alexander Bostick (Fla., 
2008), Travis DuBois Sr. (N.D., 2011), Matthew Livers (Neb., 2006), Lorenzo Montoya (Colo., 2000), 
Travis Rowley (N.M., 2007), James Cox, (Mo. 2007), and Michael Clemens (Ind., 2015). Email from 
Richard A. Leo, professor of law and psychology, Univ. of S.F., to Rob Warden (Mar. 27, 2019 11:02 
CDT) (on file with authors). 
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The underlying problem is that the standard for admission of confessions into 
evidence at trial is their voluntariness—not their reliability.1030 On the latter score, the 
confessions in our chronicled cases leave much to be desired. In the Ward-Fontenot case, 
the authorities construed descriptions of dreams as confessions, even though the 
purported facts in the dreams were significantly at odds with the facts of the crime.1031 
Intellectual limitations known to render suspects vulnerable to psychological 
interrogation techniques1032 were manifested in three of the cases—those of Ogrod, who 
suffered from learning disabilities, 1033  Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr., who was only 
seventeen and had an IQ of seventy-two when he made the confession that landed Echols 
on death row,1034 and Williams, who was only sixteen and had an IQ of sixty-eight when 
he was interrogated.1035 The officer who attributed an incriminating remark to Howard 
had made no contemporaneous note of the alleged admission.1036 
In medicine, before invasive procedures can be performed, except in emergencies, 
“informed consent” is required. 1037  If that standard were required in advance of 
interrogations, few suspects would waive their right to remain silent under Miranda v. 
Arizona. 1038  The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry has 
                                                 
1030 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (holding that a trial judge’s attention should focus on 
whether interrogators’ behavior “was such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring 
about confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of 
whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth”). 
1031 Supra notes 301–06 and accompanying text. 
1032 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 261 (2003) (stating 
that mentally handicapped persons “are considered to be ‘vulnerable’ suspects” and quoting the UK Police 
& Criminal Justice Act 77-78 (1984): “[M]entally handicapped people [may be] . . . particularly prone in 
certain circumstances to provide information which is . . . self-incriminating.”); Christine S. Scott-
Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Policy Interrogation, 53 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. (2007), at 54, 57-58 (citing cases that, “along with research demonstrating the 
vulnerability of young people to suggestive and deceptive interrogation techniques, suggest that juvenile 
false confessions is a serious problem.”) Since 1974, more than 500,000 U.S. police officers have been 
trained in psychological interrogation techniques. John E. Reid & Associates Training Programs, 
http://www.reid.com/training_programs/r_training.html (last visited May 23, 2019). 
1033 Supra notes 440–44 and accompanying text. 
1034 Supra notes 690–91 and accompanying text. In the United States, interrogators are allowed to lie to 
suspects. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495–96 (1977) (holding that interrogator’s lie that 
petitioner’s fingerprints had been found at the crime scene was insufficient to render his confession 
inadmissible); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (holding petitioner’s confession voluntary 
even though he had been falsely told during interrogation that a co-suspect had confessed). The practice has 
been banned in the United Kingdom. CHRISTIAN A. MEISSNER ET AL., CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 
INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION METHODS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 11–12 
(2012) 
https://campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/Meissner_Interview_Interrogation_Review.pdf. 
1035 Supra note 782 and accompanying text. 
1036 Supra note 651 and accompanying text. 
1037 Informed Consent: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited May 23, 2019). 
1038 384 U.S. 436 (1996). 
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recommended that juvenile suspects have attorneys present during interrogation. 1039 
Establishing that as a right for all suspects, regardless of age, would guarantee that 
statements made during interrogation were genuinely voluntary.  
Ten of our profiled cases involved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct1040—a 
scandal of significant proportions that has gone largely unaddressed by the courts.1041 
Various remedies have been suggested, including encouraging judges to comply with 
existing requirements to report prosecutorial misconduct to disciplinary authorities and 
requiring prosecutors to implement open-file policies to make exculpatory materials 
accessible to trial counsel. 1042  Perhaps a more effective remedy would be to avail 
prosecutors to civil liability for civil rights deprivations under the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, which provides that, with the exception of judicial officers acting in their official 
capacities, “[e]very person” who acts under color of law to deprive another of a 
constitutional right “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress.”1043 Despite that inclusive language, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has exempted prosecutors on the theory that the disciplinary process is 
sufficient to address the problem. 1044  Experience strongly suggests otherwise, and it 
seems long past time to hold prosecutors civilly accountable for their misdeeds.  
 This brings us to one of the criminal justice system’s dirtiest little open secrets, 
which is that juries, as the late Jerome Frank, a renowned legal philosopher and judge of 
                                                 
1039 Interviewing and Interrogating Juvenile Suspects, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 
(Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://www.aacap.org/aacap/Policy_Statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.a
spx (last visited May 23, 2019). 
1040 Those of Sonia Jacobs (profile No. 1) (suppressing polygraph examiner’s memo undermining trial 
testimony of key witness, supra note 34 and accompanying text), Jonathan Bruce Reed (No. 2) (telling jury 
that jailhouse informant’s testimony that Reed, in describing the crime, had stated that the victim had a 
tampon in place, although in fact the tampon had been inserted at the hospital after the attack, and failing to 
disclose the informant’s plea agreement, supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text), John George Spirko 
(No. 5.) (failing to disclose evidence that alleged co-perpetrator had been in Kentucky when the crime 
occurred in Ohio, supra notes 198–202, 211–12 and accompanying text), Kevin Cooper (No. 6) (belated 
disclosure during trial of exculpatory witness interviews, supra notes 257–62 and accompanying text), 
Walter Ogrod (No. 11) (failing to disclose that two informants had been promised leniency in exchange for 
their testimony, supra notes 495–96 and accompanying text), Dennis Harold Lawley (No. 13) (withholding 
exculpatory evidence, supra note 569 and accompanying text), Tyrone Lee Noling (No. 14) (allegedly 
coercing witnesses to testify falsely, supra note 608 and accompanying text), David Ronald Chandler (No. 
15) (threatening witness with electric chair unless he falsely implicated defendant, supra note 630 and 
accompanying text), Corey Dewayne Williams (No. 20) (suppressing exculpatory recordings of witness 
interviews, supra notes 802–04 and accompanying text), and Larry Ray Swearingen (No. 22) (failing to 
disclose statements of victim’s co-workers that she had received threatening telephone calls that the 
defendant could not have made, supra note 879 and accompanying text). 
1041 For an account of the extent of the problem and the failure to address it, see Thomas P. Sullivan & 
Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals For Reform, 
105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015).  
1042 Id. at 904–39 (providing a thorough discussion of possible reforms). 
1043 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
1044 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials 
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an 
association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the 
only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.”). 
Vol. 14:3]                                                                                Rob Warden and John Seasly 
467 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, observed eighty-one years ago, are 
“hopelessly incompetent as fact-finders”1045—an inconvenient truth borne out in the 
DNA forensic age.1046 As long as we have juries, surely we ought not entrust them with 
life-and-death decisions. Nor, of course, should we relegate such decisions to judges like 
“Maximum Dan” Futch.1047 That leaves but one option—abolishing capital punishment. 
 
                                                 
1045 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 179–80 (1930).  
1046 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER 
TRIAL (1996) (documenting twenty-eight cases in which convicted persons were exonerated by DNA 
testing). 
1047 Supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
